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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: MAPPING THE FORGIVENESS TERRITORY 
Forgiveness has a history. As far back as the biblical record, authors have depicted 
forgiveness as a way to repair relationships and heal communities. In Christian accounts 
forgiveness serves as an antidote to revenge, a mechanism for staying in right relationship 
to God, and a way to hold communities together. In the modern age, it becomes the 
psychological power of the individual to supersede negative emotions in the aftermath of 
violence. Celebrated by therapists and talk-show hosts, forgiveness emerges as both a 
sparkling moral ideal and the amazing accomplishment of magnanimous victims. So 
miraculous, onlookers whisper. So Christ-like! 
The particular story of forgiveness told in these pages claims less expansive 
beginnings. As a young woman, I was nearly killed by an intruder who broke into my 
home early one Sunday morning. The attacker was never caught. When I woke from a 
coma, the difficult work of recovering from my injuries spread out before me. In the 
hospital, I listened to well-meaning visitors issue a series of religious platitudes: This is 
all part of God’s plan. The Lord works in mysterious ways. God saved you for a reason. 
I collected these words in lieu of responding to them. I just listened and blinked my 
eyes, which for weeks remained bright red with hemorrhage.  
You will never be fully healed until you forgive the man who did this. 
I added this one to my mental list. I lingered on the words: until you forgive. 
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The God invoked in those bedside platitudes seemed overwhelming and abusive. Part 
of God’s plan? Saved for a reason? Saved at all, and by the same God who watched it all 
unfold until that last moment of saving?  
And by implication, this was also a God who would watch to see if I forgave my 
attacker and then judge me by my act of charity toward the stranger who nearly beat me 
to death. If I believed in God as I lay in that hospital bed for all those weeks, it was not 
this God.  
You will never be fully healed until you forgive the man who did this. 
I knew with everything in me that this was wrong. 
 
This dissertation seeks to examine and provide alternatives to Christian forgiveness 
imperatives that are presented to victims of wrong doing in general and violence in 
particular. Advocates of forgiveness often promote it as a religious and moral obligation 
and cite the New Testament as support. Three texts appear frequently in arguments for 
forgiveness: Jesus’ “seventy times seven” instructions (Mt. 18:21-22; Lk. 17:3-4), in 
which Jesus instructs his disciples to forgive boundlessly (“seventy times seven times” in 
Matthew [18:21], and “seven times seven times” in Luke [17:4]); the Lord’s Prayer (Mt. 
6:9-13; Lk. 11:1-4), in which God’s forgiveness is intertwined with human willingness to 
forgive, and Jesus’ cry from the cross, “Father, forgive them” (Lk. 23:34a). Close 
readings of these texts, however, open to interpretations other than the simplistic, “you 
must forgive.” 
Advocates of forgiveness conflate certain biblical understandings, such as that 
forgiveness is an absolute requirement, with contemporary, psychological notions of the 
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term, like forgiveness as unconditional and unilateral. This sometimes reflects over-
interpretation of the biblical material; while Jesus’ instructions often appear absolute, 
closer readings suggest that his account of forgiveness contains ambiguities and 
conditions. Forgiveness in the teachings of Jesus appears to be closely tied to 
reconciliation (i.e., restoring relationships), is used as a means of strengthening the 
nascent Christian community, and requires repentance from the offender. In 
contemporary contexts, though, a different vision of forgiveness emerges, one that is 
focused primarily on the individual victim and defined as an emotional or psychological 
change that is unilateral (involving only the person forgiving) and unconditional 
(requiring nothing from the offender, esp. repentance). The danger arises when this idea 
of forgiveness is read back into the biblical instructions, and unilateral, unconditional 
forgiveness is presented to victims as a moral imperative. As David Konstan observes, 
“Forgiveness, in the modern acceptation of the word, did not exist in classical antiquity or 
in the early Judeo-Christian tradition…The modern conception, which involves a moral 
transformation in the offender and a corresponding change of heart in the forgiver, is of 
relatively recent vintage as a moral idea.”1  
When such conflation occurs, victims are sometimes pressured to forgive by pastors, 
psychologists, legal representatives, family members, or friends. Such pressure can be 
both physically and psychologically harmful.2 In her work on trauma and recovery, Judith 
                                                
1 David Konstan, Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 165-66. 
2 On the negative effects of pressuring victims to forgive, see Kerrie James, “The 
Interactional Process of Forgiveness and Responsibility: A Critical Assessment of the 
Family Therapy Literature,” in Carmel Flaskas, Imelda McCarthy, and Jim Sheehan 
(eds.), Hope and Despair in Narrative and Family Therapy: Adversity, Forgiveness, and 
Reconciliation (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 127-38 (135-36); Sharon Lamb, 
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Lewis Herman describes the “cruel torture” of forgiveness that appears to be out of reach 
to most victims.3 In some cases, victims succumb to pressure, forgive unrepentant 
offenders (who are potentially still dangerous), and make themselves vulnerable to future 
injury.4  
I explore the problem of pressuring victims to forgive across three contexts. First, I 
examine the growing restorative justice movement that views responding to crime as a 
question of restoring relationships among the victim, the offender, and the community 
rather than—or sometimes in addition to—punishing offenders. In the process, 
forgiveness becomes a catchword for “healing” and victims are pressed, both explicitly 
and tacitly, to forgive offenders and repair the broken relationship, even when the 
offender was a stranger and no relationship preceded the crime. Restorative justice 
                                                
“Women, Abuse, and Forgiveness: A Special Case,” in eadem and Jeffrie G. Murphy 
(eds.), Before Forgiving: Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in Psychotherapy (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 155-71 (esp. 156-61); Benjamin E. 
Sanders and Mary B. Meinig, “Immediate Issues Affecting Long-term Family Resolution 
in Cases of Parent-Child Sexual Abuse,” in Robert M. Reece (ed.), Treatment of Child 
Abuse: Common Ground for Mental Health, Medical, and Legal Practitioners 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 36-53 (46); Kathryn 
Norlock, Forgiveness from a Feminist Perspective (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2009), p. 28. 
3 Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From 
Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 190. 
4 Carol J. Adams, Woman-Battering (Creative Pastoral Care and Counseling Series; 
Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1994), p. 49; James Leehan, Pastoral Care for 
Survivors of Family Abuse (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), p. 104; 
James Newton Poling, “Preaching to Perpetrators of Violence,” in John S. McClure and 
Nancy J. Ramsay (eds.), Telling the Truth: Preaching about Sexual and Domestic 
Violence (Cleveland, OH: United Church Press, 1998), pp. 71-82 (80). On the dangers of 
premature forgiveness, see Margaret R. Holmgren, Forgiveness and Retribution: 
Responding to Wrongdoing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 53, 63-
64. On forgiveness as a lack of self-respect, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Forgiveness and 
Resentment,” in idem and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge Studies in 
Philosophy and Law; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 14-34 
(18). 
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advocates frequently combine biblical instructions and contemporary psychological 
notions in promoting a unilateral, unconditional version of forgiveness. Furthermore, they 
present forgiveness as the good half of a dichotomy in which being consumed by 
negative emotions such as anger, resentment, indignation, and rage is the only alternative. 
Second, I consider forgiveness in the context of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission; I focus specifically on the writings and speeches of 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Here again, victims of apartheid and anti-apartheid violence 
are presented with a unilateral, unconditional task of forgiveness that claims its warrant 
from New Testament teachings. Because of the public nature of the Human Rights 
Violations Committee hearings, the celebrity of Desmond Tutu, and the religious ideas he 
imported into the process, the rhetoric of forgiveness was publicly known. Victims were 
under enormous pressure to forgive and reconcile with former combatants for the sake of 
the “New South Africa.” The TRC Commission and Bishop Tutu presented anger and 
resentment as forgiveness’s “demonic other,”5 and gave victims no choice but to forgive 
if they wanted to claim a place in the new, reconciled state. 
Finally, I look at language of forgiveness in the pastoral care of victims of domestic 
violence. Again, some pastoral care practitioners predicate their contemporary notions of 
unilateral and unconditional forgiveness on biblical texts; the result is a religious 
imperative to forgive even when the offender is unrepentant or still a threat to the victim. 
As in the first two cases, a dichotomy emerges in the pastoral care literature that positions 
forgiveness against corrosive negative emotions. Victims must forgive regardless of the 
                                                
5 Thomas Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue: Jean Améry and the Refusal to Forgive 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2008), p. 29. 
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disposition of the offender in order to save themselves from being consumed by anger 
and to remain right with God.  
Alongside each of the three case studies, I consider a particular Gospel text that 
provides both the basis for the discussion in context as well as a lens for reconsidering 
forgiveness in that setting. I examine forgiveness in the restorative justice movement 
alongside Jesus’ seventy-times-seven instructions (Mt. 18:21-22; Lk. 17:3-4) in order to 
demonstrate that the biblical material contains a call for offender repentance (Lk. 17:4 
and Mt. 18:15-17) that would serve victims well in this alternative justice process. The 
Lord’s Prayer (Mt. 6:9-13; Lk. 11:2-4) provides a way of thinking about forgiveness in 
post-apartheid South Africa, also by way of illuminating the role of repentance as seen in 
the plea for forgiveness, “forgive us our trespasses/sins/debts.” Finally, I consider Jesus’ 
cry from the cross, “Father, forgive them” (Lk. 23:34a), in the context of pastoral care for 
victims of domestic violence. Here I demonstrate how calls to imitate Christ through 
patient suffering or unconditional forgiveness misinterpret the biblical text. On the cross, 
Jesus prays for the forgiveness of his attackers and does not forgive them himself. This 
recognition provides an alternative path for faithful imitation. 
Jesus’ teachings on forgiveness 
Understandings of forgiveness have shifted from the biblical account to the present-
day emphasis on unconditional forgiveness requiring only the victim’s participation. First 
I show how forgiveness in the teachings of Jesus is active, relational, and conditional. 
Next I present the work of several key thinkers from the fields of philosophy, theology, 
and psychology who draw on the biblical material but demonstrate the shift towards more 
emotional, individual understandings of the concept.  
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A full summary of research and analysis of the three primary texts in this study 
appears in the chapters to follow. Here I present the major themes and implications of 
these texts as well as other mentions of forgiveness in the Gospel texts. Throughout this 
dissertation, I use the New Revised Standard Version of the Bible unless otherwise noted. 
The forgiveness material in the Gospels can be divided into four categories:  
1. Direct instructions to forgive, including Mt. 6:9-13 and Lk. 11:2-4 (the Lord’s 
Prayer); Mt. 6:14-15, Mk. 11:25, Lk. 6:37-38, and Jn. 20:22-23 (forgive others 
in order to be forgiven by God); Mt. 18:21-22 (forgive seventy-seven times); 
Lk. 17:3-4 (if there is repentance you must forgive; forgive seven times); and 
Mt. 18:23-35 (the Parable of the Unforgiving Servant). 
2. Pronouncements of forgiveness, including Mt. 9:2-8, Mk 2:2-12, and Lk. 
5:17-26 (the healing of the paralyzed man); and Lk. 7:36-50 (a woman’s sins 
are forgiven). 
3. Warnings about the unforgivable sin (Mk. 3:29; Mt. 12:32; Lk. 12:10).  
4. The prayer for forgiveness from the cross (Lk. 23:34a). 
These citations represent the totality of Jesus’ discussions of forgiveness in the Gospels.6 
For the purposes of this project, I focus most closely on Jesus’ instructions about 
interpersonal forgiveness as opposed to his words on divine forgiveness. In this category, 
there are three results of forgiveness: restoration of relationship (Mt. 18:21-22 and Lk. 
17:3-4), reciprocal responsibility to God (Mt. 6:14-15, Mk. 11:25, Lk. 6:37-38, and Jn. 
20:22-23), and cancellation of a debt (Mt. 6:9-13 and Lk. 11:2-4; Mt. 18:23-35). The 
                                                
6 While some interpreters also include as examples of forgiveness Lk. 6.27-28 and Mt. 
5.44-45 (love your enemies); Lk. 15.11-32 (the prodigal son); and Jn. 8.1-11 (the woman 
caught in adultery), these text do not mention forgiveness by name and I do not include 
them in my account. 
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discussions of debt cancellation may be understood metaphorically as referring to the 
release from the moral debt incurred by sinning against one’s neighbor, and thus they 
may be folded into the categories of restoration of relationship and reciprocal 
responsibility to God. 
The purpose of this taxonomy is to distill Jesus’ teachings on forgiveness to their core 
and then to draw a contrast with contemporary understandings of forgiveness that claim 
Gospel antecedents. For example, nowhere in these texts does Jesus suggest that 
forgiveness should be unconditional. On the contrary, in the seventy-times-seven 
instructions in Matthew and Luke, Jesus details measures for offender repentance before 
the victim is obligated to forgive: 
 
Mt. 18:15-17, 21-22  
 
 
Lk. 17:3-4  
“If another member of the church 
sins against you, go and point out the 
fault when the two of you are alone. If 
the member listens to you, you have 
regained that one. But if you are not 
listened to, take one or two others 
along with you, so that every word may 
be confirmed by the evidence of two or 
three witnesses. If the member refuses 
to listen to them, tell it to the church; 
and if the offender refuses to listen 
even to the church, let such a one be to 
you as a Gentile and a tax-collector.” 
… 
Then Peter came and said to him, 
“Lord, if another member of the church 
sins against me, how often should I 
forgive? As many as seven times?” 
Jesus said to him, “Not seven times, 
but, I tell you, seventy-seven times.” 
 
Be on your guard! If another 
disciple sins, you must rebuke the 
offender, and if there is repentance, 
you must forgive. And if the same 
person sins against you seven times a 
day, and turns back to you seven 
times and says, “I repent,” you must 
forgive. 
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With regard to the text in Matthew, I interpret discussion of community discipline that 
precedes the seventy-times-seven instructions as a call for repentance or at the very least, 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing: 
“If another member of the church sins against you, go and point out the fault 
when the two of you are alone. If the member listens to you, you have regained 
that one. But if you are not listened to, take one or two others along with you, so 
that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If 
the member refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if the offender 
refuses to listen even to the church, let such a one be to you as a Gentile and a tax-
collector.” (Mt. 18:15-17) 
 
In the absence of being receptive to rebuke, the offending member is cast out of the 
community, although not without the possibility of re-inclusion; gentiles and tax 
collectors are frequent subjects of evangelism.7 The point here is that the offender has a 
responsibility to respond to first the individual’s and then the community’s concern. I 
interpret this as a call for repentance. Only when that condition has met are Jesus’ 
listeners required to forgive boundlessly. 
The Lord’s Prayer offers both a model for repentance and an imperative to forgive: 
 
Mt. 6:12  
 
 
Lk. 11:4 
And forgive us our debts, 
as we also have forgiven our 
debtors. 
And forgive us our sins, 
for we ourselves forgive everyone 
indebted to us. 
 
In its expression of hope for reciprocal forgiveness, the prayerful voice first requests 
forgiveness. I interpret this initial plea as an expression of acknowledging sin, 
repentance, and of the need for forgiveness. The prayer, so understood, contains not only 
a statement about the relationship between divine and human forgiveness (we forgive 
                                                
7 For examples, see Jn. 4:5-26 (Samaritan woman), Lk. 19:1-10 (staying at Zaccheus’s 
house), Mt. 10:3 and Lk. 5:27 (calling of Matthew), Mt. 8:5-13 (healing of the 
centurion’s servant), Mk. 2:13-17 (dinner with the tax collectors). 
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others so God will forgive us), but also an acknowledgment of wrongdoing (we 
acknowledge that we have sinned and we repent). The fact that the prayer is recited 
regularly speaks to the importance of forgiveness in strengthening the nascent 
community.8  
Immediately following Matthew’s seventy-times-seven instructions comes the 
Parable of the Unforgiving Servant: 
For this reason the kingdom of heaven may be compared to a king who wished to 
settle accounts with his slaves. When he began the reckoning, one who owed him 
ten thousand talents was brought to him; and, as he could not pay, his lord 
ordered him to be sold, together with his wife and children and all his 
possessions, and payment to be made. So the slave fell on his knees before him, 
saying, “Have patience with me, and I will pay you everything.” And out of pity 
for him, the lord of that slave released him and forgave him the debt. But that 
same slave, as he went out, came upon one of his fellow-slaves who owed him a 
hundred denarii; and seizing him by the throat, he said, “Pay what you owe.” 
Then his fellow-slave fell down and pleaded with him, “Have patience with me, 
and I will pay you.” But he refused; then he went and threw him into prison until 
he should pay the debt. When his fellow-slaves saw what had happened, they 
were greatly distressed, and they went and reported to their lord all that had taken 
place. Then his lord summoned him and said to him, “You wicked slave! I 
forgave you all that debt because you pleaded with me. Should you not have had 
mercy on your fellow-slave, as I had mercy on you?” And in anger his lord 
handed him over to be tortured until he should pay his entire debt. So my 
heavenly Father will also do to every one of you, if you do not forgive your 
brother or sister from your heart. (Mt. 18:23-35) 
 
In this illustration, one’s status as forgiven obligates one to approach others with a 
forgiving disposition. While it is clear that the parable’s language of debt stands as a 
metaphor for sin, as it does in the Lord’s Prayer, the story does not consider the moral 
implications that might accompany a spiteful or violent offense. David Konstan writes, 
“Remitting a debt does not imply any wrongdoing on the part of the debtor: it is simply 
                                                
8 The Didache instructs, “Pray this three times each day” (8:3); on the thrice-daily 
gatherings of the early community, see Aaron Milavec, The Didache: Text, Translation, 
Analysis, and Commentary (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2003), p. 65. 
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an act of generosity on the part of the lender, equivalent to a gift. The liberated debtor 
makes no apologies, feels no remorse, and undergoes no change of heart in respect to the 
benefactor, for there has been no offense at all, whether voluntary or involuntary.”9 
Without a consideration of wrongdoing, the parable is of limited use for understanding 
interpersonal forgiveness. Moreover, in the parable the consequence for not “paying it 
forward” is having one’s own forgiveness rescinded and replaced with torture and 
imprisonment. This parable means to say something about interpersonal forgiveness 
beyond the literal context of monetary debt, but the message is not clear.  
In his work on debt metaphors for sin and forgiveness in the Bible, Gary Anderson 
offers an interpretation of this parable: “We are in danger of becoming debt-slaves when 
we sin. Should the act go uncorrected, then one will have to ‘pay’ for the ‘cost’ of the 
misdeed through the ‘currency’ of physical punishment. Fortunately God is merciful and 
will remit the debt we owe if we humbly beseech him.”10 Here Anderson lets humble 
beseeching stand in the place of repentance, but the analogy doesn’t follow. As Konstan 
observes, there is no need for a person in debt to repent or show remorse. In any case, 
begging for mercy is quite a different thing from offering an apology.  
In this parable, the metaphor of sin as debt creates a transactional relationship both 
between human and divine and among fellow human beings. Debts may be accrued and 
forgiven, or they may be offset by credits such as gained in almsgiving.11 Anderson 
explains, “How we talk about sin influences what we will do about it.”12 Talking about 
                                                
9 Konstan, Before Forgiveness, p. 118. 
10 Gary A. Anderson, Sin: A History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 
32-33.  
11 Anderson, Sin, p. 14. 
12 Anderson, Sin, p. 14. 
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sin as debt allows for sin to be erased in the way debts can be erased, either by loan 
forgiveness or debtor repayment. In the parable, one’s potential for debt forgiveness is 
linked to one’s willingness to forgive others their debts. The same holds true for the 
petition in Matthew’s version of the Lord’s Prayer: first comes the plea for forgiveness 
(“forgive us our debts,” 6:12), followed by the condition for that forgiveness (“as we also 
have forgiven our debtors,” 6:12).  
As with sin, how we talk about forgiveness also influences what we will do about it. 
Envisioning forgiveness as release from debt demonstrates that the effects of forgiveness 
may be visible and concrete, i.e., forgiving a debt involves adjusting accounts so that the 
burden of the debt no longer weighs on the debtor. The sin-as-debt metaphor shows that 
forgiveness was something to be done, not something only to be thought or felt. While it 
is difficult to draw a one-to-one relationship between the forgiveness depicted in this 
parable and interpersonal forgiveness for things like betrayal, assault, or oppression, the 
metaphor is instructive about the impact of human forgiveness on divine forgiveness. 
According to Anderson, the parable illustrates that people are at risk for accruing debt 
when they sin, and the way out is through physical punishment. The hope is that God will 
be merciful and forgive the figurative debt just as human beings forgive the “debts” of 
one another.13 There is no model for the debtor to follow other than to beseech God, and 
to forgive others from the outset.  
However, not all sin can be conceived as debt, or be as easily resolved by the victim’s 
release of that debt. A victim’s pain, physical injury, and fear of future harm may not be 
wiped away in one forgiving motion, or even if they are, they might reappear. The 
                                                
13 Anderson, Sin, pp. 32-33. 
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complexity and lability of such injuries makes conceiving of interpersonal sin as debt an 
insufficient analogy in the realm of human wrongdoing.14 Crimes of physical violence, 
for example, often leave wounds that are not easily wiped away. Talking about 
forgiveness as the cancellation of a debt, then, has limits when it comes to more serious 
interpersonal offenses. 
Finally, Jesus’ stern words about the unforgivable sin (Mk. 3:29//Mt. 12:32//Lk. 
12:10) provide the clearest evidence that forgiveness is neither an absolute good nor an 
unquestioned moral obligation. In these cases, Jesus explains that there is one sin that will 
not be forgiven (the agent is not named but is assumed to be God15): blasphemy against 
the Holy Spirit. These cases coupled with the image of the unforgiving king in the above 
parable raises the question of whether forgiveness can be named a moral or religious 
obligation when even God does not behave accordingly. In all three Synoptic Gospels, 
unforgiveness is a distinct possibility. 
However, unforgiveness as a fact of life also presents a serious threat to human 
beings, whose salvation, according to the Gospel account, is utterly dependent on divine 
forgiveness. Even though the exact nature of God’s forgiveness is not made explicit in 
the text, there is no doubt that humans need it and they must forgive each other in order 
to receive it. Matthew adds this coda to the Lord’s Prayer: “For if you forgive others their 
                                                
14 Linda Radzik, Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 119. 
15 Janet Meyer Everts, “Unforgivable Sin,” in David Noel Freedman, et al. (eds.), The 
Anchor Bible Dictionary (6 vols.; New York: Doubleday, 1992), vol. 6, pp. 745-46 (745); 
L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness: A Theological Analysis (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 194-95; John S. Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary 
on the Greek Text (NIGCT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), pp. 505-506; W.D. 
Davies and Dale C. Allison (eds.), Matthew: A Shorter Commentary (London and New 
York: T & T Clark, 2004), p. 201; Lamar Williamson, Mark (Interpretation; Louisville, 
KY: John Knox Press, 1983), p. 86. 
  14 
trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if you do not forgive others, 
neither will your Father forgive your trespasses” (6:14-15), and Luke writes, “Do not 
judge, and you will not be judged; do not condemn, and you will not be condemned. 
Forgive, and you will be forgiven; give, and it will be given to you” (6:37).16 For most 
Christian interpreters, forgiveness forms a triangular relationship among the victim, the 
offender, and God. Where the message of the parable is that being forgiven (by God or by 
others) should inspire further forgiveness, these verses suggest that human forgiveness 
inspires divine forgiveness. In Luke and Acts, “forgiveness of sins” becomes a synonym 
for salvation.17 The imperative to forgive is not just a moral issue; it is a soteriological 
necessity.  
The Greek word most commonly translated as “forgive” in these texts is a0fi/hmi, a 
verb whose semantic range includes “let go,” “send away,” “cancel,” “remit,” “pardon,” 
“leave,” “give up,” “divorce,” and “abandon,” in addition to “forgive (debts)” and 
“forgive (sins).”18 These meanings suggest that interpersonal forgiveness in the time of 
the composition of the Gospels had an active, or outward, character and was not only a 
                                                
16 This verse marks the only time in the Gospels in which the verb a0polu/w is translated 
in the NRSV as “forgive.” Elsewhere in the Gospels, a0polu/w is taken to mean “send 
away” (Mt. 14:15, 22, 23, 15:23, 32, 39; Mk. 6:36, 45, 8:3, 9; Lk. 8:38, 9:12), “depart” 
(Lk. 2:29), “divorce” (Mt. 1:19, 5:31, 5:32, 19:3, 7, 8, 9; Mk. 10:2, 4, 11, 12; Lk. 16:18), 
or “release” (Mt. 27:15, 17, 21, 26; Mk. 15:6, 9, 11, 15; Lk. 13:12, 14:4, 22:68, 23:16, 17, 
18, 20, 22, 25; Jn. 18:39, 19:10, 19:12). 
17 Gary S. Shogren, “Forgiveness (NT),” in Freedman, et al. (eds.), Anchor Bible 
Dictionary, vol. 2, pp. 835-38 (836); Lk. 1:77, 24:47; Acts 2:38, 5:31, 10:43, 13:38, 
26:18. 
18 Walter Bauer, William F. Arndt, F. Wilbur Gingrich, and Frederick W. Danker (eds.), 
Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature (3d 
ed.; Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999), a0fi/hmi, p. 125 (hereafter BAGD); 
see also See Rudolf Bultmann, “aphíēmi,” in G. Kittel and G. Friedrich (eds.), 
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (10 vols.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1964), vol. 1, p. 509. 
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matter of changing one’s mind or feelings (an inward action). This verb appears a total of 
146 times in the New Testament, but it is translated in the NRSV as “forgive” only thirty-
eight of those times. Elsewhere it appears primarily as a transitive verb with a direct 
object: They left their nets (oi9 de eu0qe/wv a0fe/ntev ta\ di/ktua; Mt. 4:20); Leaving the 
crowd behind (kai\ a0fe/ntev to\n o1xlon; Mk. 4:36); Let the children come to me (a1fete 
ta\ paidi/a e1rxesqai pro/v me; Lk. 18:16); Let it alone for one more year (a1fev au0th\n 
kai\ tou=to to\ e1tov; Lk. 13:8). In the Pauline literature, a0fi/hmi also has the connotation 
of “divorce” (the husband should not divorce his wife [a1ndra gunai=ka mh\ a0fie/nai], 1 
Cor. 7:11-13). In most cases, the verb depicts a concrete action taken, usually toward 
another person. Given this semantic range for a0fi/hmi, first-century hearers would have 
understood forgiveness to have an active character. In other words, it is something one 
does (words spoken, action taken, physical things altered) rather than something one 
feels.  
Interpretations of forgiveness  
The biblical forgiveness material has been interpreted in a variety of ways.19 In 
contemporary literature, these instructions and forgiveness in general get developed in 
three main ways: forgiveness as strengthening the community, forgiveness as controlling 
negative emotions, and forgiveness as a therapeutic strategy that benefits the individual 
forgiver’s health. In what follows I present some of the primary voices representing these 
three interpretations. 
                                                
19 See the individual chapters for histories of interpretation of the texts in question. 
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Forgiveness as strengthening community 
According to Jesus’ teachings, offender repentance and relationship play important 
roles in forgiveness. In the Gospel texts, forgiveness is bilateral: the process involves 
action from the offender toward the victim with a tangible outcome such as restored 
relationship or a strengthened community. When repentance is not forthcoming, 
forgiveness fails. For example, just prior to Jesus’ instruction in Matthew to forgive 
boundlessly (18:21-22), community members who are not receptive to correction are cast 
out of the community. Luke’s presentation of the boundless-forgiveness instruction 
contains the qualifier, “if there is repentance” (17:3-4). And when Jesus is on the cross, 
he offers a prayer for forgiveness rather than forgiving his executioners directly; one 
reason for this may be that they do not repent of their actions. Furthermore, God’s 
forgiveness may be granted or removed for specific reasons (Mk. 3:29//Mt. 12:32//Lk. 
12:10 [unforgivable sin]; Mt. 18:23-35 [unforgiving servant]; Mt. 6:14-15 [if you forgive, 
God will forgive you; if you don’t forgive, God will not forgive you]). Forgiveness in the 
teachings of Jesus lacks explicit definition, but it is undoubtedly a relational or bilateral 
process that happens under certain conditions with tangible outcomes. 
A number of modern biblical interpreters retain this emphasis on community 
cohesion and repair of relationship. Here I discuss two examples, one secular and one 
religious: Hannah Arendt, who discusses the political implications of forgiveness, and L. 
Gregory Jones, who argues that forgiveness is crucial in the maintenance of the body of 
Christ. Both Arendt and Jones call for forgiveness as a necessity in repairing community 
relationships. This is a key theme for Jesus, and it undergirds the forgiveness emphases of 
both Desmond Tutu and advocates of restorative justice. 
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Hannah Arendt, theorizing forgiveness by way of New Testament sources, famously 
asserts, “The discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus 
of Nazareth.”20 Key for Arendt is Jesus’ message that human forgiveness is not only 
possible but necessary for divine forgiveness and—more important—the survival of 
human community. She writes, “Trespassing is an everyday occurrence which is in the 
very nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a web of 
relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go 
on.”21 “Forgiving” and “dismissing” are closely related here; Arendt envisions 
forgiveness as “the possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being 
unable to undo what one has done.”22 Reversed by forgiveness, the wrongdoing is 
effectively erased. 
For Arendt, forgiveness is an act of will that involves the forswearing of both 
resentment and revenge in response to wrongdoing. But this forgiveness is not just an 
absence of negative action, of withholding anger or resentment. Forgiveness is a social 
act that reflects a commitment to renewed trust and preservation of community. Arendt 
calls this idea amor mundi, and L. Gregory Jones uses the phrase “the body of Christ”23 
referring to the same kind of community concern. Arendt’s understanding of the value of 
                                                
20 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1998 [1958]), p. 238. 
21 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 240. In her analysis, Arendt cites the healing of the 
paralytic in Luke (5:21-24), the Lord’s Prayer and its addendum in Matthew (6:9-15), and 
Luke’s instruction to forgive seven times seven times if there is repentance (Lk. 17:3-4; 
emphasis mine). 
22 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 237. 
23 Margaret Betz Hull, The Hidden Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London and New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 75; Joseph Butler, “Sermon IX: Upon Forgiveness of 
Injuries,” in David E. White (ed.), The Works of Bishop Butler (Rochester, NY: 
University of Rochester Press, 2006), pp. 96-102 (99). 
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forgiveness emphasizes the collective over the individual and emphasizes the ability of 
forgiveness to prevent destruction and repair communal relations. She pulls the basic 
theme of forgiveness as redemption and renewal from the New Testament and cites Jesus 
as its author,24 but her model of political (or social) forgiveness lacks the divine 
reciprocity that characterizes discussions of forgiveness in the Gospels. Arendt thus 
transforms the divine imperative into a primarily communal one. 
Pointing out that “crime and willed evil are rare,” Arendt interprets Jesus’ forgiveness 
instructions as applying mainly to mundane, everyday missteps, with forgiveness as a 
way to balance and correct wrongdoing in a community. She writes, “Only through this 
constant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents, only by constant 
willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a 
power as that to begin something new.”25 Arendt’s account of forgiveness does not 
include more serious crimes, or “radical evil.”26 For such criminals, she offers another 
biblical prescription: “Where the deed itself dispossesses us of all power [to forgive or 
punish], we can indeed only repeat with Jesus: ‘It were better for him that a millstone 
were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea’” (quoting Mt. 18:6).27 Where the 
biblical text refers to a specific crime punishable by drowning, that is, putting a stumbling 
block in front of anyone who believes in Jesus, Arendt recontextualizes this to apply to 
crimes of impossible enormity.  
                                                
24 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 240. She cites the reciprocal formulas offered in Mt. 
6:14-15, 18:35, and Mk. 11:25; along with the “seven times seven times” teaching in 
Luke (17:3-4).  
25 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 240.  
26 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 241. 
27 Arendt, Human Condition, p. 241. 
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In her report on the trial of Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann, Arendt faces a man whose 
crimes during the Holocaust constitute such “radical evil.” She explains why his crimes 
put him beyond the reach of the “mundane” forgiveness she describes earlier:  
Just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth with 
the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations—as though you and 
your superiors had any right to determine who should and should not inhabit the 
world—we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to 
want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must 
hang.28 
 
In this case, not forgiving Eichmann (i.e., sentencing him to death), repairs the 
community. She writes, “The reparation effected in criminal cases is of an altogether 
different nature; it is the body politic itself that stands in need of being ‘repaired,’ and it 
is the general public order that has been thrown out of gear and must be restored, as it 
were.”29 Thus, not forgiving the most egregious crimes serves the same purpose as the 
mundane or trivial forgiveness Arendt describes: it repairs the community (or the body 
politic, or amor mundi).  
L. Gregory Jones argues for an “embodied”—or, lived out in practice—understanding 
of forgiveness based on the teachings of Jesus.30 He writes, “Humans are called to 
become holy by embodying [God’s] forgiveness through specific habits and practices that 
seek to remember the past truthfully, to repair the brokenness, to heal divisions, and to 
reconcile and renew relationships.”31 Jones defines forgiveness as “not so much a word 
                                                
28 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2006 [1963]), p. 279. 
29 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 261. 
30 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, pp. xii, passim. He cites Lk. 7:36-50 (sinful woman 
forgiven), Mt. 18 (community discipline, seventy-times-seven, the Parable of the 
Unforgiving Servant), Mt. 5:44 (love your enemies), and Jn. 20:23 (“forgiving and 
retaining”). 
31 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, p. xii. 
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spoken, an action performed, or a feeling felt as it is an embodied way of life in an ever-
deepening friendship with the Triune God and with others.”32 In Jones’s account, 
forgiveness and reconciliation (figured as the repair of a broken relationship) are deeply 
intertwined. One does not occur without the other, and reconciliation is a necessary 
reflection of the forgiveness embodied by Jesus.33 The “craft of forgiveness” (or, 
forgiveness as an “embodied way of life”) means that forgiveness and reconciliation are 
inseparable. For Jones, forgiveness is meaningless without the repair of the relationship 
that was broken by the offense. 
Jones goes to great lengths to define forgiveness not as a simple concept, but a way of 
life. In this way he follows Arendt by locating the significance of forgiveness in the 
social sphere. This relational nature of forgiveness leads Jones to criticize contemporary 
psychological approaches (see below) that allow for internal, unilateral expressions of 
forgiveness and do not take the next step of communal action. However, Jones so 
thoroughly rejects the idea of forgiveness as a thought or action (he prefers to talk about 
“the craft of forgiveness” as a general way of life) that in the end he does not ever offer a 
clear definition of the term. Instead, there is nothing to separate Jones’s “craft of 
forgiveness” from, say, a “craft of compassion” or “craft of charity.” Furthermore, 
Jones’s conflation of forgiveness and reconciliation negates the possibility of forgiveness 
in cases where reconciliation is impossible, undesirable, or both. Even so, his insistence 
on the communal and relational nature of forgiveness is helpful for the consideration of 
the difficult kinds of forgiveness presented in the case studies to follow. 
                                                
32 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, p. xii. 
33 Jones does acknowledge that sometimes “hope against hope” for reconciliation is as 
close as some might get to actual communion, but that hope is a key element of 
forgiveness (Embodying Forgiveness, p. 232). 
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Both Arendt and Jones preserve the active character of forgiveness and cite its 
importance for preserving communities and repairing relationships. Both draw on New 
Testament sources to demonstrate that forgiveness must be a way of life, whether secular 
or religious, and that it involves more than simply a change of mind or heart. They 
thereby offer more complex accounts than do advocates who embrace unilateral, 
unconditional forgiveness as the biblical imperative.  
Forgiveness as controlling negative emotions 
Nowhere does Jesus suggest that forgiveness involves only the control of a victim’s 
anger or resentment toward the offender. However, this understanding of forgiveness is 
not uncommon among both religious and secular interpreters. Anglican Bishop Joseph 
Butler (1692-1752) advances a theory of forgiveness that, although grounded in the 
Gospels, defines forgiveness primarily as the act of controlling negative emotions. A 
number of later thinkers adopt this approach. 
In his 1726 sermon “Upon Forgiveness of Injuries,” Butler defines forgiveness as the 
forswearing of active resentment.34 This marks the beginning of a trend in a number of 
disciplines toward apophatic definitions of forgiveness: defining forgiveness by what it is 
not. According to Butler, forgiveness prevents excessive resentment from damaging the 
body of Christ on earth35 (L. Gregory Jones follows this line of thinking) and protects 
human salvation in the hereafter. Butler regards resentment itself as a “natural” emotion36 
and to be expected. However, “when this resentment entirely destroys our natural 
                                                
34 Butler, Joseph, “Upon Forgiveness,” p. 96. 
35 Butler, “Upon Forgiveness,” p. 98. 
36 Butler, “Upon Forgiveness,” p. 96. 
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benevolence towards [our neighbor], it is excessive, and becomes malice or revenge,” he 
explains. “The command to prevent its having this effect, i.e. to forgive injuries, is the 
same as to love our enemies.”37 Forgiveness, then, is defined as an antidote to excessive 
negative reactions that threaten love of neighbor. Rather than reacting positively to an 
offense, forgiveness primarily reacts against the possibility of anger or resentment. 
Like Butler, Miroslav Volf locates the essence of forgiveness in the willingness to 
forego a negative reaction to an offense. “Forgiveness cuts the tie of equivalence between 
the offense and the way we treat the offender,” he writes. “I forgo all retribution. In 
forgiving, I absorb the injury—the way I may absorb, say, the financial impact of a bad 
business transaction.”38 Volf draws a direct equivalence between financial loss and other 
injury. But as discussed above, such a transactional understanding of forgiveness leaves 
out the possibility for (or necessity of) repentance on the part of the offender. Any robust 
view of biblical forgiveness must address the role of repentance.  
Psychologist Robert D. Enright also depends on the absence of negative emotions to 
capture the essence of forgiveness. He writes, 
The forgiveness process, properly understood and used, can free those bound by 
anger and resentment. It does not require accepting injustice or remaining in an 
abusive situation. It opens the door to reconciliation, but it does not require 
trusting someone who has proven untrustworthy. Even if the offender remains 
unrepentant, you can forgive and restore a sense of peace and well-being to your 
life.39  
 
                                                
37 Butler, “Upon Forgiveness,” p. 99; emphasis mine. To forgive is to “prevent” 
resentment from having ill effect. 
38 Miroslav Volf, Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005), p. 170. 
39 Robert D. Enright, Forgiveness is a Choice: A Step-by-Step Process for Resolving 
Anger and Restoring Hope (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 
2001), p. 43. 
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Like many other psychologists,40 Enright pits forgiveness against a seemingly necessary 
negative opposite, in this case, being “bound by anger and resentment.” Enright defines 
forgiveness as “a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgment, 
and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly injured us, while fostering the 
undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love toward him or her.”41 He 
sees the father in the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk. 15:11-32) as a prime example of 
forgiveness-as-withholding-resentment when he welcomes his errant son home.42 
Forgiveness, again, is mainly a question of controlling or eradicating negative emotions. 
Here, Enright joins philosopher Joanna North in defining forgiveness this way: “If we 
are to forgive, our resentment is to be overcome not by denying ourselves the right to that 
resentment, but by endeavoring to view the wrongdoer with compassion, benevolence 
and love while recognizing that he has willfully abandoned his right to them.”43 North 
often collaborates with Enright in developing materials advancing this emotional 
understanding of forgiveness. She writes, “Forgiveness, through such active mental and 
emotional endeavor, is therefore possible even in the absence of repentance and 
                                                
40 See for example, Roy F. Baumeister, Julie Juola Exline, and Kristin L. Sommer, “The 
Victim Role, Grudge Theory, and Two Dimensions of Forgiveness,” in Everett L. 
Worthington (ed.), Dimensions of Forgiveness: A Research Approach (Radnor, PA: 
Temple Foundation Press, 1998), pp. 79-104 (79-80); Everett L. Worthington, “Initial 
Questions About the Art and Science of Forgiving,” in idem (ed.), Handbook of 
Forgiveness (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 1-14 (1); Liz Gulliford, “Intrapersonal 
Forgiveness,” in Fraser Watts and Liz Gulliford (eds.), Forgiveness in Context: Theology 
and Psychology in Creative Dialogue (London and New York: T & T Clark International, 
2004), pp. 83-97 (84); Lewis B. Smedes, Forgive and Forget: Healing the Hurts We 
Don’t Deserve (New York: HarperCollins, 1984), p. 2. 
41 Robert D. Enright, Suzanne Freedman, and Julio Rique, “The Psychology of 
Interpersonal Forgiveness,” in Robert D. Enright and Joanna North (eds.), Exploring 
Forgiveness (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), pp. 46-62 (46-47). 
42 Enright, Forgiveness is a Choice, pp. 24-25. 
43 Joanna North, “Wrongdoing and Forgiveness,” Philosophy 62 (1987), pp. 499-508 
(502). 
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retribution. It is essentially an internal change of heart…a willed change of heart—the 
successful result of an active endeavor to replace bad thoughts with good, bitterness and 
anger with compassion and affection.”44 North also cites the Parable of the Prodigal Son 
(Lk. 15:11-32) as an example of forgiveness that takes the form of (the father) 
withholding a negative reaction (to the son).45 North also positions forgiveness as the 
good half of a dichotomy that presents anger, resentment, and other negative emotions as 
its necessary opposites. Forgiveness thus defined becomes primarily the state of not being 
angry, bitter, or resentful. Clearing away these negative emotions makes way for 
compassion, affection and good thoughts. Rather than something active and constructive, 
forgiveness emerges an exercise in thought control. 
Charles L. Griswold expands on the apophatic definition of forgiveness to include 
refraining from negative actions as well as feelings.46 Griswold points out that Bulter 
defines forgiveness only as forswearing revenge (an action), not resentment (a feeling). 
Then Griswold sets forth his own definition that fills the gap he sees in Butler: 
“Forgiveness does however mean overcoming negative feelings that embody and 
perpetuate the key features of resentment, feelings that very often accompany 
resentment—such as contempt and scorn—insofar as they are modulations of the moral 
hatred in question.”47 Thus, Griswold defines forgiveness as an emotional state. He 
briefly considers the semantic range of a0fi/emi in the biblical texts and opts to merge the 
term with the classical Greek term suggnw/mh, which Griswold sees as a more cognitive 
                                                
44 North, “Wrongdoing and Forgiveness,” p. 506. 
45 North, “Wrongdoing and Forgiveness,” p. 501. 
46 Charles Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 19-37. 
47 Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 41; emphasis in original. 
  25 
task, in arriving at his own definition. He finds that when suggnw/mh is used to mean 
“forgiveness,” the term carries more cognitive and emotional associations than does 
a0fi/emi (whose semantic range includes, in addition to “forgive,” simple action verbs such 
as “leave” or “dismiss”).48 “Forswearing the emotion is indeed the ultimate goal,”49 he 
writes. However, defining forgiveness only as the absence of negative emotions 
disregards the constructive potential of forgiveness offered in the biblical account as well 
as its bilateral character. While Butler and others draw—to varying degrees—from the 
teachings of Jesus to inform their definitions, their tendency to locate the action of 
forgiveness only in the mind or heart of the victim neglects the corporate and tangible 
nature of forgiveness presented in the Gospels.  
Therapeutic forgiveness 
This emphasis on forgiveness as a matter of forswearing resentment leads to a third 
trend in forgiveness research: defining forgiveness as needing only the participation of 
the victim. This understanding suggests that victims can and should overcome injury or 
wrongdoing by adjusting their thoughts and emotions in a positive way with regard to the 
offender, regardless of the offender’s disposition or presence. Advocates of this brand of 
forgiveness often claim biblical warrant, but there is no indication in the teachings of 
Jesus that forgiveness requires only an emotional or mental exercise. Even so, 
psychologists, pastoral counselors, legal representatives, and others may pressure victims 
to forgive even when the offender is unknown, unrepentant, or still a threat. Victims may 
                                                
48 Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 3; see n. 3 for his discussion of a0fi/emi.The term suggnw/mh 
appears once in the New Testament: “This I say by way of concession (suggnw/mhn), not 
of command” (1 Cor. 7:6).  
49 Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 42; emphasis mine. 
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then be judged according to their willingness or ability to demonstrate forgiving thoughts 
toward the offender. 
This unilateral, unconditional, emotional view of forgiveness appears most often in 
the work of psychologists and pastoral counselors. The “therapeutic”50 understanding of 
forgiveness assumes not only that victims may transform their experience by changing 
how they think and feel about it, but also that such forgiveness is necessary for healing. 
The pressure on victims to forgive can be enormous. 
Psychologists began to embrace forgiveness as a therapeutic strategy in the 1980s, 
and many credit Lewis B. Smedes and his 1984 book Forgive and Forget: Healing the 
Hurts We Don’t Deserve as foundational for starting the “forgiveness movement.”51 
Smedes first defines forgiveness as “God’s invention [and gift to humanity] for coming to 
terms with a world which, despite their best intentions, people are unfair to each other 
and hurt each other deeply.”52 However, he downplays the importance of forgiveness in 
                                                
50 Psychologists and pastoral caregivers use this term both to recommend psychological 
approaches to forgiveness and to criticize them; see for example, Terry D. Hargrave, 
“Families and Forgiveness: A Theoretical and Therapeutic Framework,” The Family 
Journal 2.4 (1994), pp. 339-48, and Cynthia Ransley and Terri Spy, Forgiveness and the 
Healing Process: A Central Therapeutic Concern (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 31-
50 (forgiveness as an effective therapeutic strategy); Chris Brauns, Unpacking 
Forgiveness: Biblical Answers for Complex Questions and Deep Wounds (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway Books, 2008), p. 65 (therapeutic forgiveness as distinct from “biblical 
forgiveness”), and Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, pp. 35-91 (therapeutic forgiveness as 
“the Church’s psychological captivity in Western culture”). I use the term to describe 
how forgiveness (often unconditional and unilateral) is promoted in therapeutic contexts 
(such as counseling) as an emotionally and psychologically curative approach to 
wrongdoing.  
51 Smedes, Forgive and Forget. 
52 Smedes, Forgive and Forget, pp. xi-xii. 
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relationship or community repair. Forgiveness, he argues, is primarily something we do 
“for our own sakes.”53 
In this slim volume, Smedes unleashes a cacophony of metaphors54 that portray 
forgiveness in a positive, almost magical light, and that suggest that forgiveness can be 
accomplished by any individual simply as an act of will: 
The only way to heal the pain that will not heal itself is to forgive the person who 
hurt you. Forgiving stops the reruns of pain. Forgiving heals your memory as you 
change your memory’s vision. When you release the wrongdoer from the wrong, 
you cut a malignant tumor out of your inner life. You set a prisoner free, but you 
discover that the real prisoner was yourself.55  
 
While Smedes often cites the New Testament as a source—he references the Parable of 
the Unforgiving Servant (Mt. 18:23-35), the woman caught in adultery (Jn 8:1-11), and 
the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk. 15:11-32), among others56—his theories of 
forgiveness have very little grounding in the biblical text. The parable of the prodigal and 
the story of the woman caught in adultery nowhere use the term forgiveness. Nowhere 
does Jesus suggest that forgiveness stops pain or repairs memory. Nowhere is non-
forgiveness given as a tumor or disease, or forgiveness as psychic healing. And certainly, 
nowhere does Jesus advocate forgiveness as a form of self-care or self-improvement. 
These are modern ideas. Forgiveness as a way of making oneself feel better is more a 
product of the contemporary self-help movement than it is a biblical precept. Smedes 
                                                
53 Smedes, Forgive and Forget, p. 30; emphasis in original. 
54 Absent among these is the metaphor of debt forgiveness. 
55 Smedes, Forgive and Forget, p. 133. 
56 Smedes references the following texts in Forgive and Forget: the Parable of the 
Unforgiving Servant (p. 150), the story of the woman caught in adultery (p. 48), the cry 
of dereliction (p. 87), Judas’ betrayal (p. 16), Peter’s denial (pp. 16, 108), the healing of 
the paralyzed man (p. 94), the Parable of the Prodigal Son (p. 68), and the cry from the 
cross, “Father, forgive them” (p. 11). 
  28 
conflates these emotional understandings of forgiveness with biblical examples and 
presents them as religious imperatives.  
Such psychological formulations of forgiveness conflated with biblical imperatives 
can result in pressure on victims to change their thinking about an offense without 
necessarily holding offenders accountable. Here the problem is that these emotional 
formulations of forgiveness are written back into the biblical account. For example, 
Smedes cites the cry of dereliction (Mt. 27:46, “My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me?”) as an instance where human beings who suffer and feel abandoned by 
God can choose even to forgive God.57 In response to the seventy-times-seven 
instructions, Smedes emphasizes the endlessness of the numbers, but offers an emotional 
purpose. He writes, “Jesus was talking [in the seventy-times-seventy instructions] about 
healing our memories of a wound that someone’s wrong etched in our cemented past. 
Once we have stopped the abuse, we can forgive however many times that it might take 
us to finish our healing.”58 Here, the beneficiary of the forgiveness is the individual who 
forgives, not the community. The only person involved in forgiving is the victim, and the 
hoped-for outcome is the healing of memories. This obscures the fact that the forgiveness 
Jesus called for required the participation of the offender and the community, not just the 
victim. The role of offender repentance is lost in Smedes’s analysis. 
On this point L. Gregory Jones critiques Smedes’s work. According to Jones, any 
definition of forgiveness that does not regard community as central is detached from the 
biblical tradition: “On Smedes’s account…therapeutic forgiveness is divorced from 
Christian practices and doctrine; an individual’s psychic health replaces the goal of 
                                                
57 Smedes, Forgive and Forget, pp. 87-88. 
58 Smedes, Art of Forgiving, p. 161. 
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substantive Christian community lived in faithfulness to the Triune God.”59 Although 
Smedes imagines that “when we forgive we ride the crest of love’s cosmic wave; we 
walk in stride with God,”60 Jones places this cosmic wave squarely outside the biblical 
tradition.  
In spite of its religious underpinnings, Smedes’s account has broad appeal among 
secular psychologists and pastoral caregivers alike. Everett L. Worthington cites Smedes 
for his understanding of forgiveness as benefitting a person’s mental health.61 
Psychologists mostly abandon Smedes’s emphasis on biblical themes and images; thus 
forgiveness becomes a kind of psychological intervention that addresses only the 
emotional state of an individual. 
Most psychological definitions of forgiveness share the following ideas with Smedes: 
forgiveness is good for the forgiver, forgiveness is the best response to wrongdoing (and 
the only other response is negative and harmful), and forgiveness may be unilateral or 
unconditional in nature (that is, not involving the wrongdoer in any way). As a result, 
forgiveness is often touted for its supposed health benefits, and victims of crime or other 
offense are often pressed by counselors to forgive in order to free themselves from 
suffering (both mental and physical) relating to the offense.62  
                                                
59 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, p. 52. 
60 Smedes, Forgive and Forget, p. 152. 
61 Worthington, “Initial questions,” pp. 1-13 (1). 
62 For examples of these approaches, see Jennie C. Noll, “Forgiveness in People 
Experiencing Trauma,” in Worthington, Handbook of Forgiveness, pp. 363-75; Alex H.S. 
Harris and Carl E. Thoreson, “Forgiveness, Unforgiveness, Health, and Disease,” in 
Worthington, Handbook of Forgiveness, pp. 321-33; Loren Toussaint and Jon R. Webb, 
“Theoretical and Empirical Connections Between Forgiveness, Mental Health, and Well-
Being,” in Worthington, Handbook of Forgiveness, pp. 349-62; Jennifer P. Friedberg, 
Sonia Suchday, Danielle V. Shelov, “The Impact of forgiveness on cardiovascular 
reactivity and recovery,” International Journal of Psychophysiology 65.2 (2007), pp. 87-
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As these psychological understandings permeate discussions of forgiveness in 
theology, law, philosophy, and pastoral care, professionals in these areas conflate them 
with their own understandings of the select biblical passages. The result is a moral and 
religious imperative on victims to forgive as a matter of controlling their thoughts and 
feelings.  
Forgiveness and repentance 
Jesus’ links his forgiveness instructions to the concept of repentance. Here I consider 
how the repentance requirement informs the process of forgiveness throughout the 
Gospel. In the New Testament, the primary term translated as “repentance” is meta/noia 
(the verbal form, “to repent,” is metanoe/w). This term appears throughout the synoptic 
Gospels (but is absent in the Gospel of John). The relationship between repentance and 
forgiveness calls into question interpretations of Jesus’ teachings that portray forgiveness 
as unilateral or unconditional.  
The basic meaning of meta/noia is a “change of mind” and is closely linked with 
“turning” to faith in the gospel message.63 In Luke, when the “scribes and Pharisees” 
question Jesus about his association with “tax collectors and sinners” (5:30), he responds, 
“Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick; I have come to 
                                                
94; Martina Antonia Waltman, “The psychological and physiological effects of 
forgiveness education in male patients with coronary artery disease” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002); Charlotte Vanoyen Witvliet, “Forgiveness and 
Health: Review and Reflections on a Matter of Faith, Feelings, and Physiology,” Journal 
of Psychology and Theology 29 (2001), pp. 212-24; Michael E. McCullough, Kenneth I. 
Pargament, and Carl E. Thoresen, “The Psychology of Forgiveness: History, Conceptual 
Issues, and Overview,” in idem (eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, Research, and Practice 
(New York: Guilford Press, 2000), pp. 1-14. 
63 A. Boyd Luter, “Repentance (New Testament),” Freedman, et al. (eds.), Anchor Bible 
Dictionary, vol. 5, pp. 672-74 (672-73).  
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call not the righteous but sinners to repentance” (5:31-32). Here, repentance involves a 
change of mind (i.e., toward faith in the gospel) and a turn away from sinful behavior. 
Later in the Gospel, Jesus announces the great value of a repentant sinner’s turn to 
righteousness: “There will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over 
ninety-nine righteous people who need no repentance” (15:7). In his resurrection 
appearance, Jesus commissions the disciples to deliver this message: “repentance and 
forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed in [my] name to all nations” (Lk. 24:47). Here, 
repentance precedes forgiveness of sins. 
The Gospel of Luke contains the only explicit mention in the Gospels of repentance 
in the context of interpersonal sin. Jesus warns his disciples, “Be on your guard! If your 
brother sins, you must rebuke the offender, and if there is repentance, you must forgive. 
And if the same person sins against you seven times a day, and turns back to you seven 
times and says, ‘I repent,’ you must forgive” (17:3-4). The familial language indicates 
that forgiveness is a community matter. It is a multi-part exercise: First the sinner must be 
rebuked, and if he repents, the victim is obligated to forgive him. If the person sins again, 
and repents again, forgiveness must follow “seven times” or ad infinitum. Jesus expects 
that the one sinned against will be able to judge whether there has been sincere 
repentance. The “brother” language indicates that this instruction is meant for 
relationships within a specific community. 
In Luke’s Gospel, the action of repentance is not restricted to an intellectual or 
emotional change. Early in the narrative, John the Baptist instructs, “Bear fruits worthy of 
repentance” (3:8). Thus, the inward change must be outwardly enacted. According to 
John the Baptist, those fruits include sharing clothing and food with the poor, not 
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overcharging for taxes, and not extorting money (3:10-14).64 Such actions may or may 
not indicate regret or a sorrowful disposition toward the past, but they do demonstrate a 
change in action in the future. 
Repentance in the Gospels is a prerequisite for forgiveness from both God and other 
human beings. Other than the actions described to sinners and tax collectors above, 
however, the Gospels offer no instruction on how to gauge the sincerity of any expression 
of repentance; this is left to the victim’s judgment. For the purposes of this dissertation, I 
include apology (“I’m sorry,” “Forgive me,” “Pardon me”) as an acknowledgment of 
wrongdoing and gesture of repentance, as in the petition for forgiveness in the Lord’s 
Prayer: “Forgive us our debts/sins” (Mt. 6:12//Lk. 11:4).65 The spoken word has currency 
as repentance in the Lucan instruction: “[If the same brother] turns back to you seven 
times and says, ‘I repent,’ you must forgive” (17:4). Repentance in the Gospels has 
visible manifestations, whether in the form of changed behavior (tax collectors and 
sinners improving their practices) or spoken apology (“Forgive me,” “I repent”). In 
Matthew’s community discipline instructions (18:15-20), repentance takes the form of 
being receptive to the rebuke of another member of the community or the community at 
large; since uncooperative members are cast out of the community (at least temporarily), 
the ensuing forgiveness instructions apply to those who listen and change their behavior. 
In Luke, the right response to such rebuke is repentance (17:3). In each of these cases, the 
                                                
64 This elaboration on the meaning of repentance occurs only in Luke; there is no 
corresponding instruction in Matthew or Mark (Guy D. Nave, The Role and Function of 
Repentance in Luke-Acts [Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002], p. 132). 
65 On the varieties of spoken apology as requests for forgiveness, see Radzik, Making 
Amends, p. 56; on “forgive me” as an example of apology, see Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: 
The Meanings of Apologies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. vi, 263 
n. 17. 
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victim (or the representative community, as in Matthew) must determine whether the 
repentance is sincere. 
Repentance and obligatory forgiveness 
To this point, I have argued that according to the Gospels’ forgiveness instructions, a 
victim is not obligated to forgive when repentance is absent. The Gospel material 
portrays forgiveness as a bilateral exercise (i.e., involving effort from both victim and 
offender), and that victims should not be pressured to forgive unrepentant, absent, or 
unknown offenders. I point this out in order to counter contemporary calls for 
unconditional and unilateral forgiveness that claim biblical precedent. However, this 
emphasis on repentance raises the question: What happens when the offender is 
repentant? Is a victim obligated to forgive when there is sincere repentance on the part of 
the offender? 
According to the Gospel instructions, it appears that the answer is yes. Both Matthew 
and Luke indicate that boundless forgiveness is the appropriate response to a repentant 
offender: the seventy-times-seven instructions in Mt. 18:12-22 follow the section on 
community discipline and offender rebuke; in Lk. 17:3-4, Jesus emphasizes unlimited 
forgiveness “if there is repentance.” The Lord’s Prayer (Mt. 6:14//Lk. 11:4) and the 
Parable of the Unforgiving Servant (Mt. 18:23-35) make plain that divine forgiveness is 
contingent on human willingness to forgive.  
Even with such straightforward instructions, though, there is room for individual 
discernment. The biblical requirement for outward manifestation of inward repentance 
introduces an element of time and judgment to repentance. For example, a victim cannot 
rely on words of apology alone. The offender’s behavior must change over time to show 
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that the repentance (both words and actions) is sincere; assessing this change becomes a 
matter of the victim’s judgment.  
In the Gospel of John, the risen Jesus commissions the disciples, standing in for the 
entire community, to do exactly this: use their own judgment in deciding whom and what 
sins to forgive. John describes, “He breathed on them and said to them, ‘Receive the Holy 
Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, 
they are retained’” (Jn 20:22-23). James W. Barker argues that John reformulates the 
Matthean instruction on binding and loosing (18:18) as a correction to offset the harsh 
consequences for non-forgiveness given in Matthew’s Parable of the Unforgiving Servant 
(those who do not forgive will be handed over for torture by God; 18:34-35).66 Barker 
observes, “John emphasizes the disciples’ authority to withhold forgiveness, concerning 
which Matthew had cautioned.”67  
Jesus grants this authority to forgive or retain sins to each disciple present, and to 
every member of the community by extension. While some argue that this applies only to 
the disciples functioning as a community,68 I hold that Jesus means to grant this 
authority—along with the guiding wisdom of the Holy Spirit—to all members of the 
community for all time.69 The fact that he makes this announcement to an incomplete 
                                                
66 James W. Barker, “John’s Use of Matthew” (Ph.D. diss; Vanderbilt University, 
Nashville, TN: 2011), pp. 83-103; John shifts the language from “loosing” (lu/w) to 
“forgiving” (a0fi/emi), thus matching the a0fi/emi language in Mt. 18:21-22 (seventy-times-
seven) and 18:23-35 (Parable of the Unforgiving Servant). 
67 Barker, “John’s Use of Matthew,” pp. 103. 
68 Tobias Hägerland, Jesus and the Forgiveness of Sins: An Aspect of His Prophetic 
Mission (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 75-76; Raymond 
Edward Brown, “The Kerygma of the Gospel According to John,” Interpretation XXI 
(1967), pp. 387-400 (391). 
69 Francis J. Moloney, The Gospel of John (Sacra Pagina; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 1998), p. 534; David Aune, The Cultic Setting of Realized Eschatology in Early 
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group of disciples (at least Thomas is missing; those in attendance are not named) 
indicates that he means his words to apply to a broader audience. Craig S. Keener writes, 
“Although the promise is given directly to those present at the time, it will no more 
exclude later generations of Christians (such as John’s audience) than it would Thomas 
once he believes.”70 Just as Matthew’s Great Commission (28:19-20) is taken to apply to 
all Christians at all times, so this “commission” also extends to all Christians.  
This means that even in cases where the offender repents, the victim may opt not to 
forgive. Perhaps a crime is too enormous, the injuries too severe, or the ongoing fear is 
too great to warrant forgiveness. As each of the Synoptic Gospels attests, there is at least 
one sin that is beyond the province of God’s forgiveness (see Jesus’ warning about the 
sin that “will not be forgiven;” Mk. 3:29//Mt. 12:32//Lk. 12:10). 
The instruction in Jn 20:22-23 does not contradict the forgiveness instructions in 
Matthew and Luke; instead, it provides a complement as it commissions the disciples 
(who represent the entire community) to judge carefully when deciding whether to 
forgive. The implication in these verses is that the Holy Spirit (which Jesus breathes onto 
                                                
Christianity (Supplements to Novum Testamentum, 28; Leiden: Brill, 1972), p. 83; Craig 
S. Keener, The Gospel of John: A Commentary (2 vols.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 2003), vol. 2, p. 1206; Leon Morris, The Gospel According to John (The New 
International Critical Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1995), pp. 748-49; Frederick Dale Bruner, The Gospel of John: A Commentary (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), p. 1165; Steve E. Hansen, “Forgiving and Retaining Sin: 
A Study of the Test and Context of John 20:23,” Horizons in Biblical Theology 19 
(1997), pp. 24-32 (27). Barker, “John’s Use of Matthew,” p. 103 (see his diagram for 
Jesus’ words applying to individual acts of forgiveness). 
70 Keener, Gospel of John, p. 1206. 
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the disciples just prior to the instruction) will guide such decisions. And regardless of 
whether a victim forgives or retains the sins of another, God will follow suit.71 
With this intertextual reading, the forgiveness instructions in Matthew and Luke are 
tempered by Jesus’ authorizing the disciples (and the community) to make their own 
decisions about forgiveness. From Matthew and Luke, it is clear that forgiveness plays an 
important role in community cohesion and individual salvation (i.e., forgiveness by God), 
but John’s Jesus adds that forgiveness is neither a given nor an absolute obligation. 
Rather, victims must discern whether forgiveness is appropriate with the knowledge that 
God will act accordingly. 
Forgiveness that inspires repentance 
There is a strain in Christian theology that views repentance as a response to—rather 
than a prerequisite for—divine forgiveness. Miroslav Volf likens forgiveness to a gift that 
must be received. He writes, “Forgivers’ forgiving is not conditioned by repentance. The 
offenders’ being forgiven, however, is conditioned by repentance. Without repentance the 
forgivers will keep forgiving but the offenders will remain unforgiven, in that they are 
untouched by that forgiveness.”72 With regard to divine forgiveness, first there is 
forgiveness, then the response of repentance, then the grabbing hold of forgiven-ness. It 
is only by responding with repentance that one may truly accept the gift of forgiveness, 
                                                
71 This assumes the divine passive in Jn 20:23 (“they are forgiven them…they are 
retained”); see Barker, “John’s Use of Matthew,” p. 90. See n. 15 for further examples of 
the divine-passive construction. 
72 Volf, Free of Charge, p. 183. 
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but it is the initial forgiveness that inspires the repentant response.73 Similarly, 
Augustine’s concept of prevenient grace has God’s grace (and forgiveness) as occurring 
prior to any human action (including repentance).74 In this view, Jesus’ prayer from the 
cross, “Father, forgive them” (Lk. 23:34a) becomes an example of grace (forgiveness) 
that precedes and then prompts human action (repentance). 
This line of thinking has made its way into psychological circles as a way to promote 
unconditional and unilateral forgiveness. In the realm of interpersonal forgiveness, 
“Genuine forgiveness can lead the sinner to understand their wrongdoing and repent,” 
write Cynthia Ransley and Terri Spy.75 In this view, forgiveness becomes a mode by 
which the victim could positively influence the wrongdoer. “If the expression of 
forgiveness is viewed as sincere,” write Julie Juola Exline and Roy F. Baumeister, “the 
perpetrator could note the victim’s admirable behavior and feel inspired (or perhaps 
shamed) toward repentance.”76 In the context of this dissertation, such an understanding 
of the relationship between forgiveness and repentance becomes simply a way to heap a 
double burden on victims. Not only must they forgive unconditionally, but they must do 
so for the good of the perpetrator (i.e., to inspire his repentance).  
                                                
73 On Jesus’ forgiveness on the cross as inspiring repentance, see Karin Scheiber, 
Vergebung: Eine systematisch-theologische Untersuchung (Religion in Philosophy and 
Theology, 21; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), p. 67. 
74 Phillip Cary, Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 26. 
75 Ransley and Spy, Forgiveness and the Healing Process, p. 14. 
76 Julie Juola Exline and Roy F. Baumeister, “Expressing Forgiveness and Repentance: 
Benefits and Barriers,” McCullough, Pargamet, and Thoresen (eds.), Forgiveness: 
Theory, Research, and Practice, pp. 133-55 (137). 
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Forgiveness and restorative justice 
In what follows, I present chapter summaries and show how the case studies work 
together toward a more measured account of forgiveness for victims of violence and 
other wrongdoing. In the first case study, I provide a brief history of interpretation of 
Jesus’ seventy-times-seven instructions (Mt. 18:21-22 and Lk. 17:3-4). I demonstrate 
how the Church Fathers and the Reformers focus on the role of repentance in these 
instructions and how contemporary interpretations abandon the emphasis on repentance 
that is clear in both Matthew and Luke’s versions. As a result of these more recent 
interpretations, victims who participate in restorative justice encounters are often 
presented with biblical imperatives for unlimited forgiveness that is also unilateral and 
unconditional (i.e., not requiring offender repentance), when the biblical material presents 
quite a different picture.  
Restorative justice advocates idealize and heavily promote forgiveness while often 
claiming biblical mandate. I call for a reexamination of the seventy-times-seven material 
and a reinstitution of a bilateral process of forgiveness that can and must include offender 
repentance. I am critical of the restorative justice movement’s lavish praise of 
unconditional forgiveness both because it misappropriates the biblical teaching and 
because it threatens to revictimize the victim.  
Claiming biblical foundations, restorative justice advocates emphasize forgiveness 
and reconciliation as the primary response to crime. A major facet of this movement is 
the practice of Victim-Offender Mediation (VOM), where, together with a mediator 
victims face offenders to talk about the effects of the crime. While pressure to forgive is 
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taboo in this process, restorative justice advocates heavily promote forgiveness in other 
contexts and the tacit pressure to forgive is strong.  
Since many restorative justice advocates cite biblical foundations for their work,77 
this case study examines how they import biblical forgiveness instructions into a quasi-
legal process and bring them to bear on victims in the context of mediation. The seventy-
times-seven instructions in Matthew and Luke are especially prevalent in restorative 
justice literature. I show that only the “unlimited” character of forgiveness is preserved 
and celebrated, while the emphasis on offender repentance is usually downplayed and 
sometimes lost. I show how the trend in biblical studies also leans toward emphasizing 
the command for unlimited forgiveness.  
In the context of restorative justice, VOM practices both enact and contradict the 
biblical instructions. While the process is presented as a dialogue—with roles for both the 
offender (to apologize) and the victim (to forgive)—such expectations render the 
encounter artificial and scripted. Further, there is much more discussion and praise of 
                                                
77 See for example: Mark Umbreit and Marilyn Peterson Armour, Restorative Justice 
Dialogue: An Essential Guide for Research and Practice (New York: Springer 
Publishing Company, 2011), pp. 69-70; Pierre Allard and Wayne Northey, “Christianity: 
the Rediscovery of Restorative Justice,” in Michael L. Hadley (ed.), The Spiritual Roots 
of Restorative Justice (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), pp. 119-142 (133-35); 
Christopher D. Marshall, Beyond Retribution: A New Testament Vision for Justice, 
Crime, and Punishment (Studies in Peace and Scripture; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2001), pp. 268-69, 284; B. Bruce Cook, “Justice that Reconciles and Heals: Developing a 
Ministry for Crime Victims with a Restorative Justice Perspective” (D. Min. diss., Drew 
University, Madison, NJ: 2002), pp. 24-25; Marc Forget, “Crime as Interpersonal 
Conflict: Reconciliation between Victim and Offender,” in Carol Prager and Trudy 
Govier (eds.), Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2003), pp. 111-36; and especially Howard Zehr, “Restoring 
Justice,” in Lisa Barnes Lampman and Michelle D. Shattuck (eds.), God and the Victim: 
Theological Reflections on Evil, Victimization, Justice, and Forgiveness (Cambridge, UK 
and Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans and Neighbors Who Care, 1999), pp. 131-59, and 
Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Christian Peace Shelf; Scottsdale, 
PA: Herald Press, 1990), pp. 45-47, 51, 174, 185-86, 190, 228, and passim. 
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“forgiving” victims in the movement’s literature than there is about repentant offenders. 
Victims are expected to forgive regardless of the offender’s disposition, and this 
expectation is based largely on the supposed therapeutic benefits of forgiveness. Such 
forgiveness is presented as biblical, and so victims face not just a moral imperative, but 
also a theological one.  
The goal of this case-study analysis is not to discount or reject the role of forgiveness 
in the aftermath of crime. Rather, I argue that a more thorough application of the bilateral 
model of forgiveness presented in the Gospels provides a more balanced and emotionally 
safer approach to VOM than the current idealized version of forgiveness. Victims are not 
required to forgive offenders who are not repentant, and that repentance must be judged 
to be sincere and reflected in concrete actions such as restitution where possible (also a 
key concept in restorative justice). In the absence of such repentance, victims may 
withhold forgiveness and reconciliation. This is exactly the process described in the 
seventy-times-seven material. When applied to restorative justice encounters, it stands to 
create a richer experience for victims. 
Forgiveness and post-apartheid South Africa 
In the context of post-apartheid South Africa, forgiveness language dominates the 
national discourse of reconciliation. During the Human Rights Violations Committee 
hearings, victims were sometimes implored to forgive even by the TRC chairperson 
himself, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Forgiveness was touted both for its healing potential 
(mainly psychological; mainly for individuals) and its religious importance. Tutu’s 
memoir of the period, No Future Without Forgiveness, reflects this imperative. Tutu 
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repeatedly asserts that the future of the “new South Africa” is dependent on the 
unconditional forgiveness of the victims of apartheid and anti-apartheid violence. 
Alongside this rhetoric of forgiveness, I consider the Lord’s Prayer (Mt. 6:9-13; Lk. 
11:2-4). While Tutu does not frequently cite the prayer in his writings, he does mention 
its forgiveness imperative;78 its presence is implied with its daily recitation at the 
openings of the TRC hearings.79 First I review the history of interpretation of these verses 
and note how the prayer functions as a tool for ensuring community cohesion. In the 
Gospel context, the Lord’s Prayer unites voices toward common hopes and commitments: 
enough food, mutual forgiveness, protection from evil, and the emergence of the 
kingdom of God on earth.80 The prayer is a community prayer.  
The Lord’s Prayer is consistent with other accounts of forgiveness in the Gospels in 
that it emphasizes the bilateral character of forgiveness. The prayer contains both a plea 
and a promise: forgive us as we forgive. The plea contains an admission of guilt, a sense 
of repentance (i.e., asking for forgiveness), and a hope for divine pardon. The promise 
looks to enact that forgiveness in order to preserve and strengthen the early Christian 
                                                
78 Desmond Tutu, God Is Not a Christian: And Other Provocations (New York: 
HarperOne, 2011), p. 31 (citing Tutu’s words with the South African Council of 
Churches in Mogopa in 1983); Desmond Tutu, The Rainbow People of God: The Making 
of a Peaceful Revolution (ed. John Allen; New York: Doubleday, 1994), p. 224. 
79 Allan Aubrey Boesak, “‘Just Another Jew in the Ditch’: Incarnated Reconciliation,” in 
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interpersonal forgiveness. 
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community. The plea for forgiveness, which I interpret as an expression of repentance, is 
inseparable from the promise to forgive. The community repeats each of these pleas and 
promises when they pray together. 
This interpretation of the Lord’s Prayer is instructive in the context of the TRC and 
post-apartheid South Africa in that the promotion of forgiveness by Tutu and others often 
dismisses the need for repentance. Indeed, while victims in the HRVC hearings were 
often pressed to forgive, offenders appearing before the Amnesty Committee were not 
urged to apologize or otherwise show remorse. While the TRC has roles for both victims 
and offenders—the Human Rights Violations Committee and the Amnesty Committee 
hearings, respectively—the two are kept separate and there is no opportunity for 
dialogue. The rhetoric of victim forgiveness is not matched by a similar call for offender 
repentance or remorse, although coming before the Amnesty Committee with no 
guarantee of a positive outcome is a step in that direction. 
Together with his promotion of forgiveness, Tutu also frequently warned of the ill 
effects of negative emotions such as anger or resentment. Victims, then, were presented 
with an imperative to forgive based not on offender repentance but rather on promises of 
psychological or emotional healing. While he advocated forgiveness based on Christian 
imperatives, Tutu conflated that forgiveness with an idealized model of unconditional, 
unilateral forgiveness that would give birth to a new, reconciled South Africa.  
In this chapter I also demonstrate that Tutu’s repudiation of the negative emotions 
discounts the role played by anger and resentment in the years of protest leading up to the 
end of apartheid. Moving forward to a consideration of Tutu’s thought during and after 
the TRC, I show that forgiveness alone is insufficient as a national ethic. In many ways, 
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forgiveness and the reconciliation it often precedes may serve as powerful catalysts for 
conflict transformation. But forgiveness alone did not end apartheid; protest and anger 
and righteous indignation paved the way to the TRC. The biblical account does not 
preclude anger even as it calls for bilateral forgiveness. The TRC and Tutu would better 
serve victims with a reexamination of a process that calls for unconditional forgiveness. I 
propose the Lord’s Prayer as a countervailing example of community cohesion that 
involves both repentance and forgiveness. Tutu’s boosterism of unconditional, unilateral 
forgiveness may provide emotional catharsis in the short term, but pressuring victims 
toward this kind of forgiveness creates a weak version of reconciliation that is based on 
the emotional sacrifice of victims rather than mutual effort and respect.  
Forgiveness and the pastoral care of victims of domestic violence 
According to the National Institutes of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control, 
approximately 1.5 million women are victims of domestic abuse in the United States 
every year.81 Since victims often seek help from Christian clergy or other pastoral 
caregivers, theological responses play a role in how victims understand their situations 
and whether they find safety from their abusers. 
In many cases, pastors and pastoral counselors raise the issue of forgiveness with 
victims of domestic violence. Often victims, having noted the Gospel emphasis on 
forgiveness, struggle with whether and how to forgive their abusers. While certainly not 
all pastoral professionals advise women to remain in abusive marriages, many advocate 
                                                
81 P. Tjaden and N. Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner 
Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Justice, 2000; Publication No. NCJ 181867), p. iii, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf.  
  44 
forgiveness, either towards reconciling the marriage relationship or for the individual 
health of the victim. In this chapter, I examine how women are sometimes encouraged to 
follow the example of Christ on the cross (“Father, forgive them,” Lk. 23:34a) and to 
forgive without condition. I argue that this verse in fact reflects a refusal to forgive in 
such a circumstance, and thus it provides a positive model for victims of domestic 
violence to withhold forgiveness from unrepentant and potentially dangerous abusers. 
Considering that many women forgive and return to abusive partners only to be abused 
again, victims may be served by a reading of this text that encourages an intermediary 
step, such as prayer that makes way for careful discernment as called for in Jn 20:23 
before forgiving. 
I review the history of interpretation of Jesus’ cry from the cross in order to show 
how the verse has been used in both ancient and contemporary contexts to promote 
unconditional forgiveness in the midst of suffering, as well as after the fact. In light of 
Jesus’ other teachings on forgiveness in the Gospel of Luke (e.g., 17:3-4), some scholars 
assert that he withholds forgiveness in the absence of repentance.82 His prayer for 
forgiveness is entirely consistent with his earlier call for enemy love (Lk. 6:27-28), but it 
is not a direct act of forgiveness. In Luke Jesus teaches a forgiveness that is conditioned 
on repentance, and his prayer on the cross illustrates this.  
Next, I show how pastoral caregivers often apply explicit or tacit pressure on victims 
to forgive their abusers in ways that are similar to techniques used by forgiveness 
advocates in the other two case studies. Many pastors and counselors embrace the 
psychological model or unilateral and unconditional forgiveness and present this to 
                                                
82 See for example, S. John Roth, “Jesus the Pray-er” Currents in Theology and Mission 
33.6 (2006), pp. 488-500 (497). 
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victims as a biblical imperative. This forgiveness is given as the duty of the victim, as 
well as the only way to heal from abuse. I demonstrate how some pastoral caregivers 
downplay the role of repentance and conflate biblical and psychological understandings. 
When Jesus prays from the cross, he turns the matter of forgiveness over to God. As 
he suffers violence and death, he demonstrates to victims that forgiveness in the midst of 
violence is not an obligation. This prayer in place of forgiveness gives victims who are 
concerned with following the biblical text another way to respond in the midst or 
aftermath of abuse. With this interpretation, victims maintain their moral agency and may 
faithfully imitate Christ without forgiving their abusers. 
Reimagining forgiveness 
In each of these three cases, well-meaning theologians, clergy, and counselors 
transform the biblical call for forgiveness as a bilateral process that has practical 
outcomes (restored relationship, reconciliation, community cohesion) into a pop-
psychological notion that requires only emotional work on the part of the victim and little 
participation from the offender or the affected community. As such, the entire burden of 
repair rests on the victim. This dissertation presents new interpretations of biblical texts 
toward reimagining forgiveness as bilateral and contingent. 
Preserving the bilateral nature of forgiveness in accordance with the Scriptures offers 
victims a biblically based alternative to forgiving offenders. This allows victims to 
protect themselves in the wake of violence by refusing to forgive and reconcile with their 
abusers while remaining faithful to their religious convictions. The seventy-times-seven 
instructions, the Lord’s Prayer, and Jesus’ cry from the cross each contains a prescription 
for repentance as a necessary part of forgiveness.  
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It is not the purpose of this project to debunk or devalue forgiveness. On the contrary, 
I recognize that a process of repentance and forgiveness may be a powerful part of 
conflict transformation or relationship repair. Indeed, such repair is what is called for in 
the Gospel texts. However, I suggest that not every act of forgiveness is morally valuable 
or even appropriate. Following Margaret Urban Walker, I argue that the value of 
forgiveness is governed by its intentions and outcomes. She writes,  
An account of forgiveness needs to capture that part of forgiving that looks ahead 
hopefully to an uncertain future and not only to the part that looks to settle something 
in the past. There are conditions [i.e., whether the offender repents, whether that 
repentance is sincere, and whether that relationship is genuinely safe for the victim 
going forward] that make that hopefulness more or less risky, and understanding 
forgiveness as something of moral value involves understanding what conditions 
those are.83  
 
Thus, forgiveness must not be idealized; every act of forgiveness is only as good as what 
it accomplishes. For example, if forgiving an unrepentant abuser opens the door for 
further abuse, such forgiveness is not morally good. Such a discerning account holds 
forgiveness accountable to the biblical view and provides a safeguard for acts of 
forgiveness that put the victim or others in danger by becoming again vulnerable, either 
physically or emotionally, to the offender.  
Walker also argues that there are circumstances in which relationship repair may not 
be possible. She writes, “Where the reparative role of forgiveness is blocked or 
impossible due to some changeable feature of the situation, it may be true that to forgive 
under those conditions [lack of repentance, amends, or acknowledgment of harm] would 
be wrong.”84 For Walker, there are no negative moral implications for the victim who is 
                                                
83 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after 
Wrongdoing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 151-52. 
84 Walker, Moral Repair, pp. 178. 
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unable or unwilling to forgive. She continues, “Holding wrongs ‘unforgivable’ is a way 
to mark the enormity of injury and the malignancy of wrongdoing as exceeding anything 
that could be made to fit back into a reliable framework of moral relations.”85 Walker 
focuses on the end result of forgiveness as well as the act of forgiveness before naming it 
as a virtue. According to Walker, forgiveness may not be possible. According to the 
biblical instructions, forgiveness may not be possible. But that failure does not indicate a 
moral failure on the part of the individual victim. This dissertation is predicated on this 
careful and conditional understanding of the possibilities and limits of forgiveness. 
                                                
85 Walker, Moral Repair, pp. 190. 
  48 
CHAPTER II 
FROM REPENTANCE AND REPAIR TO EXISTENTIAL MUSCLE-FLEXING: 
FORGIVENESS IN THE “SEVENTY TIMES SEVEN” INSTRUCTIONS AND 
VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION 
When Clair and Anna May Weaver were brutally murdered by their fourteen-year-old 
son Keith in 1991, the response from Landisville Mennonite Church was immediate. In 
addition to caring for surviving family members, Pastor Sam Thomas created support 
groups for the community and began providing legal and social assistance for Keith. In 
the early days after the murders, Thomas encouraged the congregation to “understand 
what it means to forgive,” and to “think about their intent to forgive.”86  
A few months later, church members had established the “70x7 Fund” to help with 
the legal, therapeutic, educational, and personal needs of Keith Weaver. Through the 
fund, the congregation acknowledged their “biblical responsibility to have compassion 
for both victims and offenders and their desire to forgive and continue forgiving, even 
‘seventy times seven,’ as Jesus called his disciples to do in Matthew 18.”87  
In reporting on these events, Andrea Schrock Wenger calls the fund, “A modern 
response to an ancient command.”88 She presents the story of the Church’s actions as an 
example of restorative justice in action. Indeed, Howard Zehr, widely regarded as the 
                                                
86 Andrea Schrock Wenger, “How Does a Congregation Deal with a Triple Murder?” 
Gospel Herald, February 9, 1993, pp. 6-8 (6). The now-defunct Gospel Herald was a 
news organ of the Mennonite Church from 1908 to 1998. I received a scanned copy of 
this article courtesy of Colleen MacFarland of the Mennonite Church USA Archives on 
April 17, 2012.  
87 Wenger, “How Does a Congregation Deal with a Triple Murder?” p. 7. 
88 Wenger, “How Does a Congregation Deal with a Triple Murder?” p. 7. 
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founder of the restorative justice movement, cites the community’s response as a shining 
example of right response to crime. He writes, “[The] only justice [is one] that treats each 
actor as a full participant…that encourages communication and empathy, that addresses 
the needs of victims as well as offenders.”89 Zehr cites the “70x7 fund” as a model of 
restorative justice practice. Its name, he observes, recognizes that “forgiveness [is] a 
decision that would need to be made over and over, ‘seventy times seven.’”90 
The church’s response to the murder in their midst—as well as Zehr’s analysis—goes 
to the heart of the restorative justice movement in which advocates offer an alternative to 
the so-called “retributive” criminal justice system and criticize its emphasis on 
punishment. Privileging such values as forgiveness and reconciliation, they emphasize 
the humanity and agency of the victim, the offender, and the community. In their view, 
the essence of crime is a broken relationship and the goal of restorative justice is to repair 
that breach.91 Even when there was no relationship prior to the offense, many restorative 
justice advocates contend that the crime creates a relationship, and that relationship is 
worth restoring.92 As Mark Umbreit observes, “Restoration of the emotional and material 
                                                
89 Zehr, “Restoring Justice,” p. 159. 
90 Zehr, “Restoring Justice,” p. 154. 
91 On crime as broken relationship in restorative justice, see Howard Zehr, Changing 
Lenses, p. 184; Daniel W. Van Ness, Crime and Its Victims (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1986), p. 137; Elizabeth M. Bounds, “For Prisoners and Our 
Communities,” in Rebecca Todd Peters and Elizabeth Hinson-Hasty (eds.), To Do 
Justice: A Guide for Progressive Christians (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1989), p. 37; Marshall, Beyond Retribution, p. 73; Stuart Wilson, “The Myth of 
Restorative Justice: Truth, Reconciliation and the Ethics of Amnesty,” South African 
Journal of Human Rights 17 (2001), pp. 531-62 (553); Keith Allen Regehr, “Judgment 
and Forgiveness: Restorative Justice Practice and the Recovery of Theological Memory” 
(Ph.D. diss.; University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada, 2007), p. 37; Conrad G. Brunk, 
“Restorative Justice and the Philosophical Theories of Criminal Justice,” in Hadley (ed.), 
Spiritual Roots, pp. 31-56 (48). 
92 Zehr, Changing Lenses, p. 51. 
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losses resulting from crime is far more important than imposing ever-increasing levels of 
costly punishment on the offender.”93 
In this chapter, I examine the intersection of Scripture and law in the restorative 
justice movement and specifically in the practice of Victim-Offender Mediation (VOM). 
Since many restorative justice advocates cite biblical foundations for their work,94 I 
address how they interpret the community instructions about forgiveness in Mt.18:21-22 
and Lk.17:3-4 and apply them in this context. Advocates often use these texts to promote 
unlimited and unconditional forgiveness. However, a closer look at the biblical texts 
demonstrates definite boundaries within the forgiveness instructions, boundaries that are 
often transgressed in VOM practices. 
First, I review the history of interpretation of the so-called “seventy-times-seven” 
instructions on forgiveness. I show how these verses teach a forgiveness that is boundless 
but conditional, and I situate them in their context of a set of instructions intended to 
strengthen the nascent Christian community. In examining the process of forgiveness 
described in Matthew and Luke, I find that the call for repentance given explicitly in Lk. 
17:4 and implied in Matthew’s discourse on community discipline (18:15-20) is highly 
valued among early church fathers and reformers, but is often lost in the celebration of 
“radical forgiveness”95 that is the hallmark of restorative justice and mediation practices. 
                                                
93 Mark S. Umbreit and Jean Greenwood, Guidelines for Victim-Sensitive Victim-
Offender Mediation: Restorative Justice through Dialogue (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office 
for Victims of Crime, NC 176346; St. Paul, MN: Center for Restorative Justice and 
Peacemaking, 2000), p. 1. 
94 See “Introduction,” n. 73. 
95 Brian Zahnd, Unconditional? The Call of Jesus to Radical Forgiveness (Lake Mary, 
FL: Charisma House, 2010), p. 82: “Restorative justice is…the kind of justice Jesus 
wants to bring to a broken world. This is the kind of justice that can happen when we 
choose to end the cycle of revenge. This is the kind of justice that can happen when we 
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I also show how current interpretations enlarge the definition of forgiveness, downplay 
the role of repentance, and conflate the biblical instructions with contemporary 
psychological notions of forgiveness.  
Next, I show how VOM practices are both consistent with and also antithetical to the 
biblical forgiveness instructions. Jesus’ instructions—especially in Matthew—serve as 
directions for resolving conflicts within the community, a process that ideally ends in 
forgiveness. VOM follows this course to a point, especially by carefully delineating 
requirements for both victim and offender. However, by identifying a “forgiving” victim 
in conversation with a “repentant” offender as the basic structure, the very process 
contains pressure on each participant to behave in a particular way or risk termination of 
the mediation session.96 Further, advocates tend to draw the basis of their advocacy of 
forgiveness from contemporary visions of unlimited and unconditional forgiveness, both 
religious and psychological. While VOM mediators take care never to pressure victims to 
forgive, I show that implicit pressure and a preference for forgiveness exists.  
                                                
are more interested in restoration than retaliation.” Restorative justice expectations for 
offenders span a spectrum from eliminating prisons to encouraging mediation as a 
complement to the criminal process. For an extended discussion of the variety of 
meanings of “justice” in restorative justice circles, see Zehr, Changing Lenses, pp. 61-
157. On justice as defined anew in each restorative justice context, see Jennifer 
Llewellyn, “Restorative Justice and Truth Commissions,” in Gerry Johnstone and Daniel 
W. Van Ness, Handbook of Restorative Justice (Portland, OR: Willan Publishing, 2007), 
pp. 351-71 (360). 
96 Some VOM mediators discourage expressions of anger during mediation, and many 
cases are rejected for VOM if the victim is judged to be “too angry.” As a result, victims 
must sublimate negative emotions in order to fit within the VOM picture of what 
successful mediation looks like (Jennifer Gerarda Brown, “The Use of Mediation to 
Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique,” Emory Law Journal 43 [1994], pp. 
1247-1309 [1276]). 
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In the murder case described above, the pastor warns, “It is not helpful at all to push 
forgiveness or to give pat answers.”97 But as the congregation acted out a specifically 
“restorative” vision of community justice, one of the first tasks of the ministry team was 
to help parishioners and the victim’s family “understand what it means to forgive, and to 
…think about their intent to forgive.”98 At no point in this extended article about the 
murders and their aftermath does the author recount the words or behavior of the offender 
after his arrest. The article does not report whether he was apologetic or remorseful. For 
this community, supporting or forgiving Keith Weaver does not depend on his response. 
                                                
97 Wenger, “How Does a Congregation Deal with a Triple Murder?” p. 8. 
98 Wenger, “How Does a Congregation Deal with a Triple Murder?” p. 6. 
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Jesus’ forgiveness instructions in Matthew and Luke 
Two similar sets of teachings about forgiveness appear in Matthew and Luke:  
 
Mt. 18.21-22  
 
 
Lk. 17.3-4  
Then Peter came and said to him, 
“Lord, if my brother sins against me, 
how often should I forgive? As many 
as seven times?” Jesus said to him, 
“Not seven times, but, I tell you, 
seventy-seven times.” 
Be on your guard! If your brother 
sins, you must rebuke the offender, 
and if there is repentance, you must 
forgive. And if the same person sins 
against you seven times a day, and 
turns back to you seven times and 
says, “I repent,” you must forgive. 
 
In both passages, the verb a0fih/mi (“forgive”) echoes the Lord’s Prayer as well as the 
pronouncements of forgiveness in the healing of the paralyzed man (Mt. 9:2-8, Mk 2:2-
12, Lk. 5:17-26) and the sinful woman (Lk. 7:36-50). In Matthew’s version, Jesus gives a 
simple instruction: if a member of the church sins against you, then you must forgive 
seventy-seven times, that is, without limit. The Lucan formula is more complex. Instead 
of presenting forgiveness as an automatic response to wrongdoing, Jesus describes a 
bilateral process in which the offender must first show repentance before the victim is 
required to forgive.  
Unlimited forgiveness 
Scholars most commonly interpret Matthew’s use of “seventy-seven” to mean that 
forgiveness should be boundless.99 The number may also be an allusion to Gen. 4:24, 
                                                
99 In Matthew, the command is to forgive seventy-seven times (e9bdomhkonta/kiv e9pta/, 
which is often mistranslated as “seventy times seven times”). In Luke’s version (17:3-4), 
the command is to forgive “seven times” (e9pta/kiv) if preceded by seven expressions of 
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where Lamech boasts that he will avenge himself seventy-sevenfold. Jesus’ audience 
would have noticed this parallel and so regarded the instruction concerning unlimited 
forgiveness as the correction of Lamech’s unrestricted revenge.100 Understood as such, 
forgiveness serves to quiet, or offset, the desire for revenge. However, unlimited 
forgiveness may be as problematic as unlimited revenge in that it may excuse even 
ongoing offenses; a more effective antidote to unlimited revenge could be more careful 
consideration and moderation of the forgiving or angry response. 
Others interpret the number seventy-seven as representing not the quantity but rather 
the ongoing character of forgiveness. Christoph Klein sees the command as less about 
quantity and more a way of life, “an understanding of reconciliation as a process, that 
needs to be repeatedly [and] constantly maintained, regularly nurtured and brought about, 
therefore pointing to the demand for a ‘culture of reconciliation.’”101 In this 
configuration, forgiveness as a way of life may not include a forgiving response to every 
instance of wrongdoing but rather a general disposition toward forgiving where possible.  
In both Matthew and Luke, Peter questions whether one should forgive “seven 
times,” which would have been a very large or even infinite number. This makes Jesus’ 
multiplied responses seem even more excessive.102 Matthew’s instruction for boundless 
                                                
“I repent” (metanoh/sh|). For the sake of expediency, I refer to these texts as the “seventy 
times seven” instructions or teachings. 
100 Douglas R.A. Hare, Matthew (Interpretation; Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1993), 
p. 216. 
101 Christoph Klein, Wenn Rache der Vergebung weicht: Theologische Grundlagen einer 
Kultur der Versöhnung (Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenische Theologie, 
93; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), p. 19; translation mine. Original text: 
“Eines Verständnisses von der Versöhnung also Prozess, der immer wieder, ständig, 
regelmässig gepflegt und bewirkt, werden muss; sie ist somit Hinweis auf die Forderung 
einer ‘Kultur der Versöhnung.’” 
102 R.T. France, The Gospel of Matthew (NICCNT, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 
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forgiveness appears near the end of Jesus’ discourse on community rule. In the preceding 
verses, Jesus advises his followers to rebuke other church members when they commit 
sins and to cast those who are not receptive to this rebuke out of the community (18:15-
17). He tells Peter that he is obligated to forgive his “brother” (18:21) seventy-seven 
times. Similarly, in Luke Jesus instructs forgiveness of “your brother” (17:3) seven times 
a day as long as that disciple repents.103 The familial language indicates that these 
instructions were intended to promote reconciliation within a specific community. Luke’s 
addition of “a day” (th=v h9me/rav) to the instruction emphasizes the everyday character of 
this process.  
Forgiveness and reconciliation are closely linked in these passages. Matthew and 
Luke both devote substantial effort to dealing with conflict and reconciliation within the 
community. Relationships in the church are worth restoring.104 The exhortations in 
Matthew and Luke are limited to how church members should behave toward one 
another. The community cannot survive without active effort to maintain and nourish 
relationships.105 Forgiveness in these contexts is synonymous with reconciliation; in 
Jesus’ teachings, forgiveness always involves the restoration of right relationship and 
                                                
pp. 700, 704-705; on seven as an infinite number, see my “Seventy Times Seven,” in 
Michael Gilmour and Mary Ann Beavis (eds.), The Dictionary of the Bible and Western 
Culture: A Handbook for Students (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2012), pp. 
482-83. 
103 The NRSV renders o9 a0delfo/v as “another member of the church” (18:21) and 
“another disciple” (17:3). 
104 Thomas G. Long, Matthew (Westminster Bible Companion; Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), p. 210. On forgiveness as a tool for community 
maintenance, see also Gordon M. Zerbe, Non-Retaliation in Early Jewish and New 
Testament Texts: Ethical Themes in Social Contexts (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1993), p. 204, and W.G. Thompson, Matthew’s Advice to a Divided Community 
(Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970).  
105 Allison, “Matthew,” p. 867; see also Davies and Allison, Matthew, p. 308. 
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reintegration into the community, whether that is a human community or the 
eschatological community of the saved. The current notion that forgiveness can begin and 
end with the individual victim, or achieve an emotional or psychological change, does not 
appear in Jesus’ teachings.106 
Reproving and repentance 
While the teaching of unlimited forgiveness in Matthew seems antithetical to the 
immediately preceding instructions on strict discipline for unrepentant sinners (those not 
receptive to reproof should “be to you as a Gentile and a tax-collector” 18:17), in fact 
they are complementary. Forgiveness should be unlimited, but not unconditional. 
Leviticus instructs, “You shall not hate in your heart anyone of your kin; you shall 
reprove your neighbor, or you will incur guilt yourself” (19:17; emphasis mine). 
Correcting one’s neighbor is, according to the Bible, not only a kind response; it is also 
an obligation. Further, as Davies and Allison observe, “The [early Christian] community 
would cease to be if it did not insist on [right behavior]. Thus the spirit of forgiveness 
cannot mean blindness and indifference to sin within the church.”107  
Matthew supplies only a general instruction on forgiveness, but Luke offers details on 
the mechanics of the process. Luke gives a pair of parallel examples: “If your brother 
sins, you must rebuke him, and if there is repentance, you must forgive. And if the same 
person sins against you seven times a day, and turns back to you seven times and says, ‘I 
repent,’ you must forgive” (Lk. 17:3-4). Luke thereby presents a progression: sin → 
rebuke → repent → forgive. The second example is more specific: sin seven times a day 
                                                
106 Konstan, Before Forgiveness, p. 165-66. 
107 Davies and Allison, Matthew, p. 308. 
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→ turn back seven times a day → say, “I repent” → forgive. In Luke’s description, the 
process of forgiveness is an exchange between victim and offender with requirements on 
both sides. It follows that if any of the steps fails, the entire process fails. Luke makes 
clear that repentance is necessary for forgiveness. 
In both the Gospels of Luke and Matthew, forgiveness material appears within a 
collection of community instructions. Where Matthew separates the process of reproof 
(Mt. 18:15) from the command to forgive (18:22), Luke joins the two to demonstrate that 
forgiveness must be preceded by repentance (17:3-4). Repeated sins must be 
accompanied by repeated expressions of repentance before there can be repeated 
forgiveness (signified by the number seven).  
The early church followed Luke’s insistence on repentance. Concerning Matthew’s 
verse about the one who is unwilling to be reproved being “as a Gentile and a tax 
collector” (18:17), John Chrysostom sees Matthew as imposing a limit the command for 
forgiveness.108 He rephrases Peter’s question by adding a phrase: “How often then ought 
I to bear with him, being told his faults, and repenting? Is it enough for seven times?”109 
The addition of “being told his faults” and “repenting” to Matthew’s text indicates the 
importance of both behaviors in the granting of forgiveness. For Chrysostom, repentance 
is such an integral part of the forgiveness instruction that he alters Peter’s question in 
order to include the repentance behavior described in Luke. 
Martin Luther makes a similar move. He writes, “As oft as thy brother asks 
forgiveness, thou shalt forgive him.”110 Again, repentance demonstrated by “asking 
                                                
108 St. John Chrysostom, Homily 61 on Matthew. 
109 St. John Chrysostom, Homily 61 on Matthew. 
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forgiveness” is included in the formula. Luther considers the Matthean and Lucan 
versions of these texts to be interchangeable; his comment on Lk. 17:1-4 cross-references 
Matthew 18.111 Even in the midst of a sermon on Christ’s voluminous grace and 
forgiveness, Luther incorporates a call to repentance: “Because Christ…set up and 
erected such a kingdom, as wherein is only grace, which must at no times cease….So that 
if thou repent all things will be wholly forgiven thee.”112  
Luther invokes Lk. 24:47 (“Repentance and forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed in 
his name to all nations”) to demonstrate further the inexorable relationship between 
repentance and faith, which together open the way to forgiveness. According to Luther, 
repentance and faith cannot be understood separately. “These two are the first elements of 
Christian life,” he writes. “Repentance or contrition and grief, and faith through which we 
receive the forgiveness of sins and are righteous before God. Both should grow and 
increase in us.”113 Even as the reformer sought to correct what he saw as the Catholic 
emphasis on human works as necessary for salvation, he held onto the call for repentance 
as a requirement for forgiveness. 
John Calvin also focuses on the importance of repentance. He writes, “As repentance 
is a wonderful work of the Spirit, and is the creation of the new man, if we despise it, we 
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offer an insult to God himself.”114 He considers the Matthean and Lucan instructions 
together: Mt. 18:21-35 (the seventy-times-seven instruction and the Parable of the 
Unforgiving Servant) and Luke 17:4 (the seventy-times-seven instruction with the 
inclusion of repentance). His arrangement of the Gospel instructions presents a text that 
moves from the last line of the parable—“So likewise shall my heavenly Father do to you 
if you forgive not every one his brother from your hearts their offenses”—straight to 
Luke’s instruction—“If the same person sins against you seven times a day, and turns 
back to you seven times and says, ‘I repent,’ you must forgive.”115 By joining the two 
scriptures in this way, he emphasizes the role of repentance in forgiveness. Thus, even for 
the Reformers, repentance is an essential part of the process of forgiveness. 
Unconditional forgiveness 
Matthew and Luke present forgiveness instructions that demand concrete expressions 
(in Matthew, receptiveness to rebuke; for Luke, repentance), and early interpreters 
emphasize the bilateral process of repentance and forgiveness. However, contemporary 
voices from biblical studies, pastoral care, and psychology embrace a vision of 
forgiveness that has neither limit nor condition. Such forgiveness is then contained 
entirely in the emotional state of the victim, while the offender remains unrepentant or 
even unknown. In these scenarios, forgiveness is separated from reconciliation; it 
becomes a change of mind and heart, one that a victim is often pressured to perform. 
                                                
114 John Calvin, in Calvin’s Bible Commentaries: Matthew, Mark and Luke, Part II 
(trans. John King; Charleston, SC: Forgotten Books, 2007), p. 328. 
115 Calvin, Calvin’s Bible Commentaries, p. 325. 
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Underlying this idea are Jesus’ instructions for unlimited forgiveness, which are 
understood as unconditional.116 
Theologian and psychologist Lewis B. Smedes writes, “Forgiving is a gift, not a duty. 
It is meant to heal, not obligate. So the only good answer to Peter’s question is: Use the 
gift as often as it takes to set you free from a miserable past you cannot shake.”117 David 
W. Augsburger cites both the Matthean and Lucan passages in his work on pastoral care, 
but like Smedes, he says nothing about repentance. “Jesus sets no limits, draws no line in 
the sand, defines no point when forgiving love can capitulate to evil and offer reactive 
violence. It is in this refusal of limits, this boundless and stubborn refusal to draw lines to 
define the intolerable, that we reflect the fullness of God’s love.”118 Both authors praise 
the unconditional and unlimited character of Jesus’ teachings, but neither retains the 
original verse’s emphasis on offender repentance. 
Today, the phrase “seventy times seven” has become Christian shorthand for 
unconditional and unlimited forgiveness, especially forgiveness in situations of betrayal 
or violence. In Seventy Times Seven: The Power of Forgiveness, Johann Christoph 
Arnold relates a series of stories in which “real people” demonstrate forgiveness in 
                                                
116 David Konstan offers an account of this shift in Before Forgiveness, pp. 122-23. For 
examples of “seventy-times-seven” interpreted as a call for unconditional forgiveness, 
see Johann Christoph Arnold, Seventy Times Seven: The Power of Forgiveness 
(Farmington, PA: Plough Publishing House, 1997); Doris Donnelly, Seventy Times 
Seven: Forgiveness and Peacemaking (Erie, PA: Pax Christi USA, 1993); David 
Augsburger, Seventy Times Seven: The Freedom of Forgiveness (Chicago, IL: Moody 
Press, 1970); Thomas W. Buckley, Seventy Times Seven: Sin, Judgment, and Forgiveness 
in Matthew (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1991); among many other textbooks, 
memoirs, and novels bearing this title and celebrating “the power of forgiveness.”  
117 Lewis B. Smedes, The Art of Forgiving: When You Need to Forgive and Don’t Know 
How (New York and Toronto: Random House, 1996), p. 161. 
118 David W. Augsburger, Helping People Forgive (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1996), p. 143. 
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difficult circumstances: a woman forgives her husband for molesting their daughter; a 
woman forgives and advocates for the man who kidnapped and murdered her daughter; 
parents forgive the drunk driver who killed their son.119 These, Arnold writes, are “people 
who have the right to tell you that forgiveness is the only way to find healing.”120 Arnold 
attests to the healing power of both forgiveness and repentance, but at no point does he 
posit the latter as a condition of the former.121 In his view, human forgiveness is a 
reflection of Jesus’ forgiveness, which knows no bounds.122 Repentance can open the 
door to forgiveness, but forgiveness can and should take hold even in its absence. A 
church community’s goal, he argues, “should never be punishment, but restoration.”123 
However, avoiding punishment need not negate the role of repentance, whether in a 
church community or criminal process. Withholding forgiveness in the absence of 
repentance is not necessarily synonymous with “punishment,” and according to the 
instructions in Matthew and Luke, it is exactly what is called for. 
Restorative justice and the forgiveness imperative 
Forgiveness seventy-times-seven times is attractive as a community ethic in its 
simplicity and clarity. Teodor Costin notes the potential for such forgiveness to manifest 
in everyday life. He writes, the forgiveness teachings in Matthew, “which are powerfully 
radical and at the same time stand a realistic chance of being implemented, are rooted in a 
                                                
119 Arnold, Seventy Times Seven. 
120 Arnold, Seventy Times Seven, back cover. 
121 Arnold, Seventy Times Seven, p. 150. 
122 Arnold, Seventy Times Seven, p. 157. 
123 Arnold, Seventy Times Seven, p. 150. 
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deep experience of an impartial God.”124 However, the biblical text does not portray God 
as “impartial.” In Matthew especially, God is portrayed as a harsh judge prone to violent 
reactions as seen in the Parable of the Unforgiving Servant when the servant is “handed 
over to be tortured” (18:35). Neither the Matthean nor the Lucan instructions on 
boundless forgiveness recommend impartiality; on the contrary, they provide guidelines 
for reproof and repentance, along with forgiveness that depends on both. The idea that 
these forgiveness instructions might reach into contemporary contexts with a “realistic 
chance” of being implemented is the kernel of the restorative justice movement. Drawing 
on a biblical vision of restoration of right relationship through repentance, forgiveness, 
and mutual respect, advocates propose alternatives to criminal justice that include 
restitution along with mediation (and ideally, reconciliation) between victim and 
offender.  
Restorative justice advocates identify the movement against traditional criminal 
justice, or what they term a “retributive” system.125 Claiming a biblical foundation, 
restorative justice shifts the focus away from the state and abstract legal concepts such as 
crime as a violation against the State126 to focus on the effects of crime on relationships 
                                                
124 Teodor Costin, Il Perdono di dio nel Vangelo di Matteo: Uno studio esegetico-
teologico (Tesi Gregoriana Serie Teologia, 133; Roma: Editrice Pontificia Università 
Gregoriana, 2006), p. 223; translation mine. Original text: “Tali affermazioni etiche di 
Matteo, con il loro forte radicalismo e, nello stesso tempo, con la loro reale possibilità di 
essere messe in pratica, sono radicate nella propria profonda esperienza di un Dio 
imparziale.” 
125 While restorative justice advocates position themselves against the “retributive” 
American criminal justice system, this is in fact a misnomer. Retribution (or, deserved 
punishment) is only one justification for punishment in a system that also aims for 
deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. See Matthew Lippman, Contemporary 
Criminal Law: Concepts, Cases, and Controversies (2nd ed.; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2010), pp. 54-57. 
126 Umbreit and Greenwood, Guidelines, p. 1; Zehr, Changing Lenses, p. 152. 
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and the community. The restorative vision names three primary stakeholders: the victim, 
the offender, and the community in which the crime occurred127 and insists that all three 
have an active role in seeking justice in the aftermath of crime. Justice is defined in terms 
of restoration of right relationship among individuals and communities rather than 
punishment of an offender. The victim takes the central role in this process, and the 
offender is encouraged to provide restitution to both the victim and the affected 
community, such as repayment of a loss or repair of damaged property. The personal 
needs of the victim and the offender rather than the state are at the forefront, and every 
attempt is made to resolve the conflict without adjudication or incarceration.128 
Central to this vision of justice is a process called Victim-Offender Mediation 
(VOM), in which the victim and the perpetrator sit together with a trained mediator in 
order to resolve questions and engage in dialogue about the offense and its effects. VOM 
reflects restorative justice’s desire to incorporate civil dispute resolution techniques such 
as mediation and restitution into the process of addressing criminal wrongs.129  
More than 1,000 VOM programs, both private- and state-funded, currently operate in 
North America and Europe.130 Advocates cite high rates of emotional satisfaction for 
                                                
127 Umbreit and Greenwood, Guidelines, p. 1.  
128 For a narrative description of restorative justice principles—especially forgiveness—
employed in the context of a murder trial, see Paul Tullis, “Can Forgiveness Play a Role 
in Criminal Justice?” New York Times Magazine (January 4, 2013), pp. 28-38. 
129 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 239. See also, Albert Fiadjoe, Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
A Developing World Perspective (New York: RoutledgeCavendish, 2004), pp. 109-130. 
130 Mark S. Umbreit and Jean Greenwood, National Survey of Victim-Offender Mediation 
Programs in the United States (Office for Victims of Crime, NCJ 176350; St. Paul, MN: 
Center for Restorative Justice & Peacemaking, 2000), p. 3; in 2000, there were 315 
programs in the United States and Canada, and 707 programs in Europe. 
  64 
both victims and offenders.131 Currently VOM is used primarily in juvenile cases, first-
time offenses, and low-level property crimes, but advocates are pressing for its 
employment in cases of assault, rape, and even homicide (with surviving family 
members).132 VOM provides a controlled setting in which victims can question offenders 
and offenders may explain or apologize for their actions. In some cases, offenders are 
offered reduced sentences in exchange for participating in mediation;133 in others, VOM 
stands in for the criminal justice process altogether, which means no conviction and no 
state-imposed sentence when the mediation yields positive results and both parties are 
satisfied with the outcome.  
                                                
131 For surveys and figures, see Mark S. Umbreit, Victim Meets Offender: The Impact of 
Restorative Justice and Mediation (Criminal Justice Press; Monsey, NY: Willow Tree 
Press, 1994); Heather Strang, Repair or Revenge? Victims and Restorative Justice 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Umbreit and Greenwood, National Survey; among 
others. 
132 See, for example, Sarah Eschholz, et al., “Offender’s Family Members’ Responses to 
Capital Crimes: The Need for Restorative Justice Initiatives,” in Curt R. Bartol and Anne 
M. Bartol (eds.), Current Perspectives in Forensic Psychology and Criminal Behavior 
(3rd ed.; Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications, 2012), pp. 220-29 (224); Mark S. Umbreit, 
William Bradshaw, and Robert B. Coates, “Victims of Severe Violence in Dialogue with 
the Offender: Key Principles, Practices, Outcomes and Implications,” in Elmar G.M. 
Weitekamp and Hans-Jürgen Kerner (eds.), Restorative Justice in Context: International 
Practice and Directions (Portland, OR: Willan Publishing, 2003), pp. 123-44; Mark S. 
Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert B. Coates, and Kathy Brown, “Victim-Offender Dialogue in 
Violent Cases: A Multi-Site Study in the United States,” in E. van der Spuy, S. 
Parmentier, and A. Dissel (eds.), Restorative Justice: Politics, Policies and Prospects  
(Cape Town: Juta, 2008), pp. 22-39; and Mark S. Umbreit, The Handbook of Victim-
Offender Mediation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001), Chapter 13: “Advanced 
Mediation and Dialogue in Crimes of Severe Violence,” pp. 255-90. 
133 Martin Wright, “Victim-Offender Mediation as a Step Towards a Restorative System 
of Justice,” in Heinz Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto (eds.), Restorative Justice on Trial: 
Pitfalls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation – International Research 
Perspectives (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 525-
40 (534). 
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Biblical foundations of restorative justice 
Most early victim-offender mediation134 programs were community-based non-profit 
organizations, and many were located in and funded by religious groups, often Mennonite 
churches. The Mennonite Central Committee Office on Crime and Justice continues to 
provide training, resources, and funding support to VOM programs worldwide.135 In a 
2000 national survey, Mark S. Umbreit and Jean Greenwood identify the characteristics 
of VOM programs in the United States:136 twenty-two percent surveyed were based in 
churches, and thirty-nine percent of mediations took place in Christian or Jewish places 
of worship: churches, synagogues, or temples.137  
Howard Zehr incorporates biblical material into his writings and sees the church as 
essential to the movement. “[VOM] desperately needs the church if it is to survive in a 
form that matters,” he writes. “Motivated by a biblical vision of justice as 
restoration…the church can provide the kind of independent value base and independent 
institutional base which is necessary to carry the vision.”138 Zehr’s “vision of biblical 
justice” is predicated on a broad definition of shalom that incorporates equal distribution 
of resources, peaceful social relationships, and a condition of honesty or “moral 
                                                
134 The first organized victim-offender mediation programs (first called victim-offender 
reconciliation programs, or VORP) took place in the 1970s in Elkhart, Indiana and 
Kitchener, Ontario (http://www.vorp.org/history.shtml).  
135 Marty D. Price, “Victim-Offender Mediation: The State of the Art,” VOMA Quarterly 
7.3 (1996), p. 1. 
136 Umbreit and Greenwood, National Survey. 
137 Umbreit and Greenwood, National Survey, pp. 5, 10. For VOM in church basements 
and classrooms, see also Robert B. Coates, “Mediation Observations: Case Examples and 
Analysis,” in Umbreit, Victim Meets Offender, pp. 119-38 (119, 129). 
138 Zehr, Changing Lenses, p. 174.  
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integrity.”139 All of this is “how God intends things to be.”140 Zehr interprets forgiveness 
as the highest goal for the social aspect of shalom as restoration of right relationship. 
Zehr cites multiple Old Testament texts as both positive and negative examples of 
shalom-as-justice (Lev. 24:19-20, “an eye for an eye;” Lev. 19:18-19, “do not seek 
revenge” but “love your neighbor;” Lev. 24:16, “anyone who blasphemes must be put to 
death”), but primarily he offers general statements not supported by biblical citations. 
Zehr cites only one New Testament text in support of his vision of biblical justice: 
“Therefore since we are justified by faith, we have peace with God” (Rom. 5:9). Here 
Zehr cites the RSV, but the Greek text of the final clause is quite different: swqhso/meqa 
di’ au0tou= a0po\ th=v o0rgh=v, or “we are saved through him from the anger.” The 
emphasis is on the absence of anger, not peace, and the agent of that anger is not explicit. 
Thus Zehr reads shalom-as-peace into the biblical material to support his own definition 
of justice rather than starting with the Bible and building from there. 
Zehr draws heavily on his Mennonite tradition by appealing to biblical principles that 
emphasize reconciliation and repair as primary goals.141 As a result of crime, he writes, 
“Victims and the community have been harmed and are in need of restoration.”142 
Victims should be at the center of the justice-making process and offenders should “make 
                                                
139 Zehr, Changing Lenses, pp. 126-57. 
140 Zehr, Changing Lenses, p. 132. 
141 On non-violence in the Mennonite tradition, see Sally Engle Merry, “Mennonite 
Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation,” in Cynthia Sampson and John Paul 
Lederach (eds.), From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to International 
Peacebuilding (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 203-217. The 
other texts in this volume are also instructive on non-violence in the history of the 
Mennonite tradition. 
142 Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (The Little Books of Justice and 
Peacemaking; Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2002), p. 64. 
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things right.”143 The community should be the site of this justice process, and the goal is 
an idealized image of repaired relationships and wounds addressed by dialogue and 
restitution rather than trial and incarceration. 
In some ways, restorative justice—and especially VOM—appears to bring the 
principles of the seventy-times-seven instructions into contemporary contexts in a 
productive way. The vision of conflict resolution presented by Jesus involves a dialogue 
that includes both forgiveness and repentance. The offender is held accountable by the 
community (in Matthew) or the victim (in Luke), and repentance opens the door for 
forgiveness, which is here synonymous with restored relationship. For restorative justice 
advocates, that restored relation is the essence of justice.144 
Howard Zehr cites the New Testament as a starting point. “We are called to forgive 
our enemies, those who harm us, because God has forgiven us,” he writes. “We cannot be 
free as long as we are dominated by enmity.”145 Zehr cites Mt. 18:21-22 as a reversal of 
the “law of Lamech”: “It is no accident, perhaps, that [Jesus] extends [this reversal] to 
seventy times seven, a number almost beyond imagination. From unlimited retaliation to 
unlimited love—we have come full circle.”146 He does not mention the Lucan version 
with its requirement for offender repentance.  
                                                
143 Zehr, Little Book, p. 65. 
144 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, pp. 35-96, esp. 92; Annalise E. Acorn, Compulsory 
Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice (Law and Society Series; Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2004), p. 11. 
145 Zehr, Changing Lenses, p. 45. Here, Zehr misquotes the biblical text; while Jesus does 
instruct his followers to “love your enemies,” (Lk. 6:27) nowhere does Jesus suggest that 
they should forgive their enemies.  
146 Zehr, Changing Lenses, p. 150. 
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The lack of emphasis on repentance in restorative justice literature is especially 
curious considering its prominence in the teachings of Jesus.147 In Luke, Jesus states, 
“There will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine 
righteous people who need no repentance” (Lk. 15:7). Repentance is sometimes 
celebrated in restorative justice, but repentance has nothing to match the cachet of victim 
forgiveness. When advocates quote scripture, they are most likely to cite the seventy-
times-seven teachings, Jesus’ cry from the cross, or the Lord’s Prayer—all of which are 
easily extrapolated to support the kind of emotional and unilateral forgiveness that 
restorative justice advocates praise. Jesus’ teachings about repentance carry as much 
weight in the Gospels as those on forgiveness.148  
When an offender agrees to a mediation session, this hints at repentance, but it may or 
may not be articulated during the mediation session. And since offenders often have 
incentives to participate in mediation (such as reduced or dropped charges, reduced 
sentences, or increased privileges), victims may not simply assume that a cooperative 
offender is a repentant one.149 
                                                
147 Jesus talks passionately about repentance multiple times in the Gospel literature: Mt. 
4:17, 11:20-21, 21:32; Lk. 5:31-32, 13:3-5, 15:7, 15:10, 17:3-4, 24:47. 
148 While Jesus emphasizes the importance of repentance, he devotes more overall time to 
discussing forgiveness: Mt. 6:12, 14-15; 9:2-8; 12:31-32; 18:21-22; 18:23-35; 26:28; Mk. 
2:2-12; 3:28-29; 4:10-12; 11:25; Lk. 5:17-26; 6:37-38; 7:36-50; 11:3; 12:10; 17:1-4; 
23:34; 24:46-47; Jn. 20:22-23. 
149 This is true especially in juvenile cases, when participation in mediation can mean 
dropped charges (or felony charges reduced to misdemeanors) and avoiding a criminal 
record. See Marian Liebmann, Restorative Justice: How It Works (London and 
Philadelphia, PA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2007), p. 325; Wright, “Victim-Offender 
Mediation as a Step,” p. 534; Declan Roche, Accountability in Restorative Justice 
(Clarendon Studies in Criminology; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 86. 
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Christopher Marshall presents a distorted view of biblical teachings in his 
presentation of biblically grounded restorative justice. He notes that the Lucan version of 
the seventy-times-seven command calls for repentance, but even so, he still manages a 
vision of unconditional forgiveness. “For a broken relationship to be restored, forgiveness 
by the victim alone is not enough; there must also be repentance by the offender,” he 
writes. “But even if repentance is not forthcoming, even if the relationship cannot be 
restored, the disciple is still obligated to nurture forgiveness.”150 As if on cue, Marshall 
then cites Jesus’ cry from the cross as a prooftext.  
As restorative justice advocates map the biblical call for forgiveness onto their 
theories of how criminal justice should work, three themes emerge. First, biblical 
forgiveness is equated with unilateral, unconditional forgiveness. Second, the 
requirement for repentance is lost. And third, forgiveness gets defined as a psychological 
and emotional feat accomplished by the victim, regardless of whether the offender is 
present or shows remorse. In the ideal paradigm, a remorseful offender sits across the 
table from a receptive victim and the mediation culminates in a catharsis of apology and 
forgiveness. But absent this, an endlessly and unconditionally forgiving victim suits the 
restorative purpose. 
However, the conviction that a victim will be “healed” (or, made to feel better 
physically or emotionally) by forgiving and restoring a relationship with her attacker 
represents a major flaw in restorative justice thinking. As they conjure ideals of 
successful, forgiving VOM encounters, restorative justice advocates paint their bright 
picture against the dark backdrop of retributivism (a theory of justice that advocates the 
                                                
150 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, p. 73. 
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punishment of criminals). A false dichotomy emerges as restorative justice defines itself 
over and against so-called retributive justice. In the process, victims are limited to two 
options: they engage in VOM and follow its rules of engagement, or they reject the 
restorative path in favor of retribution. The idealized “forgiving victim” takes on a 
pernicious other, the ultimate VOM undesirable: the “angry victim.”  
Defining forgiveness 
For restorative justice advocates, the primary point of departure from the biblical 
teachings is the definition of forgiveness. Where the seventy-times-seven instructions 
offer roles for both victim and offender toward forgiveness-as-reconciliation, restorative 
justice advocates isolate forgiveness as the most important and potentially most thrilling 
aspect of restoring right relation. In these pages I do not mean to suggest that restorative 
justice advocates should map their understandings of forgiveness exactly from the 
biblical text. Rather, I argue that a second look at the seventy-times-seven instructions 
could help to temper VOM’s intense focus on the victim’s response and prompt equal 
concern for the responses of both victim and offender. The bilateral vision of forgiveness 
presented in both Matthew and Luke stands to lighten the burden on the victim to forgive 
and open new possibilities of restored relationship in which accountability and restitution 
play a larger role. 
A salient problem in restorative justice literature is the conflation of biblical 
forgiveness with contemporary psychological definitions of the term. Howard Zehr starts 
out with the Bible but arrives at an unconditional forgiveness that the victim is obligated 
to undertake for her own good. “Forgiveness is letting go of the power the offense and 
the offender have over a person,” he explains. “Without this experience of forgiveness, 
  71 
without this closure, the wound festers, the violation takes over our consciousness, our 
lives.”151  
Following Zehr, Marshall writes, “Forgiveness is a process whereby those who have 
been wounded let go of the power of the offense and the offender over them, and more 
toward freedom and wholeness.”152 Such understandings of forgiveness dismiss the role 
of repentance and emphasize the psychological task of the victim. “The offense” takes on 
a life of its own as an unfriendly ghost that torments the victim, and forgiveness is the 
only way she will overcome its power.  
Restorative justice is better served by preserving the bilateral character of forgiveness 
presented in the biblical text that sees forgiveness and reconciliation as separately defined 
but closely linked. In her work on VOM,153 Stephanie van de Loo highlights the 
difference between forgiveness (Vergebung) and reconciliation (Versöhnung). 
“Forgiveness means a change of attitude on the side of the hurt person regardless of the 
dispositions or behavior of the person who caused the hurt, such as insight, remorse, or 
repentance,” she writes. “Reconciliation is a reciprocal process that requires both the 
injured person and the offender to assume responsibility for [dealing with the past] and 
also requires both to have the desire to improve relations going forward.”154 Van de Loo 
                                                
151 Zehr, Changing Lenses, p. 47. 
152 Marshall, Beyond Retribution, p. 73. 
153 In Germany this practice is known as Täter-Opfer-Ausgleich, which translates to 
Offender-Victim Compensation. 
154 Stephanie van de Loo, Versöhnungsarbeit: Kriterien - theologischer Rahmen – 
Praxisperspektiven (Theologie und Frieden; Stuttgart: W. Kolhammer, 2009), p. 16; my 
translation. Original text: “Vergebung meint eine Einstellungveränderung auf der Seite 
der - im wörtlichen oder metaphorischen Sinn - verletzten, vergebenden Person die 
unabhängig geschieht von Dispositionen oder Verhaltensweisen der verletzt habenden 
Person wie beispielsweise Einsicht, Reue oder Umkehr; Versöhnung als wechselseitiger 
Prozess setzt hingegen bei verletzter und verletzt habender Person gleichermassen 
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focuses on the “work of reconciliation” (Versöhnungsarbeit), a process that may include 
forgiveness and repentance but is not synonymous with these. For her, VOM at its best 
will be a reflection of God’s reconciliation, or restored relationship, with humankind 
through Jesus.155  
For the purposes of this chapter, I follow van de Loo in distinguishing between 
forgiveness and reconciliation. While these two ideas overlap nearly completely in the 
biblical text—that is, forgiveness does not exist apart from its tangible effect of the 
restoration of right relation—today they represent two very different ideas. Forgiveness is 
defined as giving up resentment, anger, or negative actions against the offender and may 
include—but not always—the offender’s expressions of remorse or repentance. 
Reconciliation refers to the restoration of right relationship between victim and offender. 
Reconciliation may include forgiveness, but it does not have to. For example, co-workers 
or family members, for example, may “agree to disagree,” thus restoring relationships but 
not necessarily forgiving past behavior.156  
                                                
Verantwortungsübernahme für das Gewesene und den Willen zur 
Beziehungsverbesserung voraus.”  
155 Van de Loo, Versöhnungsarbeit, p. 136 and passim. On the atonement of Christ as 
reconciliation with humanity, see Rom. 5:10, 2 Cor. 5:18, Eph. 2:16, Col. 1:20. 
156 On reconciliation without forgiveness, see Everett L. Worthington, “The Pyramid 
Model of Forgiveness: Some Interdisciplinary Speculations about Unforgiveness and the 
Promotion of Forgiveness,” in idem, Dimensions of Forgiveness: A Research Approach 
(Radnor, PA: Temple Foundation Press, 1998), pp. 107-38 (129-30); Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 8-9, 56-57; Juergen Manemann, 
“Anthropological Remarks on Reconciliation after Auschwitz (Response),” in David 
Patterson and John K. Roth (eds.), After-words: Post-Holocaust Struggles with 
Forgiveness, Reconciliation, Justice (The Pastora Goldner Series in Post-Holocaust 
Studies; Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2004), pp. 128-131 (131); 
Adam Morton, “What Is Forgiveness?” in Charles L. Griswold and David Konstan (eds.), 
Ancient Forgiveness: Classical, Judaic, and Christian (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 1-14 (9); Brien Hallet, “To Forgive and Forget?” in James D. 
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Veneration of forgiveness 
In restorative justice circles, forgiveness has become an idol. James Ptacek observes 
this veneration of forgiveness and its role in countering victims’ anger. “In Restorative 
Justice training conferences and events that I have attended in the United States, there 
have been tables filled with books about forgiveness on display… Forgiveness, then, 
seems to be a powerful emotional process that Restorative Justice harnesses.”157 Ptacek 
notes that restorative justice advocates claim an objective stance toward forgiveness even 
as they celebrate books and films on the topic. While restorative justice advocates 
generally agree that victims should never be pressured to forgive, they remain enamored 
with forgiveness at the level of mediator training. Often mediators are instructed to 
follow scripts that are “carefully designed to ensure that a process of emotional 
transformation [leading in the direction of forgiveness] takes place in a conference.”158 In 
such cases, while the participants are encouraged to “express disapproval about an 
offender’s actions,” this is matched by an emphasis on “the offender’s intrinsic worth as 
an individual, ‘separating the deed from the doer.’”159 
                                                
White and Anthony J. Marsella (eds.), Fear of Persecution: Global Human Rights, 
International Law, and Human Well-Being (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 
279-86 (280). 
157 James Ptacek, “Resisting Co-Optation: Three Feminist Challenges to Antiviolence 
Work, in idem (ed.), Restorative Justice and Violence against Women (Interpersonal 
Violence; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 5-38 (22). 
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Declan Roche observes a tendency of restorative justice authors to elevate 
forgiveness to a supernatural level.160 Other scholars revere the “magical”161 or 
“miraculous”162 powers of apology and forgiveness, and Conrad G. Brunk writes, 
“Offenders, victims, families, mediators, judges, and lawyers who participate all speak of 
the ‘magic,’ or ‘deeply spiritual’ aspects of the events that take place” when offenders 
show repentance and victims are able to forgive.”163 These scholars name repentance as a 
part of the process, but their primary focus is on forgiveness. 
Some argue that forgiveness is not only a moral obligation of the victim, but also 
necessary for restoring the offender as a productive member of society. Margaret 
Holmgren writes, “If the offender is forgiven by his victim, he may feel as if he has a new 
lease on life, or a second chance to be a decent, contributive member of society.”164 This 
carries resonances of the Christian notion that forgiveness may precede repentance so as 
to inspire it.165 In Holmgren’s lengthy treatise on the virtues of unconditional forgiveness, 
though, she offers scant anecdotal or statistical evidence of such positive outcomes. 
Indeed, many victims may not appreciate being loaded with the burden of restoring a 
violent offender to a positive place in the community.  
The offender has no prescribed role in this process of unconditional forgiveness. 
Instead, Holmgren writes, “I argue that an attitude of unconditional genuine forgiveness 
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is always appropriate and desirable from a moral point of view, regardless of whether the 
offender repents and regardless of what he has done or suffered.”166 A bilateral process of 
forgiveness may occur, she writes, but it will be sparked by this initial cultivation of 
“unconditional genuine forgiveness,” which is the moral obligation of the victim.167 Thus, 
the fate of both victim and offender lies in the hands of the victim and depends on the 
victim’s willingness to meet the offender face to face, listen to him, and bestow the 
powerful gift of forgiveness so that he may rejoin the community. According to 
Holmgren, the offender’s only responsibility is to attempt to make restitution for the 
crime, and to behave better in the future.168 These are major responsibilities, but they are 
not given as preconditions for victim forgiveness. Rather, Holmgren expects the victim to 
take a leap of faith and extend “unconditional genuine forgiveness” to any offender 
regardless of how he or she behaves. As with van de Loo above, such a view posits that 
victims must not only deal with their own injuries, but also help reform the offender.  
Holmgren dismisses any value of resentment in favor of this unconditional 
forgiveness and thus she condemns victims for what may well be a reasonable response 
to being violated and at best a measure of self-respect.169 In Aristotelian ethics, the 
absence of anger and willingness to forgive too easily are signs of “small-souledness” or 
obsequiousness.170 Nietzsche follows this line of thinking when he argues that 
forgiveness is a sign of weakness, while revenge is a sign of self-respect: “Everybody 
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will revenge himself unless he is without honor or full of contempt or full of love for the 
person who has harmed and insulted him.”171 Such revenge is a matter of “self-
preservation” and “self-defense.”172 Gregory Sadler observes, “Not only are such non-
forgiving responses merited [in Aristotelian thought], as well as protective of self and 
others in the community, they may even serve purposes of moral education both for the 
offender and for others.”173 Here, it is non-forgiveness rather than forgiveness that stands 
to reform the offender, much in the same way that many Christians believe that 
forgiveness may prompt resentment.  
Another way restorative justice advocates revere forgiveness is by naming it as a 
gift—sometimes ineffable and always invaluable—that the victim might offer the 
offender. Stephanie van de Loo describes forgiveness as a “free gift” from the victim that 
is not synonymous with but may contribute to reconciliation. “Forgiveness as an interior 
process can only be a free gift from the victim,” she writes. “In its interpersonal effects, 
forgiveness comes close to the concept of reconciliation.”174 Forgiveness here is figured 
as an internal, emotional process that may have a visible, outward effect in a reconciled 
relationship between the victim and the offender. This “free gift,” even in the absence of 
repentance, may heal the breach on its own.  
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Christopher D. Marshall, however, describes a gift that is transactional and requires 
“moral effort” on both sides to be accomplished. He writes, “Forgiveness, by definition, 
is a gift freely given to the guilty party, otherwise it is not forgiveness. But it is not given 
cheaply, for it occurs in the moral space created by remorse, repentance, confession, and 
accountability, and demands moral effort on the part of both giver and receiver. But when 
it occurs, it lifts the shame of offending (and, indeed, the shame of victimhood) from the 
heads of those affected.”175 The gift of forgiveness, then, stands to release both victim 
and offender from being, well, victim and offender. It is a task that can only be 
accomplished by the victim, with some “moral effort” on the part of the offender as well. 
And even though forgiveness requires effort from both sides, it is still seen as a gift from 
the victim to the offender. This is not to say that all victims are opposed to such “gifts;” 
indeed, in many cases victims find listening to and forgiving offenders to be a rewarding 
and valuable part of recovering from the criminal offense. My point is that victims ought 
not be presented with forgiveness as the only way forward, and certainly not in the 
absence of offender participation.  
The gift of forgiveness might also communicate renewed trust between victim and 
offender. Lode Walgrave writes, “Forgiving is a gift…because it conveys to [the 
offender] the victim’s trust that he will refrain from causing further harm and opens hope 
for constructive relations in the future.”176 However Walgrave does not discuss on what 
the victim might base this trust. Simply showing up for a mediation session does not, as 
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noted above, signal offender repentance. The “hope for constructive relations in the 
future” is yet another burden for victims who wish no further contact with the offender. 
Such visions of the transformative power of forgiveness do not speak to the realities of 
reconstructing moral relations in the aftermath of crime. Forgiveness is not a magic wand 
that erases the threat of further victimization by a “forgiven” offender.  
Marshall sees a gift-giving dynamic at play in the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk. 
15:11-32; see discussion of this text in the Introduction). He observes, “As the [story] 
indicates, it is the positive bestowal of honor on the shamed party, not the reinforcement 
or clarification of their shame, that makes the critical difference. And the person best 
equipped to confer such honor on the wrongdoer is the victim of their offense.”177 Again, 
the onus is on the victim (here, the father) to dole out the gifts of honor and community 
wellness. Whether the wasteful son has any gifts to offer towards the restoration of honor 
and right relationship remains unknown. However, at no point does the parable indicate 
that the father felt wronged by the prodigal son or in any way violated. Indeed, the father 
facilitated the initial dishonor by acceding to the younger son’s request for his share of 
the inheritance. The father’s response stands in contrast to the older brother, who fumes 
as the prodigal is welcomed home (15:28-30). And since the father is not exactly a 
“victim,” the idea that this is a parable about forgiveness is in question. The father is 
“filled with compassion” (15:20, e0splagxni/sqh), but there is no reason to assume that 
he forgives his son for anything. In Luke, e0splagxni/sqh (“to be filled with compassion, 
pity, or sympathy”178) is also Jesus’ response to the widow of Nain before he raises her 
only son from the dead (7:13). While this action could be considered as a gift, there is 
                                                
177 Marshall, Compassionate Justice, p. 231. 
178 BAGD, splagxni/zomai, p. 770. 
  79 
nothing in this instance that suggests that e0splagxni/sqh has anything to do with 
forgiveness. 
The gift status of forgiveness can be threatened if there is pressure to forgive, so 
restorative justice advocates direct mediators to avoid mentioning of forgiveness at all 
costs, especially in the context of VOM. Howard Zehr writes, “Those who cannot find it 
in themselves to forgive [should not] be encouraged to feel an extra burden of guilt. Real 
forgiveness cannot simply be willed or forced, but must come in its own time, with God’s 
help. Forgiveness is a gift. It should not be made into a burden.”179 Given Zehr’s 
exaltation of the mystery and beauty of forgiveness, forgiveness appears to be a foregone 
conclusion even for those who resist at first. 
Forgiveness and the VOM process 
The preference for forgiveness is clear in restorative justice literature—along with 
warnings not to pressure victims—but the message is often mixed. John Braithwaite 
includes forgiveness on a “priority list of values” for victim-offender mediation even as 
he writes, “We actively seek to persuade participants that they ought to listen 
respectfully, but we do not urge them to forgive. It is cruel and wrong to expect a victim 
of crime to forgive.”180 However, Braithwaite goes on to declare the power of forgiveness 
and advocate its celebration in restorative justice circles. “This is not to say that we 
should not write beautiful books like [Desmond] Tutu’s on the grace that can be found 
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through forgiveness,” he writes. “Nor does it preclude us evaluating restorative justice 
processes according to how much remorse, apology, forgiveness and mercy they 
elicit.”181 Thus, forgiveness emerges as a definite goal of restorative justice. 
VOM proponents take special care not to pressure victims to forgive offenders. In 
fact, the first mediation programs were called “Victim-Offender Reconciliation 
Programs” (VORP), but advocates realized that “reconciliation” might sound too much 
like pressure to forgive and adjusted the title accordingly.182 “The shift in terminology 
from VORP to VOM signaled a shift in focus, based on experience, from reconciliation 
to mediation as a defining characteristic of victim offender engagement.”183 I find this 
change to be a beneficial one. Victims of crime may be hesitant to engage in any process 
that envisions “reconciliation,” or a restored relationship, as its desired outcome. Shifting 
the focus to the process (mediation) rather than a desired goal (reconciliation) leaves the 
possibilities open. 
Forgiveness is the most mentioned unmentionable concept in all of restorative justice 
literature, especially when it comes to VOM. Writing with Marilyn Peterson Armour, 
Umbreit even refers to it as “the ‘f’ word” in the context of mediation.184 However, in the 
same work Umbreit and Armour espouse its spiritual healing effects. They write, 
“Forgiveness, in the sense of letting go of anger and control over the outcome, also 
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allows the victim to be whole again. This exercise of forgiveness relieves victims of the 
responsibility for their own anger, the crime, and the offender and replaces it with the 
trust that something else will prevent further crimes toward themselves and others.”185 
Umbreit and Armour do not define forgiveness any further than as a release of anger; 
they primarily discuss how amazing forgiveness is, and how important it is not to suggest 
it to victims.  
Heather Strang, whose work focuses on victim emotions and careful attention to the 
needs of victims in restorative justice theory, also espouses forgiveness as the goal of the 
restorative justice encounter. For example, she concludes her article, “Is Restorative 
Justice Imposing Its Agenda on Victims?” by pronouncing: “It is the work of a restorative 
justice encounter to engender emotions of remorse and forgiveness to the benefit of all 
participants. When that is achieved, then the restorative justice agenda has been 
fulfilled.”186  
Legal theorist Stephen P. Garvey considers the criminal justice process from the point 
of view of the offender and envisions punishment as a way to achieve restoration of 
relationships. For this punishment-as-restoration model to work, the victims must do their 
part. He writes, “It reflects a moral failure…for victims to withhold forgiveness 
unreasonably from offenders who have done all they can do to expiate their guilt. 
Forgiveness may not be obligatory, but neither is it always supererogatory. Forgiveness is 
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something victims ought to give, even if they are not obligated to give it.”187 In this 
sense, victims are subjected to moral “Good Samaritan” laws; they are obligated to help 
out offenders who have satisfied some idea of atonement by forgiving them. Not 
forgiving becomes an act of hostile neglect, just as forgiveness is seen above as a gift you 
are obligated to give.  
Here I engage the biblical text to counter Garvey’s argument. It is only in cases where 
the offender’s repentance is sincere (and this is a matter of the victim’s judgment) that the 
question of “obligation” arises in the biblical instructions. According to the forgiveness 
instructions in Luke, forgiveness is required “if there is repentance…[and if the offender] 
says, ‘I repent’” (17:4). In the context of mediation, such repentance takes the form of a 
speech act, as in the latter part of Luke’s instruction. Gauging the sincerity of the 
offender’s apology falls to the victim, just as in John 20:23 when Jesus authorizes the 
disciples to forgive and retain sins as they see fit188 If the victim judges the offender’s 
repentance to be insincere or lacking, she may refuse to forgive. The “gift” of forgiveness 
has little meaning when it is offered based on false pretenses.  
While victims may not be obligated to forgive when certain conditions are not met, 
the question remains: Must the victim forgive when the offender has satisfied every 
requirement? For example, if the offender apologizes and the victim judges the apology 
to be sincere, and if the offender has made restitution to the victim and the community, is 
forgiveness absolutely required? Regarding the biblical instructions, it appears that 
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forgiveness in such circumstances is compulsory. And in situations where the offender 
has met every demand of the victim and the justice system, I would not argue against 
forgiveness as a moral obligation. If the offender is sincere, if he is no longer a threat to 
the victim, and if restitution has been made, it may indeed be wrong to withhold 
forgiveness.  
Whether restorative justice advocates discuss or stay quiet about forgiveness, the 
emphasis (and sometimes the measure of mediation success) is on the victim’s ability—
and often the victim’s obligation—to accomplish it. Writing specifically about the 
offender’s experience of VOM in a manual for mediators, Janet P. Schmidt suggests that 
mediators should push offenders toward repentance, which is the final step before they 
are able to ask for forgiveness.189 However, later in the same manual, the authors also 
suggest building in “delays” in the mediations (such as delaying entering a room or 
waiting for papers to be signed) in order to make space for “spontaneous acts of 
contrition and forgiveness.”190 John Braithwaite presents a similar strategy. He offers 
forgiveness as the “prime example” of the values restorative justice practices should be 
designed to realize. “Many of us believe that if we can create spaces that give victims an 
opportunity to discover how they might bring themselves to forgive, this is the most 
important thing we can do,” he writes.191 Here again, forgiveness is an explicit agenda, 
and while Braithwaite knows better than to mention it in the mediation encounter, he 
advocates “creating spaces” where forgiveness might emerge. While some authors do 
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mention repentance and contrition, these are optional and often get overshadowed in the 
emphasis on forgiveness. 
To gain a local perspective on forgiveness and victim-offender mediation practices, in 
the spring of 2012 I contacted the Nashville Conflict Resolution Center. According to its 
website, the center mediates misdemeanor crimes in order to “[help] disputing parties 
communicate their needs and interests, express grievances and develop mutually 
acceptable solutions.”192 Forgiveness is not a stated goal of this process, but it is a theme 
that undergirds the center’s literature and workspace. 
In the main room of the center, copies of Mark Umbreit’s Handbook for Victim-
Offender Mediation (with its hopeful words about forgiveness) line the bookshelves. 
Executive director Tamara Losel screened the “awe-inspiring” film “The Power of 
Forgiveness” as part of a “movie night” at the center in 2009, and she offers a review on 
the center’s website. She writes, “As a mediator, I believe that our primary task is to 
bring more peace to this world. Virtues like love, compassion, forgiveness and mercy—
key ingredients in the recipe for peace—must be studied and put into practice in our own 
lives.”193 Losel also acknowledges that she uses this film—which features Robert 
Enright, Everett Worthington, Fred Luskin, and other prominent figures in the 
“forgiveness movement” speaking enthusiastically about forgiveness—as part of all 
mediator-training courses at the center.194 
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Forgiveness and the rhetoric of VOM 
VOM literature is replete with instructions on how not to mention forgiveness in the 
mediation context. Umbreit recommends mediators “listen for the issue of forgiveness 
either as an expectation of the offender or perhaps as a fear from the victim”195 so they 
might step out of the way of it. He writes, “If forgiveness is to occur, it must be genuine 
and not contrived or done because someone thought the mediator expected it.”196 The 
bottom line for Umbreit is that it is not a good idea to pressure victims into forgiving, 
primarily because this might prevent “genuine” forgiveness from taking hold. 
In the Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation, Umbreit issues a strong warning to 
mediators. He advises, “It is also important that mediators avoid the use of words such as 
forgiveness or reconciliation. Such words pressure and prescribe behavior for 
victims…Forgiveness may be expressed during the mediation session, but if the mediator 
so much as uses the word forgiveness, it may be destructive to the victim.”197 In spite of 
this instruction, Umbreit goes on to discuss forgiveness throughout the book in 
continuing to warn against its mention while simultaneously celebrating its amazing 
healing powers.198 Victims are more likely to forgive, he argues, if the mediator doesn’t 
mention forgiveness at all.199 Thus, the hush around forgiveness becomes a form of 
gentle coaxing.  
Umbreit even devotes an entire subsection to the topic of forgiveness in a chapter on 
mediation possibilities in cases of severe violence. He writes, “Although forgiveness may 
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be an outcome of the dialogue for some, it is not the goal of the program. Even if it is a 
goal of participants, there are limits as to how far such dialogues can move victim and 
offender…To forgive the [offender] for what he or she has done requires an almost 
superhuman effort.”200 Forgiveness cannot be a goal, then, because it takes superhuman 
emotional skills. This kind of language suggests that victims who are unwilling to forgive 
are unable to summon such a “superhuman effort.”  
The idealization of forgiveness in this context is especially problematic. Acorn notes 
the emotional allure of forgiveness in restorative justice processes, especially forgiveness 
in the wake of an especially violent or heinous crime. “It appeals as an exhilarating form 
of ethical bungee jumping,” she writes. “Forgiveness of the unthinkably egregious has 
more drama and is worth the effort because, if successful, it clearly counts as seriously 
impressive ethical and existential muscle-flexing.”201 As restorative encounters capitalize 
on catharsis, forgiveness offers a grand payoff.  
In Facing Violence: The Path of Restorative Justice and Mediation, Umbreit and 
colleagues evaluate VOM programs in Texas and Ohio and show their preference for 
forgiveness in the criteria they use. They evaluate “the philosophical principles that 
shaped the program, the selection and training of volunteers, the preparation, meeting, 
and follow-up phases of the work, supervision and accountability, waiting list issues, 
forgiveness, and self care.”202 Forgiveness becomes just one more logistical issue on the 
list along with case selection and waiting list maintenance. That the presence of 
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forgiveness is simply assumed at such a basic level demonstrates its ubiquity in VOM 
structures. 
Keith Allen Regehr argues that the “hidden presence” of forgiveness in restorative 
justice dialogues should be more explicit.203 “If Restorative Justice is to fully live up to 
its potential as a new way of doing justice, this presence [i.e., forgiveness] needs to 
become public and become a more explicit part of Restorative Justice practice,” he 
writes.204 However, later in the same text Regehr employs a familiar subversive strategy. 
He writes, “Despite its essential role in Restorative Justice, care must be taken not to 
impose a requirement of forgiveness on victims. Too strong a focus on the possibilities 
for reconciliation and forgiveness can drive victims away from a willingness to be 
involved.”205 For Regehr, forgiveness is and ought to be the primary goal of restorative 
justice practices, but mediators must behave as though it is not in order to ensure its 
possibility. 
Restorative justice advocates claim that forgiveness is not an explicit goal while 
simultaneously describing the healing effects “if it happens.”206 In practice, 
acknowledging the possible beneficial effects of forgiveness in the context VOM is not 
necessarily a negative aspect of the process. The problem lies in the double talk. 
Facilitators are careful not to mention forgiveness in the mediation encounter, but 
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elsewhere advocates are writing about it, hoping for it, and carefully documenting and 
celebrating every time mediations result in forgiving responses.207VOM advocates are not 
unaware of the tendency toward double talk. Mark S. Umbreit and Marilyn Peterson 
Armour acknowledge this “paradox of forgiveness” in an article by that title. “The more 
one talks about [forgiveness],” they argue, “the more likely [it] will be heard as 
behavioral prescriptions, and the less likely victims will participate and have the 
opportunity to experience elements of forgiveness and reconciliation.”208 
The forgiveness hush is directed at coaxing victim responses, but there is no 
equivalent surge of books and articles about how best to tiptoe around issues of 
repentance or remorse (because it would follow that advocates would need to avoid 
prescribing responses for offenders as well as victims). Since the forgiveness burden is on 
the victim, there is not as much urgency about how to approach offenders. The 
willingness to engage in mediation is often an indicator of remorse, and since the 
encounter is a conversation, a spoken apology is often forthcoming. Another reason the 
literature devotes less attention to speaking with offenders is that they may already be 
incarcerated and as a result, face-to-face preparation with a mediator prior to the 
encounter may be limited.209 
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Analyzing VOM rules and expectations 
Another way pressure to forgive manifests in VOM comes with the mandatory 
preparation and extensive rules for mediation encounters. VOM requires particular 
behaviors for both victim and offender. Victims who are angry, vengeful, and potentially 
disrespectful are excluded from participation. Likewise, apathetic and non-remorseful 
offenders are also excluded. By removing undesirable emotions and behaviors from the 
mediation, the stage is set for victim forgiveness and offender remorse. In some cases, 
these boundaries might be helpful, but in others they serve to stifle victim expressions of 
anger and hurt much in the same way VOM activists claim that the criminal justice stifles 
emotional responses from both victims and offenders.210 I argue that such negative 
emotions, especially on the part of the victim, have every place in the context of VOM. 
Mark S. Umbreit suggests “Guidelines for Victim-Sensitive Mediation and Dialogue 
with Offenders.”211 He starts by affirming the victim’s choice in time and place of the 
mediation session as well as the option to bring one or two support persons. Under the 
heading “Careful Screening of Cases,” he writes, “It is important in the mediation process 
that offenders take responsibility for their participation in the crime and proceed willingly 
to mediation.”212 From the outset, then, VOM is only open to offenders who acknowledge 
guilt and approach the process with contrition. The “Careful, Extensive Preparation of the 
Offender” emphasizes that offenders must delve into their feelings about the crime(s) and 
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their own experience as victims in order to foster empathy for the victim.213 Likewise, 
“Careful, Extensive Preparation of the Victim” includes helping victims with 
“preliminary brainstorming about the ways their losses and needs might be addressed.”214  
VOM demands certain “ground rules,” primarily “allowing each person to speak 
without interruption and speaking and listening respectfully.”215 Arguing and emotional 
outbursts risk termination of the mediation session. Offenders must admit guilt, and 
victims must listen without interruption to their explanations and/or apologies. The 
complex superstructure of rules surrounding the process runs counter to one of the most 
common restorative justice complaints about the traditional system, namely that its 
procedures take precedence over personal and emotional outcomes for the 
stakeholders.216 
These ground rules draw boundaries around what it means to be a victim in the 
context of restorative justice. George Pavlich identifies two characteristics of victimhood 
that seem to be non-negotiable. First, he identifies a “contingent ontology”; that is, being 
a victim is transient, and restorative justice processes imagine “moving beyond” the 
victim identity.217 The goal is the “non-victim sense of self,” and restorative justice 
practices like VOM are designed to assist with this forward motion into a non-victim 
future.218 Restorative justice defines itself as empowering and serving the needs of 
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victims, but at the same time it seeks to shed that label.219 I contend that the label of 
victim need not indicate weakness or inferiority, only one’s status of having been 
subjected to a crime. VOM advocates who focus on discarding the victim identity assign 
a negative value to the label by suggesting that it should be discarded. For most victims, 
however, simply abandoning a label does nothing to change the fact that they have been 
victimized.  
Further, Pavlich points to the structure of the pre-mediation process as containing a 
bias toward this type of victim identity (a victim who wants to escape the victim label) as 
well as a preference for a forgiving victim. He notes Heather Strang’s emphasis on victim 
preparation: “Insufficient preparation of victims (and of offenders) regarding their role in 
the conferences, their expectations about the outcome, and their rights in terms of 
requesting reparation can have serious negative consequences for victims.”220 Pavlich 
questions the need to “prepare” a victim to enter an encounter where she will play the 
role of victim. He wonders whether victimization alone shouldn’t be enough to 
recommend a victim for the role. Rather, what is happening is that mediators and other 
restorative justice advocates are interested in preparing a particular kind of victim. 
“‘Preparing’ is thus an important point at which subjects are socialized into the basic 
tenets of restorative justice’s victim identity,” Pavlich writes. This includes “encouraging 
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them to adopt an identity that focuses on losses (material, emotional and relational), 
needs and resolutions to these.”221  
Using Umbreit’s guidelines, Pavlich identifies the “restorative victim” as one who 
keeps her emotions under control, never becomes “abusive or revengeful,” is reasonable 
about restitution, and is forgiving whenever possible.222 “As such,” he writes, “we have at 
least a sense of the ‘ideal type’ of victim identity that restorative justice processes are 
designed to restore and reconcile with a broader community.”223 Victim-offender 
mediation programs should include all manner of victims: angry and outraged in addition 
to conciliatory and forgiving. Instead, the current agenda for VOM is to help victims 
release or overcome anger rather than express it at length in a mediation session. Indeed, 
mediation sessions risk being terminated if a victim becomes too angry.224  
Once angry and disruptive victims are screened out, forgiveness is much more likely. 
Pavlich concludes that while VOM programs vary in their tone and design, “All embrace 
equivalents of a secular confessional in which the victim is required—as a condition of 
participating in the process—to adopt a delimited identity designed to help bring about 
restoration [in the form of forgiveness or even a restored relationship].”225 Forgiveness—
or the hope for forgiveness—is central to this identity, with some form of it nearly a 
requirement for sitting on the opposite side of this “secular confessional.” In this 
metaphor, the victim sits in the place of the priest, and she is fully expected to fill her role 
by forgiving the offender.  
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Declan Roche observes the power of language in the VOM process. “Participants in 
restorative meetings are still expected to master a language—not the formal, 
dispassionate language of the courtroom—but the nuanced and complex language of the 
emotions,” he writes. “Some will be highly proficient at expressing their feelings, able to 
communicate convincingly remorse and sorrow, forgiveness and empathy. Some 
[offenders] will master it so well they can abuse it—using rhetoric to deceive, 
manipulate, and flatter.”226 Not every VOM participant will be able to master this 
“nuanced and complex” emotional language in ways that are beneficial. Some victims 
may use it as a weapon against the offender or vice versa.  
On this point, Annalise Acorn warns, “Apology and forgiveness, the primary method 
of restorative repair, can often be anything but healing. They can be essential weapons for 
placing an offender in a position to inflict new wounds and reopen old ones.”227 Either 
victim or offender may use the mediation encounter as an opportunity to unleash harsh 
words against the other. However, the VOM guidelines, which attempt to regulate the 
encounter so that it does not deteriorate into a shouting match, often over-correct and 
reach for an opposite extreme in which anger and resentment have almost no place in the 
process. Insofar as anger is permitted, it is only in service to the restorative ideals of 
forgiveness and reconciliation. Acorn writes, “Restorative justice hopes that, by making 
appropriate space for the controlled expression of mean-spirited desires, we can 
transform them in healthy desires for right-relation.”228 There is no reason to believe that 
every victim approaches a VOM encounter with hopes for forgiveness and renewed 
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relationship. Some may simply want answers about why they were targeted, or even an 
apology. The offender has something the victim wants—usually, this is information—and 
VOM gives the victim a way to get it. Righteous indignation and anger about lost 
property or physical injury are not unreasonable emotions. Requiring a victim to 
“respect” the offender precludes the expression of such emotions. While VOM sessions 
should not be occasions for verbal or physical assaults, lifting the prohibition on anger 
could result in more victim participation in and satisfaction with the process. 
Victim intentions and VOM outcomes 
The staunchest champions of restorative justice promote mediation and reconciliation 
in cases of violent crimes by strangers.229 Here, the ideal of right relation prevails 
regardless of whether a relationship preexisted between the victim and the offender. The 
crime has created a relationship, and that relationship is worth restoring. 
 In restorative justice, healing is a primary goal, and that includes healing of both 
parties after stranger crimes, including “opportunities for forgiveness, confession, 
repentance, and reconciliation.”230 Howard Zehr writes, “Some of this must take place 
between individuals and their God, their church, and their community. But involved also 
is the relationship between victim and offender, a relationship which if it did not exist 
before the offense, does now.”231 However, restoring relationships after stranger crimes 
may be a moral impossibility. Margaret Urban Walker writes, “When a crime victim has 
been unjustly harmed by a stranger, the offense creates a relationship where there was 
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none before. Forgiveness cannot aim at the restoration of relationship here, unless this 
means restoring the fact that no relationship exists, just as no relationship existed before 
the crime.”232 Here, the value of forgiveness might trump the impossibility of restoring 
right relationship in the aftermath of a crime by a stranger. By focusing so closely on 
forgiveness as the ideal outcome, advocates may unwittingly press victims to re-engage 
with their attackers in service to this ideal. 
However, victims may reject VOM and restorative principles for a number of reasons 
that have nothing to do with retribution. Not all victims are angry. Not all are choosing 
between fantasies of forgiveness and fantasies of revenge. As Susan Jacoby observes, 
“Boundless vindictive rage is not the only alternative to unmerited forgiveness.”233 Judith 
Lewis Herman demonstrates in her study of responses to crime that many victims 
actually seek a third option: incapacitation.234 They want neither to embrace nor to punish 
the offender; they just want the offender to stay away from them. Victims who hold this 
simple hope of safety may not be interested in restorative practices, but this does not 
mean that they are seething with revenge and should be viewed negatively. Some victims 
just want to be left alone. Since the majority of VOM cases are referred by the District 
Attorney’s office, victims may experience pressure as those in authority suggest they 
participate. They may reject the suggestion for a variety of reasons, including concern for 
emotional or physical safety, but they should not be characterized as angry or vengeful 
just for passing on that opportunity. Annalise Acorn argues that the goals of restorative 
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justice reach beyond what victims and communities (and even offenders) might expect in 
the aftermath of crime. She writes, “[Restorative justice] requires that we build better, 
more respectful, more mutual relationships than those that existed prior to the wrong. It 
reaches toward an idealized state of right-relationship as its model of the just.”235  
According to Herman’s study of victim responses to crime, some victims wanted or 
valued apologies; others recognized the potential for further abuse or manipulation if they 
open themselves to such communication.236 Some victims are more than happy to let the 
state step in as the arbiter of justice. Restorative justice is built on the assumption that 
mediations are in the best interest of victims, offenders, and the community, with 
forgiveness gleaming as the ideal outcome. But for many victims the refusal to forgive an 
unrepentant attacker becomes a measure of self-protection and self-respect.237 Often, 
suggesting that a victim engage in a dialogue with the offender serves as another 
victimization in itself. Martha Minow observes, “To expect survivors to forgive is to heap 
yet another burden on them.”238 
Margaret Holmgren does not address the issue of the victim’s safety in her discussion 
of the “paradigm of forgiveness.” She theorizes forgiveness as a moral ideal with 
retribution as its evil opposite: “Retributive reactive attitudes are rejected…it is 
ultimately appropriate and desirable from a moral point of view for [crime victims] to 
adopt an attitude of unconditional genuine forgiveness toward the offender.”239 She does 
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not acknowledge that victims may withhold forgiveness (or refusing to engage in 
mediation) for reasons other than retributive goals.  
Instead, as Herman demonstrates, victims may hold the very reasonable fear of being 
reoffended. Holmgren demands a level of trust that a victim may not be able to or want to 
manufacture in order to bestow this gift on the offender. She discounts the possibility of 
more complex victim responses in the title of her book: Forgiveness and Retribution, 
which are, as she describes with her subtitle, the primary Responses to Wrongdoing.240 To 
suggest that victims are morally obligated to forgive and portray non-forgiving victims as 
vengeful and hate-filled serves only to amplify the offense they already suffer. 
Conclusion 
With its promises of healing and moral accomplishment, forgiveness has become the 
shining star of restorative justice theory and practice. The structure and rules of VOM 
along with the undercurrent of forgiveness rhetoric create an environment in which 
susceptible victims are led toward forgiveness, while angry and more emotionally 
complicated victims are screened out of the process. Advocates proclaim the importance 
of not mentioning forgiveness or pressuring victims to forgive while the forgiveness 
agenda is hidden in plain sight. This is seen in books and articles celebrating the 
miraculous healing effects of forgiveness, in subtle questions posed by mediators, and in 
the biblical principles that undergird the origins and processes of restorative justice. 
In the case of the triple murder in the Mennonite congregation, “developing the intent 
to forgive” was an immediate concern. Congregants and family members called on the 
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biblical instruction of forgiveness “seventy times seven” as they worked to support the 
young man who murdered his family. In this way, they disregarded the complexity of the 
teaching that also called for reproof (Matthew) and repentance (Luke) in order for 
forgiveness to take hold. While early interpreters of the seventy-times-seven instructions 
emphasize the role of repentance in this bilateral process of forgiveness, contemporary 
readers tend to adopt a unilateral vision that incorporates modern psychological 
definitions of forgiveness as an emotional task that concerns primarily the victim.  
In their focus on community repair, VOM practices are faithful to the New Testament 
vision. Both the seventy-times-seven instruction and VOM value community cohesion 
and harmony. The dialogic structure of VOM opens the way for a repentance-forgiveness 
exchange, but advocates who dream of unilateral, unconditional forgiveness downplay 
this bilateral opportunity. Instead, they laud forgiveness as the way to restore the 
relationship and provide beneficial emotional effects for both victim and offender. The 
assumption is always that the relationship should be restored, or at least attempts should 
be made toward that goal. However, many victims may enter into mediation with little 
interest in restoring a relationship, especially in the case of stranger crimes. Other goals 
might include having questions about the crime answered and gaining a sense of future 
security.241 For VOM advocates who claim a biblical warrant, a closer focus on victim-
offender dialogue and forgiveness-repentance exchange could stand to lighten the 
pressure on the victim, hold the offender responsible, and produce a more desirable 
outcome for the victim, the offender, and the affected community. 
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Acorn underscores the heady idealism and grandiose fantasies of forgiveness and 
right-relation inherent in restorative justice literature. “The seductive vision of restorative 
justice seems, therefore, to lie in a skillful deployment—through theory and story—of 
cheerful fantasies of happy endings in the victim-offender relation, emotional healing, 
closure, right-relation, and respectful community,” she writes. “Yet, as with all 
seductions, the fantasies that lure us in tend to be very different from the realities that 
unfold. And the grandness of the idealism in these restorative fantasies, in and of itself, 
ought to give us pause.”242  
Forgiveness may well be restorative and admirable, but it should be judged by its 
effects, not simply by its expression.243 The victim alone cannot repair the broken 
relationship; rather, such a process must be nurtured by the offender in the form of 
repentance, apology, reparation, or remorse. This is what is described in the seventy-
times-seven instructions, and this is a more constructive vision of how VOM encounters 
might look. Configuring forgiveness as a unilateral, emotional task of the victim (as 
many of the above authors do) renders the offender’s contribution desirable (but 
optional). VOM advocates do not dismiss the role of offender repentance and apology, 
but at the end of the day what they celebrate most is victim forgiveness. When 
forgiveness is unilateral and unconditional, the only necessary work is the victim’s. 
Any account of forgiveness must not only seek to settle something in the past, but 
also look toward what future landscape that forgiveness creates.244 Repair of a torn fabric 
is valuable only in its strength to withstand or prevent future tears. Such a process must 
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involve effort on the part of both victim and offender. Forgiveness may not always 
succeed. This is true in the seventy-times-seven instructions, and it is true in VOM 
practices that maintain a reciprocal understanding of reconciliation. Without question, 
though, the past and the hoped-for future, along with the victim-offender dialogue, 
determine the possibility and value of forgiveness. 
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CHAPTER III 
FROM COMMUNITY COHESION TO A HEGEMONY OF HARMONY: 
FORGIVENESS IN THE LORD’S PRAYER AND POST-APARTHEID SOUTH 
AFRICA 
On April 16, 1997 in the small coal-mining and cattle-farming town of Vryheid in 
KwaZulu Natal, Bettina Mdlalose takes her seat before the Human Rights Violations 
Committee (HRVC) of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
She is there to testify about the night of April 19, 1990, when her son was killed.245 
“The police arrived at night at about twelve midnight,” she begins. “They knocked at 
the door and I asked, ‘Who are you?’ They said they were police. I opened the 
door.…Now they started looking, searching for [my son].…They went outside to get one 
white police, and they were almost breaking the door open, and they shot instantly right 
in the bedroom.” 
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She continues, “They left and I went in the room, found out that they had already shot 
him. I tried to see if there were any signs of vitality and to no avail. They came back 
again and said, ‘This one is dead, and leave him just like that.’” 
She goes on to describe the struggle to reclaim her son’s body and how the police 
disrupted the funeral with tear gas. When she finishes, she acknowledges that the 
perpetrators have not come forward and have not applied for amnesty. Even so, the 
commissioner asks her, “If they come to you and ask for forgiveness would you be 
prepared to sit down with them, shake hands with them, and reconcile with them? Would 
you be prepared to talk to them?” 
Mrs. Mdlalose replies, “I don’t think I will allow such an opportunity.” 
 
The hearings of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission began in 1995 
to address human rights violations and other wrongdoings committed during the 
apartheid regime in which black and “coloured” (Asian or mixed-race) South Africans 
were forced to live separately from whites and with significantly fewer rights, a system 
that was often enforced by violent means. The commission was divided into three parts: 
the Human Rights Violations Committee, which heard testimony of victims; the 
Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, which assisted victims in recovery and 
awarded monetary reparations (mostly symbolic); and the Amnesty Committee, which 
reviewed applications for amnesty from those who committed crimes under apartheid. 
The TRC was meant to supplant a criminal process by giving victims a forum to be heard 
and perpetrators the opportunity to make full confessions in exchange for amnesty. All of 
this was carried out in service to South Africa’s transition to democratic rule.  
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The 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act246 established the TRC 
to deal formally with crimes committed under apartheid by both the government and the 
anti-apartheid combatants. Led by Desmond Tutu, a high-profile anti-apartheid activist 
and retired Anglican archbishop, the Act presents the mandate of the TRC: 
To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as 
possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human 
rights…emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or whereabouts of 
the victims of such violations; the granting of amnesty to persons who make full 
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political 
objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past during the said 
period; affording victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the 
taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the rehabilitation 
and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of, victims of violations of 
human rights; reporting to the Nation about such violations and victims; the 
making of recommendations aimed at the prevention of the commission of gross 
violations of human rights.247 
It was the great hope of the TRC that a thorough airing of the truth would be “a means to 
reconcile a fractured nation and heal the wounds of its troubled soul.”248  
With regard to reconciliation, Mark R. Amstutz joins a number of people who judge 
the TRC to be a success: “[It] represents the most successful governmental initiative to 
                                                
246 The full text of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 24 is 
available here: http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf.  
247 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. 
248 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of 
Truth Commissions (2nd ed.; New York and London, Routledge, 2011), p. 183. 
  104 
promote peace and harmony through the discovery and acknowledgment of truth.”249 
However, others criticize the TRC for its over-emphasis on forgiveness in the service of 
reconciliation and its questionable rhetorical tactics used to urge victims in that 
direction.250 This chapter makes its contribution to that discussion through an analysis of 
the language of forgiveness that permeated the TRC process. 
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While what follows is a critique of the forgiveness rhetoric of Desmond Tutu and the 
TRC, it should not be taken as a dismissal of the entire process. Let me be clear: The 
TRC was a remarkable experiment in alternative justice and moral repair. The victories of 
this process must not be overlooked: the cycles of racial violence fueled by apartheid 
have largely ended, democratic elections are standard, and black, white, and coloured 
people live in the same communities, study in the same schools, and enjoy the same 
freedoms. I might go so far as to join with others who call the TRC miraculous, both in 
its intention and its effect. That a truth commission could successfully supplant a criminal 
system and offer something like justice to victims, perpetrators, and the affected 
community is a beacon of hope.  
But like any institution, the TRC was flawed. Today, it leaves behind unprosecuted 
former combatants who refused to apply for amnesty, persistent and abject poverty 
among the formerly oppressed communities, and a “new civil religion” of racial 
reconciliation that is already under strain.251 The systemic racism many had hoped the 
TRC would address is still a reality.252 I am critical not of the political aspirations or the 
symbolic importance of the TRC; rather, I am troubled by the language used to pressure 
victims into forgiving perpetrators in service of the new South Africa. In this respect, the 
TRC could have done better.  
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Appeals for forgiveness in the name of national unity and reconciliation are not 
uncommon in the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) transcripts, and often 
they come directly from the chairperson of the TRC, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Many 
victims acquiesce to the calls for forgiveness, and they are lavishly praised. There are 
also, however, witnesses like Bettina Mdlalose. She refuses to forgive the men who shot 
her son; she will not even face them. With one sentence, Mdlalose rejects the TRC’s 
overarching narrative of forgiveness as healing and national reconciliation.  
This narrative is seen primarily in the writings of Desmond Tutu and crystallized in 
the title of his memoir of the TRC, No Future Without Forgiveness. Here Tutu issues the 
most famous forgiveness imperative associated with the TRC: “Without forgiveness, 
there is no future.”253 He contends that victims must forgive in order to ensure the 
reconciliation of South Africa, because such magnanimity among victims is the only way 
to quell resentment and end violence.  
However, applicants for amnesty are not required to apologize or show remorse, and 
Tutu has not yet produced a corresponding volume called No Future Without Repentance. 
The forgiveness ideal presented to victims in South Africa is both unconditional and a 
national imperative. If there is no future without forgiveness, then the entire burden of the 
future is on the victims.  
                                                
253 Tutu, No Future, pp. 165, 260, 273, 279, 282; see also Desmond Tutu, “Without 
Forgiveness There Is No Future,” in Robert D. Enright and Joanna North (eds.), 
Exploring Forgiveness (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), pp. xiii-xiv; 
Desmond Tutu, in Simon Wiesenthal, The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of 
Forgiveness (rev. and exp. ed.; New York: Schocken Books, 1998), pp. 266-68 (268); 
Meinrad Scherer-Emunds, “No Forgiveness, No Future: An Interview with Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu,” U.S. Catholic 65.8 (2000), pp. 24-28; Tutu, God Is Not a Christian, pp. 
25-36.  
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In addition, Tutu’s account generally rejects the potential value of negative emotions 
such as resentment, outrage, and anger. He denounces those emotions in his post-TRC 
work, (he notes the “corrosive” effects of anger on the common good, for example254), 
and yet his own anti-apartheid speeches, sermons, and writings demonstrate how the 
negative emotions can fuel social action. Resentment, outrage, anger, and even the refusal 
to forgive can demonstrate self-respect and a commitment to justice, i.e., holding 
offenders accountable for their actions. The fall of the apartheid government and the 
institution of the TRC could not have come about without the decades of righteous 
indignation that fueled the anti-apartheid movement.  
Reflecting on the end of the apartheid era in South Africa, Tutu posits that 
forgiveness is essential not only for transforming conflict, but for all human relations 
from the creation of Adam and Eve to the present.255 “Forgiveness is an absolute 
necessity for continued human existence,”256 he writes. However, forgiveness is reactive 
and relies on the presence of wrongdoing, as well as a community that is constantly being 
defined by that wrongdoing and forgiveness as a mode of repair. To be sure, certain 
instances of forgiveness may form constructive and even admirable ways to rebuild a 
community in the aftermath of systemic violence such as apartheid, but forgiveness is not 
the only way forward, it is conditional (depending on perpetrator repentance) and 
contextual (defined or limited by circumstance and setting), and is not always a morally 
appropriate response. I argue that because forgiveness is always contextual, it does not 
always provide a fitting foundation for a national ethic.  
                                                
254 Tutu, No Future, p. 31. 
255 Tutu, “Without Forgiveness,” p. xiii. 
256 Tutu, “Without Forgiveness,” p. xiii. 
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In this chapter I use the Lord’s Prayer as a lens to think about how forgiveness might 
be understood in the context of conflict transformation (the process by which societies in 
conflict, such as South Africa under apartheid, transform that conflict into peaceful 
outcomes), particularly the TRC and South Africa’s transition to democratic rule. First, I 
consider how the Lord’s Prayer operates as a tool for social cohesion in the Gospels of 
Matthew and Luke. I show that the prayer—which is first of all a community prayer—
depicts a vision of forgiveness that equally values asking for forgiveness from God and 
forgiving others. In both Gospels but especially Matthew, the prayer demonstrates the 
importance of community harmony for being in right relationship with God. Next, I 
examine debt language in the prayer (“forgive us our debts,” Mt. 6:14; “we forgive 
everyone indebted to us,” Lk. 11:4) and evaluate its usefulness and limits in 
contemporary interpretations. The prayer contains a repentant plea for forgiveness 
(“forgive us”) as well as a commitment to forgiving others (“as we forgive”), thus 
demonstrating the bilateral character of forgiveness. 
In the years leading up to the TRC, Tutu acknowledges the interdependence of 
repentance and forgiveness in the Lord’s Prayer. In 1990, when the Dutch Reformed 
Church confessed and apologized for providing theological support for the apartheid 
government, Tutu responded with an appeal to the reciprocal forgiveness presented in the 
Lord’s Prayer. He explains, “I cannot, when someone says, ‘Forgive me,’ say, ‘I do not.’ 
For then I cannot pray the prayer that we prayed, ‘Forgive us, as we forgive.’”257 While 
Tutu often touts unconditional, unilateral forgiveness of victims, here he emphasizes the 
importance of an exchange of repentance and forgiveness. He says, “When that 
                                                
257 Tutu, God Is Not a Christian, p. 31; citing Tutu’s words with the South African 
Council of Churches in Mogopa in 1983. 
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confession of wrongdoing is made, those of us who have been wronged must say, ‘We 
forgive you.’”258  
Not all amnesty applicants viewed their testimony as confessions or expressions of 
repentance in this sense, and applicants were not required to apologize or otherwise 
express remorse for their crimes. Since amnesty was not awarded by the TRC as a gift 
but rather in exchange for information in the form of truthful testimony, testimony before 
the Amnesty Committee did not constitute the kind of confession of sin depicted in the 
Lord’s Prayer. As a result, Tutu’s charge for victims to respond to “that confession of 
wrongdoing” with forgiveness rings hollow since testimony before the Amnesty 
Committee was not seen as a “confession of wrongdoing” in the sense Tutu implies. 
In the Gospels, both Matthew and Luke provide conditions for interpersonal 
forgiveness, as seen in the previous chapter. There is no instruction relating to 
unconditional forgiveness. The Lord’s Prayer prescribes community solidarity by way of 
a bilateral understanding of forgiveness in which believers must ask for forgiveness as 
often as they dispense it. In this case, forgiveness is not just an emotion or speech act that 
makes everything right. Rather, forgiveness here is an element of reconciliation that 
requires work from all sides in order to establish right relationship in community and 
with God.  
In the context of the TRC, forgiveness was necessary for reconciliation. However the 
term “reconciliation” was highly contested, with some arguing that it demanded 
“contrition, confession, forgiveness and restitution,”259 and others calling simply for 
                                                
258 Tutu, God Is Not a Christian, p. 29. 
259 Chapter 5, “Concepts and Principles,” Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa Report (5 vols; Cape Town: Juta, 1998), vol. 1, p. 108. 
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“peaceful coexistence.”260 The TRC defined “reconciliation” as “both a goal and a 
process” for both individuals and communities.261 
For the purposes of this chapter, I define reconciliation as the repair or restoration of a 
broken relationship, both between human beings and communities at large. In the case of 
South Africa, reconciliation means the restoration of peaceful community relations in the 
wake of apartheid. The reconciliation at stake in the TRC is between black and coloured 
South Africans who were oppressed by the white apartheid government, as well as 
between perpetrators of apartheid or anti-apartheid (of all races) and their victims.  
Building on the analysis of reciprocal forgiveness in the Lord’s Prayer, the second 
part of this chapter focuses on the rhetoric of forgiveness of the TRC and particularly its 
chairperson. Tutu draws heavily on the African concept of ubuntu, which he calls “the 
African Weltanschauung.” 262 The essence of ubuntu, he explains, is the recognition that 
all human beings are interconnected, and therefore the suffering of any affects the health 
of the whole.263 This notion of inherent interdependence undergirds the TRC and the 
drive toward reconciliation. Tutu enlarges the concept to introduce Christian language of 
forgiveness to the TRC proceedings, and a future based on reconciliation becomes a 
future based on forgiveness. As a result, victims were sometimes implicitly pressured by 
commissioners to forgive. The presence of clerical garments, prayer, and candles 
contributed to the general religious character of the hearings, which supplied implicit 
moral pressure to forgive. Throughout the proceedings, Tutu and other commissioners 
abundantly praised testifiers who agreed to forgive, both in and out of the hearing rooms. 
                                                
260 “Concepts and Principles,” TRC Report, p. 108. 
261 “Concepts and Principles,” TRC Report, p. 106. 
262 Tutu, No Future, p. 31. 
263 Tutu, No Future, p. 31. 
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In addition, Tutu promotes a biblical imperative (based primarily on the Lord’s 
Prayer [see above], the seventy-times-seven instructions, and Jesus’ cry from the cross, 
“Father, forgive them”) to forgive that is based on decided non-biblical understandings of 
forgiveness. He defines forgiveness using therapeutic terms such as “healing” and 
“catharsis,” urges victims to forgive without apology or even the presence of the 
perpetrators, and repeatedly states, “To forgive is not just to be altruistic. It is the best 
form of self-interest.”264 As a result, the project of reconciliation depends wholly on 
emotional feats of forgiveness accomplished by the victims. I contend that reconciliation 
based on one-sided forgiveness stands to be shakier than its bilateral counterpart. In 
addition, such constant pressure to forgive and celebration of forgiveness marginalize 
victims who are unable or unwilling to forgive those who tortured them, terrorized them, 
and murdered their loved ones.265 
Forgiveness in the Lord’s Prayer 
Perhaps the most familiar canonical instruction on forgiveness comes in the Lord’s 
Prayer in Matthew and Luke: 
                                                
264 Tutu, No Future, pp. 31, 35; Desmond Tutu, interview by Marina Cantacuzino for The 
Forgiveness Project, London, UK, June 1, 2003, 
http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/desmond-tutu-south-africa/; Scherer-Edmunds, 
“No Forgiveness, No Future,” p. 26. 
265 No provisions were made for psychological follow-up with victims who testified 
before the HRVC or whose perpetrators applied for amnesty, so I cannot speak to the 
experience of victims whose anger and outrage might have changed in the years since the 
close of the TRC. On this topic, see Timothy Sizwe Phatathi and Hugo van der Merwe, 
“The Impact of the TRC’s Amnesty Process on Survivors of Human Rights Violations,” 
in Chapman and van der Merwe (eds.), Did the TRC Deliver? pp. 116-42 (137). On the 
lack of follow-up with victims, see also Graybill, Miracle or Model? p. 84; Brandon 
Hamber, Transforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation, and 
Mental Health (Peace Psychology Book Series; London and New York: Springer 
Science+Business Media, 2009), p. 58. 
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Mt. 6:9-13  
 
 
Lk. 11:2-4 
‘Pray then in this way: 
Our Father in heaven, 
hallowed be your name. 
Your kingdom come. 
Your will be done, 
on earth as it is in heaven. 
Give us this day our daily bread. 
And forgive us our debts, 
as we also have forgiven our 
debtors. 
And do not bring us to the time 
of trial, 
but rescue us from the evil one.’ 
 
He said to them, ‘When you pray, 
say: Father, hallowed be your name. 
Your kingdom come. 
Give us each day our daily bread. 
And forgive us our sins, 
for we ourselves forgive everyone 
indebted to us. 
And do not bring us to the time of 
trial.’ 
 
Here I demonstrate that this prayer contains not only an imperative for human beings to 
forgive, but also an expression of repentance. While the words of confession (“Forgive us 
our debts,” Mt. 6:14//”Forgive us our sins,” Lk. 11:4) are directed at God, they constitute 
a general disposition of repentance for past transgressions.  
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The extended prayer in Matthew begins with “Our Father” and implies a community 
of believers praying together.266 In both Matthew and Luke, Jesus teaches his followers to 
pray in the first-person plural.267 Darrell Bock writes, “As disciples come before the 
Father, they are to affirm their unity and share a sense of family.”268 The prayer contains 
hoped-for ideals for the new community: enough food, forgiveness within the group, and 
protection from temptation and hardship. The communal groundwork of the Lord’s 
Prayer establishes a framework for the health and strength of the community. 
The prayer as preserving community order 
The use of the first-person plural in both versions of the Lord’s Prayer emphasizes the 
importance for preserving community unity. In Matthew, the instruction is to pray to 
“Our Father,” not “My Father.” In both Matthew and Luke, the petitions follow: “Give 
us” our daily bread, “Forgive us” our debts or sins, and “do not bring us” to the time of 
trial. The Lord’s Prayer is a corporate prayer. The command to forgive ensures that 
interpersonal conflicts will not threaten the health of the group. In addition, the prayer 
serves as a foundational story for the community; when the members pray together, they 
proclaim who they are in relation to God and each other.269 According to the Didache, the 
                                                
266 Nicholas Ayo, The Lord’s Prayer: A Survey Theological and Literary (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), p. 21. 
267 Where Matthew has, “Our father” (Pa/ter h9mw~n), Luke’s prayer is addressed simply 
to “Father” (Pa/ter). Following this, both prayers are given in the first-person plural.  
268 Darrell L. Bock, Luke (IVP New Testament Commentary Series; Downer’s Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1994), p. 203. 
269 James D.G. Dunn, “The Tradition,” in idem and Scot McKnight, The Historical Jesus 
in Recent Research (Sources for Biblical and Theological Study, 10; Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 2005), p. 167-84 (168). 
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community was to pray these words together three times a day; the promises and pleas of 
this prayer were deeply ingrained in the character of the community.270 
Cyprian also emphasizes the corporate character of the Lord’s Prayer. He writes, 
“Our prayer is public and common. When we pray, we pray not for one, but for the whole 
people, because we the whole people are one…one should thus pray for all, even as He 
Himself bore us all in one.”271 Thomas Aquinas also underscores the prayer’s importance 
for the community by insisting that the corporate power of the prayer transcends 
individual wrongs, for the voice of the prayer is the voice of the church as a whole. He 
writes, “The Lord’s Prayer is pronounced in the common person of the whole Church, 
and so if anyone say the Lord’s Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor’s 
trespasses, he lies not.”272 Even one who is not forgiving may say this prayer as a part of 
the common voice. Aquinas focuses on the all-forgiving nature of God (who abides by 
the instruction to forgive boundlessly [Mt. 18:22]) rather than on the possibility that 
unforgiving Christians may be excluded from the new covenant. 
The two parts of the forgiveness prayer represent the roles in such a forgiveness 
dialogue that may lead toward reconciliation: one asks for forgiveness, while the other 
extends forgiveness. Both actions are necessary for a reconciled community. Warren 
Carter writes, “The request for forgiveness recognizes that the one praying has violated 
human dignity and not met divine and human demands. It requests God’s faithful and 
inclusive love to set aside the debts and renew relationships and community.…Asking 
                                                
270 “Pray this three times each day” (Didache 8:3); see also Milavec, The Didache. 
271 Cyprian, “On the Lord’s Prayer.”  
272 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, second part of the second part, question 83. 
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God for such mercy means releasing others from their failed obligations also.”273 I do not 
mean to suggest that sins against God and sins against other human beings are 
interchangeable, or that asking God’s forgiveness stands in for asking forgiveness of 
others. Rather, the idea is simply that human repentance (expressed to God) and human 
forgiveness are dependent on each other. 
Petitioning God to set aside one’s debts and promising to pay this generosity forward 
demonstrate a desire to reconcile relationships marred by sin, on the part of both the 
penitent and other members of the community. This turning toward a changed 
relationship is exactly what is suggested by meta/noia, the Greek word most often 
translated as repentance in the New Testament. Annemarie S. Kidder also notes the 
complementary elements in the Lord’s Prayer:274 it is a prayer of repentance (“forgive 
us”) as much as forgiveness (“we forgive”). Every member of the community—sinner or 
sinned-against, debtor or lender—makes a contribution to unity.  
While the repentance portion of the prayer is not necessarily directed at a specific 
victim to address a specific crime, it does contain an apology as an expression of 
remorse. “Forgive me” (along with “I’m sorry,” or “I repent” [as seen in Lk. 17:4]) is a 
common phrase in the language of religious confession as well as spoken apology.275 
Indeed, “Forgive me, Father, for I have sinned,” is the opening of the traditional formula 
for Roman Catholic confession (an occasion for repentance276), and in the Anglican 
                                                
273 Carter, Matthew and the Margins, pp. 167-68. 
274 Annemarie S. Kidder, Making Confession, Hearing Confession: A History of the Cure 
of Souls (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2010), p. 203. 
275 Radzik, Making Amends, p. 56; Smith, I Was Wrong, pp. vi, 263 n. 17. 
276 “In confession we have the opportunity to repent and recover the grace of friendship 
with God” (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops [USCCB], “The Sacrament of 
Penance,” http://www.usccb.org/prayer-and-worship/sacraments/penance/).  
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tradition penitents pray, “Have mercy on us and forgive us.”277 Both petitions are rooted 
in the Lord’s Prayer and taken as penitential confessions. Edward Hanna observes, 
“Without sincere sorrow and purpose of amendment, confession avails nothing, the 
pronouncement of absolution is of no effect, and the guilt of the sinner is greater than 
before.”278 The person praying makes a general expression of repentance for past wrongs 
and pledges to forgive others in return.  
Matthew’s two-verse addendum to the Lord’s Prayer underscores the connection 
between right relation in the community and divine forgiveness: “For if you forgive 
others their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if you do not 
forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses” (6:14-15). It is 
impossible for God to be in relationship with a community that does not get along 
internally. That Matthew reiterates the prayer’s forgiveness instruction testifies to its 
importance.  
Sin as debt 
Where Matthew has, “And forgive us our debts (o0feilh/mata) as we have forgiven 
our debtors (o0feile/taiv),” Luke instructs, “And forgive us our sins (a9marti/av), for we 
ourselves forgive everyone indebted to us (o0fei/lonti).” Luke indicates that God may 
forgive the sins of human beings but then grounds the possibilities of human forgiveness 
                                                
277 Book of Common Prayer (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), p. 360. 
278 Edward Hanna, “The Sacrament of Penance,” The Catholic Encyclopedia (15 vols.; 
New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911), vol 11, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11618c.htm. 
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in the metaphor of “debts” (or, “those indebted to us”). Matthew offers an exact parallel 
between divine and human forgiveness (both forgive “debts”).279 
Luke differentiates the human ability to forgive debts from God’s capacity to forgive 
sins, but Matthew assigns to both the power to forgive “trespasses” (para/ptwma) in the 
two-verse addendum. John Nolland observes, “The switch from ‘debts’ to 
‘transgressions’ [or trespasses], which Matthew uses only in vv. 14-15, confirms that 
[Matthew] intended ‘debts’ in v. 12 to be an image for wrongdoings.”280 Thus in both 
Matthew and Luke, the human willingness to forgive debts both literal and figurative is a 
precondition for divine forgiveness. The prayer presumes that human beings have the 
ability to forgive both financial debts and personal trespasses.  
The nature of forgiveness in the Lord’s Prayer 
In the history of interpretation of the Lord’s Prayer there are numerous 
understandings of the forgiveness it describes. Parallels to the Matthean follow-up to the 
Lord’s Prayer appear in both Mark and Luke. Mark, who does not include (or perhaps 
does not know) the Lord’s Prayer, gives this admonition: “Whenever you stand praying, 
forgive, if you have anything against anyone; so that your Father in heaven may also 
forgive you your trespasses (paraptw/mata)” (11:25).281 Mark’s use of para/ptwma 
                                                
279 The verb translated as “forgive” (a0fev [a0fi/hmi]) is the same in both prayers and is 
used throughout the New Testament to indicate forgiveness of financial debt as well as 
wrongdoing (Mt. 6:9-13, 6:14-15, 9:2-8, 12:31-32, 18:21-22, 18:23-35; Mk 2:2-12, 3:28-
29, 4:10-12, 11:25; Lk. 5:17-26, 7:36-50, 11:2-4, 12:10, 17:1-4, 23:34; Jn 20:22-23; Acts 
2:37-39, 8:22; Rom. 4:7, Jas 5:15; 1 Jn 1:9, 2:12). See Bultmann, “aphíēmi,” p. 509, and 
Anderson, Sin, esp. pp. 27-39.  
280 Nolland, Gospel of Matthew, pp. 293-94. 
281 The NRSV gives the following note: “Other ancient authorities add verse 26, ‘But if 
you do not forgive, neither will your Father in heaven forgive your trespasses.’”  
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for trespasses echoes Matthew’s two-verse coda where the word is used twice. 
Para/ptwma appears only once in Mark, suggesting a familiarity with or independent 
attestation of the parallel texts in Matthew and Luke.282 Matthew’s shift indicates that he 
means the language of debts to be related to these trespasses. As opposed to the more 
serious a9martiw~n (Lk. 11:4), which signifies crimes against both other human beings 
and God, para/ptwma are literally “false steps” or transgressions against others.283 
Matthew’s follow-up is concerned with linking the resolutions of interpersonal disputes 
with God’s own forgiveness of those transgressions.  
Luke also offers an additional reciprocal formula, although it is detached from the 
prayer and uses different language. Luke writes, “Do not judge, and you will not be 
judged; do not condemn, and you will not be condemned. Forgive [a0polu/ete], and you 
will be forgiven [a0poluqh/sesqe]; give, and it will be given to you” (6:37). This verse 
marks the only time in the Gospels in which the NRSV translates the verb a0polu/w as 
“forgive.” Elsewhere the NRSV renders this word as “send away,” “depart,” “divorce,” 
or “release.”284 Every other discussion of interpersonal or divine forgiveness in the 
Gospels uses the verb a0fi/hmi. Both verbs have the literal sense of “letting go;” both can 
indicate the forgiveness or release of a debt.285 The semantic range of these terms 
                                                
282 John R. Donahue and Daniel J. Harrington, Mark (Sacra Pagina; Collegeville, MN: 
Liturgical Press, 2002), p. 330. 
283 BAGD, paraptw/ma p. 627. 
284 Elsewhere in the New Testament, a0polu/w is taken to mean “send away” (Mt. 14:15, 
22, 23, 15:23, 32, 39; Mk. 6:36, 45, 8:3, 9; Lk. 8:38, 9:12; Acts 13:3, 15:30), “depart” 
(Lk. 2:29; Acts 28:25), “divorce” (Mt. 1:19, 5:31, 5:32, 19:3, 7, 8, 9; Mk. 10:2, 4, 11, 12; 
Lk. 16:18), or “release” (Mt. 27:15, 17, 21, 26; Mk. 15:6, 9, 11, 15; Lk. 13:12, 14:4, 
22:68, 23:16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25; Jn. 18:39, 19:10, 19:12; Acts 3:13, 4:21, 4:23, 5:40, 
15:33, 16:35, 16:36, 17:9, 19:41, 23:22, 26:32, 28:18; Heb. 13:23). 
285 BAGD, a0polu/w, pp. 95-96; a0fi/hmi, p. 125. 
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indicates that forgiveness was understood in this context to have perceptible outcomes of 
release and liberation from the effects of wrongdoing as from debt. 
In the Parable of the Unforgiving Servant (Mt. 18:23-35), Jesus describes a servant 
whose enormous debt is forgiven by a king. When that servant then refuses to forgive the 
small debt of his fellow slave, the king throws him into prison to be tortured and 
reinstates his debt. Matthew uses a0polu/w alongside a0fi/hmi in this story to describe the 
king’s response to the servant’s pleas, “And out of pity for him, the lord of that slave 
released [a0pe/lusen] him and forgave [a0fh=ken] him the debt” (18:27). This proximity 
suggests that Jesus plays on the similarity of being released from slavery and having a 
debt released; the semantic ranges of both words are nearly identical. Here, debt 
forgiveness and release from captivity are related. The parable presents forgiveness as not 
reciprocal but as progressive: if one is forgiven a debt, one is obligated to forgive his or 
her debtors, just as the Lord’s Prayer describes. 
However, in the Pauline literature, God’s forgiveness was understood to be grounded 
in the death and resurrection of Jesus. Thus, forgiveness was seen as a consequence of 
and response to God’s forgiveness (as given in Eph. 4:32, “be kind to one another, 
tender-hearted, forgiving one another, as God in Christ has forgiven you,” and Col. 3:13, 
“Bear with one another and, if anyone has a complaint against another, forgive each 
other; just as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive”).286 The idea that 
mutual forgiveness was a strict requirement for receiving God’s forgiveness would have 
                                                
286 Hägerland, Jesus and the Forgiveness of Sins, p. 63. In these verses, as in most New 
Testament discussions of forgiveness outside the Gospels, the word translated as 
“forgive” is xari/zomai.  
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seemed to contradict early Christian writings that locate forgiveness not in the teachings 
of Jesus, but in the death and resurrection of Christ.  
Early Christian interpreters of the Lord’s Prayer emphasized the themes of divine 
reciprocity and right relationship to God. Tertullian (160-225) shifts the emphasis from 
forgiveness to repentance: “A petition for pardon is a full confession; because he who 
begs for pardon fully admits his guilt.”287 Cyril of Alexandria (376-444) and Gregory of 
Nyssa (335-95) both posit that human forgiveness provides a model for God’s own 
behavior.288 Cyril writes, “[Jesus] first commands them to ask forgiveness of the sins they 
commit and then to confess that they entirely forgive others. They ask God to imitate the 
patience that they practice.”289 Augustine (354-430) interprets the prayer both as a call for 
almsgiving (“so that God may give to you what you give to [the poor]”)290 and a remedy, 
or discipline of penance. The emphasis for these early interpreters is on the practical 
relationship between forgiving and being forgiven. They most often see the practice of 
forgiveness as a work that both responds to and secures God’s forgiveness. 
Martin Luther identifies a problem with the prayer’s formula of reciprocal 
forgiveness. He writes, “It looks besides as if the forgiveness of sins was gained and 
merited by our forgiving. What would then become of our doctrine that forgiveness 
                                                
287 Tertullian, Chapter VII, The Sixth Clause, from “On Prayer.” 
288 Gregory of Nyssa, Discourse Five, Forgive Us Our Debts As We Forgive Our 
Debtors. And Lead Us Not Into Temptation, But Deliver Us From The Evil One; Cyril of 
Alexandria, “On Prayer,” in Arthur A. Just (ed.), Ancient Christian Commentary on 
Scripture: New Testament III: Luke (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), p. 
188. 
289 Cyril of Alexandria, “On Prayer,” p. 188. 
290 Augustine, Sermon on the Liturgical Seasons 3.6 sermons 184-229Z, from The Works 
of St. Augustine: A Translation for the Twenty-First Century (trans. Edmund Hill; Hyde 
Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), p. 107. 
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comes alone through Christ and is received by faith?”291 The idea that salvation comes 
through the practice of human forgiveness assaults the very core of Luther’s program of 
salvation by faith alone. Luther interprets the prayer as a call for peace and unity among 
the Christian community. Its utterance forms a strong bond and prevents factions and 
discord. Interpersonal forgiveness, according to Luther, then, is not a requirement but 
rather evidence of divine forgiveness. He explains, “The external forgiveness which I 
practically show is a sure sign that I have the divine forgiveness of my sins.”292 In this 
view, forgiveness on earth is God’s forgiveness made manifest; it binds the community 
together.  
John Calvin reads the prayer with a similar emphasis on God’s unlimited mercy. 
God’s forgiveness is not conditional on mutual human forgiveness. The prayer for 
forgiveness, he writes, “the Lord intended, partly to comfort the weakness of our faith.” 
Thus, the prayer contains an assurance of forgiveness more than a command. Like 
Luther, Calvin regards human forgiveness as a sign of and not a condition for divine 
forgiveness. “For [the Lord] has added this as a sign, that we may be as certainly assured 
of remission of sins being granted us by him, as we are certain and conscious of our 
granting it to others.”293 In Calvin’s view, forgiveness becomes less an imperative on 
Christians than an inevitable outcome of faith. Along with Luther, he plants the seed of 
unconditional, unilateral forgiveness developed later by Tutu.  
Some contemporary scholars assert that the loving nature of God takes precedence 
over the threat of exclusion as a result of non-forgiveness. Like Luther, they suggest that 
                                                
291 Martin Luther, Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount (5:14-15).  
292 Luther, Sermon on the Mount.  
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making God’s love dependent on forgiveness amounts to works righteousness and 
threatens the central Protestant doctrine of salvation by grace alone. Arthur W. Pink 
writes, “My capacity to forgive others seems inconsistent and incomplete at best. Will 
God’s forgiveness be the same for me? The thought is horrifying!”294 Questioning the 
idea that the forgiveness petition contains a precondition, he suggests that it is instead an 
example of Jesus’ use of hyperbole to make his point. Pink writes, “It shocks us. How 
dare we beg for grace with no intention of extending that same grace to others?”295 The 
outrageous idea that God’s forgiveness might be conditional is meant to shock people 
into practicing forgiveness. 
Nicholas Ayo reads the prayer’s forgiveness petition as a description rather than 
condition. He writes, “‘Forgive us as we forgive’ need not imply human initiative with 
God’s mercy. It may rather point to a parallel in the kind of forgiveness being asked. 
Forgive us just as or even as we forgive others.”296 Understood this way, the prayer offers 
an illustration, something more like Cyril of Alexandria’s interpretation. The meaning is 
not, “Forgive us because we forgive,” but “Forgive us in the same way we do when we 
forgive.” Ayo writes, “We learn of God’s ways by analogy with the human ways we have 
known. It is hard to imagine how anyone could comprehend God’s forgiveness if they 
had never been forgiven during their lifetime.”297 This interpretation transforms 
forgiveness from an imperative to an ideal or ambition. Forgiveness, when it happens, 
can be a powerful and loving gesture. We may hope that God will behave in this way 
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toward us in light of our sins. These scholars remove the moral imperative from the 
prayer, and thus the character of repentance is lost. Since God’s forgiveness is a foregone 
conclusion, the petition is more a rote exercise than an earnest pleading. 
Like the early Church Fathers, Desmond Tutu calls on the reciprocal formula in the 
Lord’s Prayer to illustrate the necessity of human forgiveness in the service of God’s 
collaborative kingdom. He writes, “Extraordinarily, God, the omnipotent One depends on 
us, puny, fragile, vulnerable as we may be, to accomplish God’s purposes for good, for 
justice, for forgiveness and healing and wholeness.”298 He quotes Augustine on this 
interdependence: “God without us will not as we without God cannot.”299 However, John 
Dominic Crossan points out that this is “magnificently misquoted” by Tutu; the actual 
words of Augustine are, “God made you without you, but he doesn’t justify you without 
you.”300  
In misquoting Augustine’s maxim, Tutu makes God’s action entirely dependent on 
human participation: “God without you will not.” His misquotation loses the sense of 
omnipotence and autonomy Augustine ascribes to God: “God made you without you”; for 
Augustine, God waits for right human action to justify (or make right before God). Both 
sides of this sentence imply God’s ultimate power. Tutu’s version implies a mutual 
dependence that is absent in Augustine’s original words. Tutu implies that God may 
refuse to forgive unless human beings forgive, but he also wants to say that human beings 
have a limited capacity to forgive without God. Human beings and God, then, are equal 
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partners in forgiveness; each depends on the other to make it happen. The sense of human 
pleading with God for forgiveness, which I see as an act of repentance, gets lost in this 
teamwork formulation. 
Forgiveness in post-apartheid South Africa 
In 1985, a group of unnamed, black South African theologians came together to write 
the Kairos Document, a statement on the country’s political crisis and practices of 
apartheid, and especially the state and church theologies undergirding those practices. 
While Desmond Tutu did not sign the document, he is thought to be its architect and he 
publicly supported its ideas.301 The document proposes a contextual theology, called 
“prophetic theology,” that demands justice as a necessary condition for reconciliation. 
The Kairos theologians write, 
No reconciliation is possible in South Africa without justice. What this means in 
practice is that no reconciliation, no forgiveness and no negotiations are possible 
without repentance. The Biblical teaching on reconciliation and forgiveness 
makes it quite clear that nobody can be forgiven and reconciled with God unless 
he or she repents of their sins. Nor are we expected to forgive the unrepentant 
sinner. When he or she repents we must be willing to forgive seventy times seven 
times but before that, we are expected to preach repentance to those who sin 
against us or against anyone. Reconciliation, forgiveness and negotiations will 
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become our Christian duty in South Africa only when the apartheid regime shows 
signs of genuine repentance.302  
Like Bonhoeffer, the Kairos theologians will not stand for cheap grace. There can be no 
forgiveness without its outward manifestation of reconciliation (the restoration of right 
relationship), and no reconciliation without justice. For them, “true and lasting justice” 
involves a change in social structures that is accomplished by those who are oppressed 
(i.e., it comes from the bottom, not the top).303 Forgiveness, they argue, is contextual. It 
becomes a “Christian duty” only when repentance and justice also reign. The body 
politic, like the body of Christ, must be nourished by both forgiveness and repentance. 
This necessary relationship is manifested in the Lord’s Prayer where the petition for 
forgiveness and the commitment to forgive are intertwined, although they form a 
triangular relationship rather than a reciprocal one: the general repentance is aimed at 
God, the promised forgiveness is extended to fellow human beings, and the hoped-for 
forgiveness flows from God. This does not preclude interpersonal repentance. Rather it 
implies that asking for forgiveness (from God or from one’s neighbor) should be a 
regular discipline. However, the TRC abandons the Kairos emphasis on repentance in 
favor of a notion of forgiveness as unconditional and a source of individual healing. 
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The end of apartheid and the TRC 
Apartheid (literally, “apart-ness”) was a system of legislated racial segregation and 
white political domination in South Africa from 1948 to 1993.304 Under apartheid, 
everything from park benches and bathrooms to land, education, and political status was 
racially determined. Black Africans—who made up eighty percent of the population—
along with “coloured” (Asian or mixed-race people) were forced to live separately from 
whites and afforded limited freedom of movement; some were banished to quasi-
autonomous “homelands” or bantustans. While racial segregation began in colonial times 
under Dutch and British rule, apartheid as an official policy was introduced when the 
National Party took power in 1948.  
In 1962, the United Nations established the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. 
By 1968, the UN was urging member countries to suspend all trade and cultural relations 
with South Africa.305 As anti-apartheid resistance grew in South Africa, it was met with 
rising repression and violence from the apartheid government. In 1990, South Africa 
president F.W. de Klerk began negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC) to 
end apartheid. In 1994, Nelson Mandela—who had been jailed for twenty-seven years as 
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a result of his opposition leadership—became South Africa’s first democratically elected 
president.306  
The religious character of the TRC 
Within the hearing rooms and especially in public perception, forgiveness played a 
prominent role in the TRC. In its final report, the commission is transparent about the 
introduction of Christian language and imagery into the official process. Central to this 
boosting of forgiveness was Desmond Tutu. He promotes a vision of forgiveness that is 
unconditional and that he equates with being human, and he lavishes enormous praise on 
victims who forgive their perpetrators. 
At the time of the TRC, Desmond Tutu was serving as the first black Anglican 
Archbishop of Cape Town. His presence in the hearings was visually striking. He dressed 
in full bishop’s vestments: a long, purple cassock with a clerical collar and large crucifix. 
He opened sessions with prayer and lit candles on tables covered with white cloths.307 As 
an active participant especially in the HRVC hearings, Tutu not only convened the 
proceedings but also questioned witnesses. Even after some commissioners voiced 
concerns that the hearings were “far too ‘religious’” Tutu persisted. As the story goes, he 
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tried to open a session in Johannesburg without praying and found that he could not. “We 
cannot start without having prayed,” he announced. “Close your eyes!”308  
At the hearings, Tutu prayed not only to a “God of justice” but specifically “in the 
name of Jesus.”309 He told “the victims of apartheid crimes that we must forgive because 
God forgives us and because we ask God’s forgiveness every day when we pray the 
Lord’s Prayer.” Allan Aubrey Boesak and Curtiss Paul DeYoung write, “By doing that, 
the TRC not only Christianized the process, it has set the standards for reconciliation for 
the victims of apartheid crimes, most of them black Christians who take their faith very 
seriously indeed.”310 Muslim victim Farid Esack reflects on the Christian character of the 
commission. “On the day of my testimony,” he says, “I spoke critically to an all-Christian 
panel, headed by an archbishop sitting under a huge crucifix in a church hall.”311 The use 
of Christian imagery and language in the hearings created additional moral dilemmas for 
victims—such as difficulty with forgiveness and whether one is obligated to forgive 
unrepentant perpetrators—that went largely unaddressed throughout the hearings.312  
Tutu also heavily promoted the idea of ubuntu alongside the Christian language of 
forgiveness. He writes, “Ubuntu…is to say, ‘My humanity is caught up, is inextricably 
bound up, in yours.’”313 Ubuntu calls for justice that restores broken relationships rather 
than punishes or retaliates, because relationships are primary. “Human community is vital 
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for the individual’s acquisition of personhood,” writes Michael Battle in his explication 
of ubuntu in Tutu’s theology.314 Human beings are only persons insofar as they are social 
beings.  
The language of ubuntu appears in the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act as a founding principle of the TRC: “There is a need for understanding 
but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but 
not for victimization.”315 There is a parallel relationship among ubuntu, understanding, 
and reparation. Tutu also equates ubuntu with forgiveness,316 but the official language of 
the TRC does not; rather, the call for ubuntu is defined over and against “victimization,” 
and thus implies that forgiveness and the common good must include an end to 
violence.317 By merging forgiveness and ubuntu, Tutu invokes not only a Christian duty 
to forgive, but also an imperative that goes to the very heart of victims’ African identity. 
Tutu also calculates that ubuntu is equal to forgiveness, and thus to being human. He 
writes, “We say that a human being is a human being because he belongs to a 
community, and harmony is the essence of that community. So ubuntu actually demands 
that you forgive, because resentment and anger and desire for revenge undermine 
harmony. In our understanding, when someone doesn’t forgive, we say that person does 
not have ubuntu. That is to say, he is not really human.”318  
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Lyn Graybill is critical of such a vehement commitment to forgiveness in service of 
community harmony. She writes, “An inherent danger arises when a social order is 
enshrined around collective solidarity rather than civil liberties. Victims are expected to 
forgive and accept into the fold the perpetrator in the interests of traditional African 
values, and may feel guilty if they cannot.”319 Thus, a victim who stands up for herself in 
anger or outrage excludes herself not only from the reconciled community but also from 
what makes her African and what makes her human.  
Tutu’s language of forgiveness was not always welcome to HRVC witnesses. One 
victim testifies, “The Government is telling us, saying that we must forgive the 
perpetrators. It is very difficult to forgive someone who was an enemy…We cannot 
forgive them because they are still our enemy.”320 Tutu responds, exasperated: “After ten 
years we want to see results. We do not want to see that we have wasted our time. We 
also noted the requests you mentioned [that the perpetrators be brought forward and the 
police held accountable]. Some of them are very difficult, because we are trying to 
reconcile and to forgive each other in this country.”321 With these words, Tutu sets the 
entire project of national reconciliation and forgiveness against the earnest entreaties of 
this witness. Ostensibly, the work of the TRC will be wasted if this witness refuses to 
forgive and keeps requesting to see the perpetrators held accountable.  
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In praise of forgiving victims 
Far more common than confrontations with unforgiving witnesses in the TRC 
hearings are compliments to victims who extended forgiveness, even to unrepentant or 
unknown perpetrators. Beth Savage, for example, was severely wounded by a grenade 
attack during a wine-tasting party at her golf club in King William’s Town in 1992. 
While Savage and all of the guests at the event were white, it is not clear whether the club 
registered any official support of apartheid policies. The guerilla wing of the Pan-African 
Congress (APLA, or Azanian People’s Liberation Army) claimed responsibility, and the 
perpetrators received amnesty in 1998.322 During her earlier HRVC testimony, Savage 
spoke charitably of her attacker. She testifies, “What I would really, really like [is] to 
meet that man that threw that grenade in a attitude of forgiveness and hope that he could 
forgive me too for whatever reason.”323 To this, Desmond Tutu responds:  
Thank you, I just want to say, we are, I think a fantastic country. We have some 
quite extraordinary people…I think it just augers so wonderfully well for our 
country. We thank you for the spirit that you are showing and pray that those who 
hear you, who see you will say, “Hey, we do have an incredible country with 
quite extraordinary people of all races.” And it is important for us to know that in 
the struggle, awful things happened on both sides, and that we in this Commission 
should seek to be revealing all the truth about our country.324 
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In his memoir, Tutu recounts this incident and offers further praise. He writes, “That 
ought to leave people quite speechless with the wonder of it all and make you want to be 
still in the presence of something so sublime, filled to overflowing with a sense of deep 
thankfulness that nearly all the victims, black and white, possessed this marvelous 
magnanimity.”325 Beth Savage, with her humility and expression of unconditional of 
forgiveness, is the kind of victim the TRC prizes. 
Johan Smit, a white man whose eight-year-old son was killed in a bomb blast near 
Durban in 1985, earns similar accolades after testifying that he could empathize with the 
perpetrators.326 Tutu says, “The people of this country are incredible and the testimony 
that you have just given is something which people really admire. Our hats off to you and 
we would really like to express our appreciation and thanks to God that he created people 
like yourself, and that the reason why we still have this hope that reconciliation will 
triumph in the end is because there are people like yourself.”327 In his memoir, he cites 
Smit as another extraordinary example of South African forgiveness.328  
Nor does Tutu limit his praise to South Africans. He also lauds the parents of slain 
Fulbright Scholar Amy Beihl (they started a foundation for youth in the township where 
she was killed),329 the widows of the Craddock Four (they want to forgive even though 
they don’t know whom to forgive),330 and in a puzzling non sequitur, he gives several 
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pages to the forgiving mother of a kidnapped girl in Montana and an Irishman who 
forgave his daughter’s killers.331  
When Gregory Edmund Beck testified that Nelson Mandela inspired him to forgive 
the (unknown) men who shot and wounded him, Tutu congratulated him: “Ultimately if 
we are going to have the change then it is clear that forgiveness, reconciliation, are quite 
central to that process, and justice is an element of it as well. But forgiveness ultimately 
is to say you give people the chance to change. You open a door for someone to move 
from a dark past to a new and enlightened present and future.”332 Not only is forgiveness 
essential for national reconciliation, it is also the key to a productive future for the 
offender. Tutu continues, “All of us need to change, all of us are wounded people, all of 
us are traumatized people, all of us are people who need to forgive and who also need to 
be forgiven.”333 Victims should forgive not because perpetrators repent or ask for 
forgiveness, but because all people need to be forgiven by God and each other. 
There is very little room for responses other than forgiveness in the rhetoric of the 
TRC and the new South Africa. In some cases, commissioners appeared to restate witness 
remarks to conform to the underlying narrative of forgiveness. Audrey R. Chapman 
writes, “Whether intentionally or not, commissioners frequently seemed to misinterpret 
comments of deponents. Not infrequently a deponent told the commissioners that he 
would not forgive anyone, with the commissioner ignoring or misconstruing the 
statement in his summary remarks.”334 For example, Margaret Madlana—whose twelve-
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year-old son was murdered by police—testified, “I don’t see the opportunity of me 
forgiving anyone” (here a note in the transcript indicates, “witness upset”).335 The 
commissioner responded, “It doesn’t have to be this human rights hearing, they can come 
to the amnesty so that they as perpetrators should come before the people and tell the 
truth so that people like you can be able to forgive and reconcile.”336 Rather than 
allowing her anger to stand, he reinstates forgiveness as the ultimate goal and defers it 
toward a future amnesty hearing. 
In addition to being a prized goal of the TRC, forgiveness emerges in Tutu’s writings 
as a fundamental part of being human. In one interview he waxes nostalgic about the 
forgiving response of one of the TRC witnesses. He marvels, “How fantastic to see this 
young girl, still human despite all efforts to dehumanize her.”337 Accordingly, not to 
forgive is to be less than human. Even after being a victim of severe violence, she hangs 
onto her humanity; forgiveness is the clear sign of this. 
Tutu’s praise for forgiveness is expansive. After the gallery erupts in forgiving 
applause of the contrite perpetrators of the Bisho Massacre, when police killed twenty-
eight black activists during a protest march in 1992, Tutu reflects, “It was as if someone 
had waved a special magic wand which transformed anger and tension into this display of 
communal forgiveness and acceptance of erstwhile perpetrators.”338 According to Tutu, 
even God is impressed with all this forgiveness. He writes, “God has looked and seen all 
these wonderful people who have shone in the dark night of evil and torture and abuses 
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and suffering, shone as they have demonstrated their nobility of spirit, their magnanimity 
as they have been ready to forgive.”339  
Years after the close of the commission, Tutu describes its work as a veritable 
theophany. He says,  
The whole spirit of our process at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
marked by an incredible generosity. When we had listened to the testimony of 
people who had suffered grievously and it all had worked itself out to the point 
where they were ready to forgive and embrace the perpetrators, I would 
frequently say, “I think we ought to keep quiet now. We are in the presence of 
something holy. We ought metaphorically to take off our shoes because we are 
standing on holy ground.”340  
Thomas Brudholm notes that this religious orientation offers little alternative for victims 
besides signing on to the religious-redemptive narrative. He writes, “I would suggest that 
this kind of religious praise and celebration of forgiveness offer an all too sanguine 
perspective. There is apparently no such thing as inappropriate forgiving and there is a 
fancy for the telling of uplifting stories and redemption.”341 On the “holy ground” of the 
                                                
339 Tutu, No Future, p. 158; see also Brudholm, “Advocacy of Forgiveness,” pp. 142-43. 
340 Desmond Tutu, quoted in Peter Sanford, “Out of Africa,” Catholic Herald, January 
30, 2004, http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/30th-january-2004/7/ut-of-frica. For 
taking off one’s shoes on the holy ground instantiated by the TRC’s forgiving victims, 
see also Tutu, “On Being with Krista Tippett” (radio interview), April 29, 2010, 
American Public Media; Tutu, in The Sunflower, p. 267; Desmond Tutu, “Foreword” in 
Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney L. Peterson (eds.), Forgiveness and Reconciliation: 
Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation (Philadelphia: Templeton 
Foundation, 2001), p. xii; among others. 
341 Brudholm, “Advocacy of Forgiveness,” p. 144.  
  136 
TRC, which is also “breathtaking,”342 “extraordinary,”343 and under the sway of the 
“special magic wand,”344 non-forgiveness strikes a sour note indeed. 
Tutu’s immense praise of forgiving victims coupled with the language of forgiveness 
for the sake of national unity and also for the sake of “healing” necessarily created a 
pressure among those waiting to testify.345 The hearings were broadcast daily on 
television and radio with weekly recaps distilling the highlights.346 One young victim 
remarked in a newspaper interview, “What really makes me angry about the TRC and 
Tutu is that they are putting pressure on me to forgive. …The oppression was bad, but 
what is much worse, what makes me even angrier, is that they are trying to dictate my 
forgiveness.’347 Like Bettina Mdlalose in this chapter’s opening story, other victims and 
survivors reject the idea of forgiveness on its face.  
Tutu addresses the issue of non-forgiveness only once in his memoir, and even then it 
becomes a catalyst for another panegyric on forgiving victims. He writes, “Of course 
there were those who said they would not forgive. That demonstrated for me an important 
point that forgiveness could not be taken for granted; it was neither cheap nor easy. As it 
happens, these were the exceptions. Far more frequently what we encountered was deeply 
moving and humbling.”348 Unforgiveness, then, only serves to highlight how challenging 
and remarkable an achievement forgiveness really is.  
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The specific forgiveness of the TRC 
Perpetrators who appeared before the Amnesty Committee were offered amnesty in 
exchange for a full disclosure of events; they were not required to apologize or show 
remorse.349 The hearings of the Amnesty Committee and the Human Rights Violations 
Committee were held separately and victims had few opportunities to face their 
perpetrators. As a result, the forgiveness promoted by the TRC was most often unilateral 
and unconditional. With offenders not required to apologize to victims or even face them 
to hear their testimony, forgiveness was solely the work of victims.  
This separation of victims from offender posed no problem for Tutu. In fact, 
throughout his writings during and after the TRC, he offers unconditional forgiveness the 
most praise. For example, the daughter of one the Craddock Four, whose killers were not 
identified, famously affirmed, “We do want to forgive but we don’t know whom to 
forgive.”350 Tutu highlights this incident in his memoir and even lifts this quotation into 
the title of the chapter celebrating examples of forgiveness.351  
Tutu frequently presses victims to forgive without knowing who was responsible for 
the crimes against them, much less receiving words of repentance. He considers this kind 
of forgiveness to be “Christ-like.” He writes, “Jesus did not wait until those who were 
nailing him to the cross had asked for forgiveness. He was ready, as they drove in the 
                                                
349 There were more specific requirements for amnesty: the crime had to have been 
committed between March 1, 1960 and December 6, 1993, it had to have been politically 
motivated, and the act had to have been proportional to its motives. When amnesty was 
granted, it took immediate effect, and the applicant was exempt from criminal and civil 
liability (Verdoolaege, Reconciliation Discourse, p. 15). 
350 Tutu, No Future, pp. 149. 
351 Tutu, No Future, pp. 121-60. 
  138 
nails, to pray to his Father to forgive them.”352 He argues that victims must not wait for 
confession or repentance before they offer forgiveness. Consequently, the forgiveness of 
an unknown and unrepentant perpetrator becomes the height of moral virtue, comparable 
to that of the crucified Christ. 
Such imitation sets an almost impossibly high and not exactly equivalent standard for 
victims of systematic abuses who are asked to move forward and live peacefully 
alongside those who had abused them. Thomas Brudholm and Arne Grøn write, “The 
question is whether victims of gross injustices should be held to the example of the 
crucified Christ. After all, there are a number of salient moral and ontological differences 
between the situation of Christ and that of the human survivor of genocidal violence.”353 
Issuing a prayer of forgiveness at the moment of death does not have the same 
implications as forgiving one’s rapist or torturer who may then go on to occupy the same 
neighborhood and enjoy the same freedoms as the victim.  
Tutu also extols the therapeutic benefits of unconditional forgiveness. He writes, 
“Forgiving means abandoning your right to pay back the perpetrator in his own coin, but 
it is a loss that liberates the victim. In the commission we heard people speak of a sense 
of relief after forgiving.”354 This may be so, but it is a mistake to map a small selection of 
victim responses onto all victims of apartheid. Not all of them subscribed to Tutu’s 
Christian version of forgiveness, were receptive to the TRC’s rhetoric of forgiveness, or 
felt liberated upon “forgiving” unrepentant perpetrators. In fact, many victims of 
                                                
352 Tutu, No Future, p. 272; also, Desmond Tutu, God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope 
for Our Time (New York: Doubleday, 2004), p. 56. 
353 Thomas Brudholm and Arne Grøn, “Picturing Forgiveness after Atrocity,” Studies in 
Christian Ethics 24 (2011), pp. 159-70 (169). 
354 Tutu, No Future, p. 272. 
  139 
apartheid violence were Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Baha’i, and Buddhist, to name a select 
few. These groups were marginalized by the apartheid regime based on religion and race, 
or religion-as-race.  
Since perpetrators were required neither to apologize nor to show remorse, if the new 
South Africa’s reconciliation was to be founded on forgiveness, it had to be 
unconditional. The fact that perpetrators were not compelled to demonstrate repentance 
was the primary reason the Roman Catholic Church in South Africa as well as many 
Protestant denominations found the TRC an unacceptable solution for conflict 
transformation.355 For example, Alex Boraine—deputy chair of the TRC and an ordained 
Methodist minister—argues that forgiveness is only one ingredient in a larger process of 
reconciliation that must include “confession, repentance, restitution, and forgiveness.”356 
Around the beginning of the TRC, Tutu’s emphasis shifts from repentance-based 
forgiveness to the unconditional forgiveness he sees demonstrated by Jesus on the cross.  
Both Tutu and the TRC adopt wholesale a therapeutic, psychological understanding 
of forgiveness. Not only is forgiveness a political necessity for the future of South Africa, 
but it is also essential for recovery from trauma and mental health in general. In his 
appraisal of the TRC, Jeffrie Murphy observes “arguments grounded in trendy notions of 
mental health where such gems of psychobabble as ‘closure’ and ‘a time for healing’ are 
the order of the day.”357 As such, forgiveness becomes its own mode of psychotherapy 
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towards a kind of healing only it could accomplish. The idea of forgiveness, which in this 
case is conflated with national reconciliation and sound mental health, takes on a life of 
its own in the TRC and surrounding literature. 
The emotional, therapeutic character of the hearings is well known. Lyn Graybill 
remarks, “As long as there had been crying, commissioners said that healing had 
occurred.”358 Such valuing of emotion and catharsis led to some critics dubbing the TRC 
the “Kleenex commission.”359 Tutu’s own metaphors reflect this emphasis on emotion. In 
explaining how South Africa’s process of forgiveness and reconciliation should proceed, 
Tutu provides the analogy of a husband-and-wife quarrel.360 “Tutu anticipates and desires 
an amazing euphoric catharsis,” Annalise Acorn observes. “[He] speaks of the process of 
dealing with the atrocities of apartheid as akin to husband and wife making up after a 
fight. The route is apology and forgiveness. The destination is loving embrace.”361 In this 
vision, the future of South Africa is rendered as star-crossed lovers sprinting toward each 
other on a beach at sunset after a long estrangement, all injuries and harsh words 
forgotten regardless of who inflicted the wounds.362  
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A case study in negative emotions: Desmond Tutu prior to the TRC 
Tutu finds that victims who do not forgive are “consumed by bitterness and hatred”363 
and “consumed by…a lust for revenge.”364 He continues, “Not to forgive leads to 
bitterness and hatred, which, just like self-hatred and self-contempt, gnaw away at the 
vitals of one’s being.365 Such presentations leave victims no choice; either they forgive or 
they will find themselves gnawed at and consumed by these negative passions.  
While Tutu devotes many pages to denouncing resentment, anger, and outrage, a 
close examination of his work leading up to the TRC demonstrates that such negative 
emotions were actually a driving force. The forceful rhetoric of forgiveness does not 
appear in Tutu’s writings until early 1990s, when the end of apartheid was imminent and 
the TRC under negotiation. A consideration of the totality of Tutu’s work, especially his 
social justice work in the fight against apartheid, yields a case study in favor of negative 
emotions in the service of social change and self-respect, as well as against unconditional 
forgiveness as the path to harmony. 
Tutu’s corpus of writings, speeches, and sermons spans five decades. He is 
continuously engaged with the biblical text, but his exegesis shifts around the time of the 
institution of the TRC. Until that time, Tutu’s theology centered on a God of justice and 
liberation. He cites the Exodus story as paradigmatic for black South Africans, and Jesus 
as a savior who is “setting God’s children free.”366 He emphasizes God’s preferential 
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option for the oppressed and downtrodden when he writes, “God can’t help it. He always 
takes sides. He is not a neutral God.”367 He argues that God is a liberator “who leads His 
people out of every kind of bondage, spiritual, political, social and economic, and nothing 
will thwart Him from achieving the goal of the liberation of all His people and the whole 
of His creation.”368 Tutu notes that the chief concern of God and Christ’s work on earth is 
reconciliation, but he does not mention the role of human forgiveness in this divine 
project.369  
Nowhere in his earlier work does Tutu mention forgiveness as a mode of conflict 
transformation. The Jesus who instructs his followers to “be ready to [forgive] not just 
once, not just seven times, but seventy times seven, without limit”370 is replaced by the 
prophet Jesus who preaches “release to the captives” (Lk. 4:18-19). Tutu says, “Jesus 
seems to sum up His ministry with the words from Isaiah. We see that this liberation is 
meant to be total and comprehensive.”371 Tutu does not marshal the motif of the forgiving 
Jesus until the fall of apartheid when Jesus becomes a model for victim forgiveness. 
Composed in 1985, the Kairos Document, to which Tutu was an unnamed 
contributor, also does not call for unconditional forgiveness. Instead, it promotes justice 
and reconciliation with repentance: “No reconciliation, no forgiveness and no 
negotiations are possible without repentance.”372 The tone of this document is indignant. 
Forgiveness is only mentioned in one paragraph, and there it is coupled with the charge 
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for repentance. “As disciples of Jesus we should rather promote truth and justice and life 
at all costs, even at the cost of creating conflict, disunity and dissension along the way,” 
the authors affirm. The Kairos Document calls for change, not forgiveness, and if the 
road to change includes “conflict, disunity, and dissension,” so be it.  
A few years after the publication of the Kairos Document, South Africa moves from 
apartheid to the transitional period of the TRC and Tutu’s role shifts from apartheid 
fighter to reconciliation leader. While this change in context calls for different tactics, his 
wholesale denunciation of anger and veneration of unconditional forgiveness disregard 
the constructive value of anger and overstate the political usefulness of forgiveness. 
Anger and righteous indignation fueled the non-violent protest movement against 
South Africa’s apartheid government. Exemplifying this, Tutu’s sermons and speeches 
during that time called for action, not forgiveness. While Tutu sometimes looks to a 
future when the perpetrators of apartheid might be forgiven (he writes, “The victims of 
injustice and oppression must be ever ready to forgive. That is a gospel imperative”373), 
the time for forgiveness has not yet arrived. In a taped message to the TransAfrica Forum 
in the U.S. in 1984, Tutu is exasperated. He says, “We have been deeply hurt. Blacks are 
really expendable in the view of the mighty U.S.…You can’t really trust Whites. When it 
comes to the crunch…Whites will stick by their fellow whites.”374 But in the end, Tutu is 
not discouraged. He concludes, “Freedom is coming. We will be free whatever anybody 
does or does not do about it.”375 In a magazine article around the same time, he makes an 
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ominous prediction. He writes, “I [said] last year that within five to ten years we will 
have a Black Prime Minister. Will this happen reasonably peacefully or after much 
violence or bloodshed? This is the context in which the PFP [the Progressive Federal 
Party, which advocated a federal system in place of apartheid] and White opponents of 
apartheid have to decide.”376  
Tutu was “vociferous” in his role as a leader in the United Democratic Front (UDF), a 
prominent anti-apartheid organization.377 He led marches and protests, and he called for 
change. He says, “There is nothing the government can do to me that will stop me from 
what I believe is what God wants me to do. I cannot help it when I see injustice. I cannot 
keep quiet.”378 He did not stop. He raised his voice, he pointed his finger, and he shook 
his fist. He was very often and very publicly angry. And yet this anger did not corrode his 
sense of summum bonum; it fueled it. He embraced non-violent struggle, but he also 
embraced struggle.379  
When he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1984, Desmond Tutu gave an 
impassioned speech about the conditions in South Africa under apartheid. He observes, 
“There has been little revulsion or outrage at this wanton destruction of human life in the 
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West,” and he questions why. Clearly he is revolted and outraged. He says, “Enough is 
enough. God created us for fellowship.…If we want peace, so we have been told, let us 
work for justice. Let us beat our swords into ploughshares.”380 Tutu does not mention 
forgiveness once in this speech.  
Another instance of righteous anger occurred when United States President Ronald 
Reagan decided not to impose sanctions on South Africa in 1986. Tutu snapped, “Your 
president is the pits as far as blacks are concerned. I think the West, for my part, can go to 
hell.”381 There is no public indication that Tutu ever reversed himself and “forgave” the 
West, although considering his speaking engagements and visiting professorships in the 
United States and Europe, we may assume that on some level, he has reconciled with the 
West. 
On a visit to Yad Vashem in 1989, Tutu boldly proposes that Jews—not just 
Holocaust survivors, but all Jews, and especially Israelis—direct their forgiving energies 
toward Palestinians. He suggested that forgiveness could be a positive byproduct of the 
extermination of European Jewry. After drawing a direct analogy between treatment of 
Palestinians in the occupied territories and South Africa under apartheid, he says, “Our 
Lord would say that in the end the positive thing that can come is the spirit of forgiving, 
not forgetting.” He continues with a prayer that packs a passive-aggressive punch: “God, 
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this happened to us. We pray for those who made it happen, help us to forgive them and 
help us so that we in our turn will not make others suffer.”382  
Later in a newspaper article on the topic, he suggests that Israelis are perpetrating 
another Holocaust on displaced Palestinians. He asks, “Have our Jewish sisters and 
brothers forgotten their humiliation? Have they forgotten the collective punishment, the 
home demolitions, in their own history so soon?”383 Here he distorts the pay-it-forward 
model seen in the Parable of the Unforgiving servant (and to an extent, in the Lord’s 
Prayer). In his questions, it is suffering—not forgiveness—that should prompt future 
benevolence. Holocaust survivor Ruth Kluger remarks on this idea that past suffering 
should warrant future good will with regard to the Palestinian conflict. She writes, 
“Auschwitz was no instructional institution…You learned nothing there, and least of all 
humanity and tolerance.”384 But Tutu reduces the Nazi horror to “humiliation,” and 
doesn’t recall that the Holocaust was much more than “collective punishment [and] home 
demolitions.” In fact, the concentration camps, medical experiments, and forced labor 
were hardly “punishment,” if punishment implies past wrongdoing. Tutu contends that 
the Holocaust should inspire reconciliation between Arabs and Israelis. He calls for 
“peace based on justice,” which he defines as withdrawal from the occupied territories 
and the establishment of a Palestinian state, because this is “God’s dream.” He does not 
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mention forgiveness in his prescription for a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. By writing under the title “Apartheid in the Holy Land,” it is clear which side 
Desmond Tutu holds responsible. The answer here is not forgiveness. 
The crusader Jesus of Tutu’s earlier writings stands in stark contrast to the Jesus who 
appears in his work during and after the TRC. In a 1990 sermon, he writes, “If there is to 
be reconciliation, we who are the ambassadors of Christ, we to whom the gospel of 
reconciliation has been entrusted, surely we must be Christ’s instruments of peace. We 
must ourselves be reconciled. The victims of injustice and oppression must be ever ready 
to forgive. That is a gospel imperative. [Wrongdoers must apologize,] and the wronged 
must forgive.”385 In this case, Tutu merges the prophetic Jesus with the forgiving one by 
preserving the call for repentance as a requirement for forgiveness. However, in this same 
text he also calls on the crucified Christ as a model for perfect love and unconditional 
forgiveness. He writes, “We expect Christians to be people filled with love. We expect 
Christians to be people who forgive as Jesus forgave even those who were nailing him to 
the Cross.”386  
Desmond Tutu is passionate in his depiction of Jesus as the model of unconditional 
forgiveness. When asked if he thought Jesus would forgive the Nazis if Jesus were a 
Holocaust survivor, he invokes the prayer from the cross (“Father, forgive them”) and 
ties it to the reciprocal forgiveness depicted in the Lord’s Prayer. “From the paradigm 
that Jesus provided…it wasn’t as if he was talking about something that might happen,” 
he explains. “He was actually experiencing one of the most excruciating ways of being 
killed, and yet he had the capacity to live out a prayer that he taught Christians, that we 
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can expect to be forgiven only insofar as we are ready to forgive.”387 Here Tutu connects 
the Lord’s Prayer with the prayer from the cross but leaves out the seventy-times-seven 
instructions in Matthew and Luke, both of which call for repentance as a prerequisite for 
forgiveness.  
In the mid-nineties, Tutu submitted an essay in response to Holocaust-survivor Simon 
Wiesenthal’s hypothetical query: Would you have forgiven the dying Nazi soldier who 
asked for my forgiveness? In his answer, Tutu invokes the amazing acts of forgiveness he 
encountered in the TRC. He writes, “There are others who say they are not ready to 
forgive, demonstrating that forgiveness is not facile or cheap. It is a costly business that 
makes those who are willing to forgive even more extraordinary.”388 However, he very 
carefully dodges the question and instead points to the awe-inspiring post-prison 
forgiveness of Nelson Mandela, along with Jesus’ prayer from the cross (Lk. 23:34a). He 
closes his essay on a familiar note that doesn’t answer the question of whether he would 
forgive the soldier: “[Forgiveness] is practical politics. Without forgiveness there is no 
future.”389 Of course, post-apartheid South Africa and post-Holocaust Europe are entirely 
different landscapes. In South Africa, the TRC facilitated testimony from victims and 
offenders with strict amnesty requirements. While there was no official mechanism for 
victims to face their offenders, the TRC allowed victims to tell their stories and offenders 
to be held accountable. By the time Tutu writes his reply, most victims and offenders of 
the Holocaust are dead. 
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In 1995, Tutu visited Rwanda with a church delegation a year after nearly one million 
people were killed in the genocide there. Speaking to a group of government officials and 
diplomats, he charges them with the task of justice as reconciliation. He says, “There can 
be no future without forgiveness. There will be no future unless there is peace. There can 
be no peace unless there is reconciliation. But there can be no reconciliation before there 
is forgiveness. And there can be no forgiveness unless people repent.”390 Just a year or 
two later, Tutu would be presiding over the TRC and urging victims to forgive unknown 
and unrepentant perpetrators. When his memoir appears in 1999, his promotion of 
unconditional forgiveness has expanded even further. With no requirement for 
perpetrators to apologize or show remorse in the amnesty hearings, forgiveness most 
often begins and end with the victims. 
A case study in negative emotions: Desmond Tutu after the TRC 
By the time No Future Without Forgiveness is published in 1999, the image of a Jesus 
who forgives his murderers even as they are nailing him to the cross has become Tutu’s 
central model for forgiveness. Tutu explains that Jesus forgave his executioners “and he 
even provided an excuse for what they were doing.”391 He continues by clarifying the 
implications of this interpretation for victims and survivors at the TRC. “If the victim 
could forgive only when the culprit confessed,” he reasons, “then the victim would be 
locked into the culprit’s whim, locked into victimhood, whatever her own attitude or 
intention.” Thus, he links unconditional forgiveness both to being a good Christian and 
being released from “victimhood.” No longer is Jesus’ primary role as a model for 
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fighting injustice. Now the crucified Christ stands as a co-victim and the epitome of the 
right response to suffering in his unconditional forgiveness. 
In a 2000 interview with the BBC, Desmond Tutu remarks, “Resentment and anger 
are bad for your blood pressure and your digestion.” Such comments about the 
deleterious effects of anger appear throughout his work. He writes, “Social harmony is 
for us the summum bonum—the greatest good. Anything that subverts, that undermines 
this sought-after good, is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, resentment, lust for 
revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this good.”392 
Anger interferes with forgiveness and ubuntu, he argues, and without ubuntu, one cannot 
be truly human.393 
But Tutu’s expressions of righteous indignation did not end with apartheid. When the 
Dalai Lama was denied an entry visa to South Africa to attend Tutu’s eightieth birthday 
celebration in 2011, Tutu publicly exploded: “Our government is worse than the 
apartheid government because at least you would expect it with the apartheid 
government. Let the ANC know they have a large majority. Well, Mubarak had a large 
majority, Gaddafi had a large majority. I am warning you: watch out. Watch out!”394 To 
this tirade, the official ANC response included a request for Tutu to “calm down.” He 
continued with a serious threat: “You, President Zuma and your government, do not 
represent me. I am warning you, as I warned the [pro-apartheid] nationalists, one day we 
will pray for the defeat of the ANC government.”395  
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In August 2012, Tutu pulled out of a summit because of the presence of former 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, whom Tutu charged with invading Iraq based on false 
intelligence about weapons of mass destruction. His office stated, “Morality and 
leadership are indivisible. In this context, it would be inappropriate for the Archbishop to 
share a platform with Mr. Blair.”396 It is clear that expressions of anger are essential 
elements of Tutu’s sense of moral protest. In light of all his calls for forgiveness, 
however, it is surprising that he would be so public in his displays of this “corrosive” 
quality. 
Tutu’s condemnation of anger, resentment, outrage, and other negative emotions 
overlooks an important point. It is the expression of these emotions by protesters that got 
South Africa to the point where a TRC could become possible. In the immediate context 
of conflict transformation, forgiveness is perhaps a value worth promoting, along with 
repentance and reconciliation. However, acts of forgiveness did not fuel the apartheid 
resistance. Anger and outrage have their place, and Tutu’s life is a clear example of this. 
At one point, the post-TRC Tutu even explicitly endorses the constructive value of 
anger. In a rare moment of openness to negative emotions, he says, “[These] are all part 
of being human. You should never hate yourself for hating others who do terrible things: 
the depth of your love is shown by the extent of your anger.”397 However, this is a rare 
moment indeed; Tutu’s main line both during and after the TRC is that anger is corrosive 
of social harmony, and those who do not forgive will be consumed by anger and 
resentment. He writes, “In our African worldview, the greatest good is communal 
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harmony. Anything that subverts or undermines this greatest good is ipso facto wrong, 
evil. Anger and a desire for revenge are subversive of this good thing.”398  
In the above examples, Desmond Tutu’s anger and righteous indignation were most 
often directed outside the community to promoters of apartheid and countries that 
supported the apartheid state. Regarding relations inside the community—that is, those 
who would comprise the new South Africa—Tutu is vehement in his warnings about the 
“corrosive” effects of anger.399 Such a distinction is visible in the seventy-times-seven 
instructions in Matthew and Luke. These texts frame the call for forgiveness by “brother” 
language: “If my brother (a0delfov) sins against me” (Mt. 18:21); “If your brother 
(a0delfov) sins” (Lk. 17:3). This familial language indicates that the instructions apply to 
intra-community conflict resolution. However, Tutu eschews anger and promotes 
forgiveness between both groups: the victims of apartheid and the perpetrators of those 
crimes. During and after the TRC, his language expands to cover all participants in the 
new South Africa: all victims should forgive so the new community may cohere and 
flourish. Anger—regardless of whom it is directed toward—is verboten. According to 
Tutu, sublimating anger is the answer for resolving conflict both inside and outside the 
various stakeholder communities in the TRC and the new South Africa 
In praise of negative emotions 
As demonstrated by Tutu’s anger and outrage at the apartheid government, negative 
emotions—including resentment and the refusal to forgive—might actually serve a 
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constructive purpose. Graeme Simpson writes, “The discourse of ‘forgiveness’ 
embroidered much of the Commission’s work, [but] it is equally arguable that true 
reconciliation in South Africa will more likely be achieved by integrating the anger, 
sorrow, unresolved trauma and other complex feelings of victims, rather than by 
suppressing them.”400 Jeffrie G. Murphy similarly observes, “Just as indignation or guilt 
over the mistreatment of others stands as emotional testimony that we care about them 
and their rights, so does resentment stand as emotional testimony that we care about 
ourselves and our rights.”401 Thus, resentment—sometimes manifested in a refusal to 
forgive—can be a signal of self-respect and self-worth.  
This valuation of the negative emotions provides a counter to Tutu’s forgiveness 
rhetoric. Thomas Brudholm writes, “Preservation of outrage or resentment and the refusal 
to forgive and reconcile can be the reflex expression of a moral protest and ambition that 
might be as permissible as the posture of forgiveness.”402 He also questions the TRC’s 
commitment to restoring relationships and asks whether all relationships between victims 
and offenders were even worth restoring. He writes, “The person who does not forgive 
those who wronged his or her next of kin is not likely to shrivel in existential desolation. 
Not all relationships are worthy of restoration, and maintaining networks of humane 
relationship is hardly possible on the basis of an attitude that makes a hegemony of 
harmony.”403  
With regard to scriptural precedent for Tutu’s condemnation of anger, there is no 
indication in the Gospels that anger, outrage, and indignation are destructive or 
                                                
400 Simpson, “‘Tell No Lies,’” pp. 239-40. 
401 Murphy, Punishment, p. 11. 
402 Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue, p. 4. 
403 Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue, pp. 48-49. 
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inappropriate emotions. Jesus famously “cleanses” the Temple by overturning tables and 
lambasting merchants and moneychangers (Mk. 11:13-19; Mt. 21:12-17; Lk. 19:45-48; 
Jn. 2:13-22), and he also withers a fig tree (Mk. 11:20-24; Mt. 21:18-22). He calls 
Pharisees “a brood of vipers” (Mt. 23:33) and rails at the scribes and Pharisees, “Woe to 
you, hypocrites!” (Mt. 23:13-15). Jesus “becomes angry” (a0ganakte/w)404 when the 
disciples tried to keep the children from him and he rebukes them severely (Mk. 10:13-
15).  
In these accounts and others, Jesus’ anger is a response to injustice or infidelity. Even 
in the case of the fig tree, which symbolizes the destruction of Jerusalem, Jesus’ anger 
was often a motivating force for change. In addition to freely expressing his anger, Jesus 
never actively forgives another person for any wrongdoing against him personally.405 He 
does not forgive the scribes and Pharisees for their hypocrisy, he does not forgive the 
merchants and moneychangers in the Temple, and he does not forgive the disciples for 
their doubt (although he does reconcile with them). Jesus does not employ forgiveness as 
a mode of social change or conflict transformation. Further, in his anger Jesus is not 
“consumed by bitterness and hatred,”406 as Tutu describes. Most often, his anger plays a 
constructive role. 
After submitting the TRC’s final report in 1998, Tutu notes Jesus’ propensity for 
anger. “Our Lord was very forgiving,” he says, “but he faced up to those he thought were 
self-righteous, who were behaving in a ghastly fashion, and called them a ‘generation of 
                                                
404 BAGD, a0ganakte/w, p. 4. 
405 Many interpret Jesus’ prayer from the cross (“Father, forgive them,” Lk. 23:34a) as an 
act of forgiveness. I hold that this is an example of praying for one’s persecutors (Lk. 
6:28) and not a first-person act of forgiveness. See the following chapter for a full 
discussion of this verse. 
406 Tutu, No Future, p. 120. 
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vipers.’”407 He continues, “Forgiveness doesn’t mean turning yourself into a doormat for 
people to wipe their boots on.…There is necessarily a measure of confrontation. People 
sometimes think that you shouldn’t be abrasive. But sometimes you have to be to make 
people acknowledge that they have done something wrong.”408 Here Tutu shifts the 
definition of forgiveness to include confrontation and reproof. And yet this is not the 
vision of forgiveness he advocates in his other writings and speeches in which anger and 
outrage are equated with non-forgiveness, which is non-ubuntu and therefore also 
inhuman.409 
Forgiveness is an insufficient national ethic 
Angry voices and continued protests ushered in a time when a truth commission 
working toward national reconciliation was possible in South Africa. Perhaps the 
transformation could not have occurred without the violent protests of anti-apartheid 
resistance.410 In any case, it is clear that acts of forgiveness did not lead the way. 
Unconditional forgiveness of unknown perpetrators did not transform and overturn the 
apartheid government.  
In the context of any oppressive regime, forgiveness does not necessarily work as a 
driving force for change, as Tutu’s early writings show. Forgiveness in such contexts 
                                                
407 Tutu, God Is Not a Christian, p. 38. 
408 Tutu, God Is Not a Christian, p. 38. 
409 Tutu, No Future, p. 31. 
410 For example, Nelson Mandela led the armed resistance of the ANC’s military wing. 
“Violence would begin whether we initiated it or not,” he said (quoted in Anthony 
Sampson, Mandela: The Authorized Biography [New York: Random House, 1999], p. 
145). Other armed resistance groups took action against apartheid, such as the Pan 
African Congress’s armed wing, APLA (Azanian People’s Liberation Army), which took 
aim at white civilians in the St. James Church massacre in Cape Town in 1993 as well as 
other attacks. 
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may even allow or embolden oppressors to continue their persecution. Instead, morally 
valuable responses may include negative emotions such as anger and indignation that call 
for justice and change.  
Forgiveness as a sustaining political ethic misses the mark; there can be either 
constant harmony, or constant forgiveness. There cannot be both. Forgiveness is reactive; 
it needs disruptions in the harmony to take hold. There is no forgiveness without victims, 
and there are no victims without wrongdoing. Further, it may not be a good idea to mix 
personal forgiveness with political aims. Rajeev Bhargava writes, “One cannot forgive 
for the future good of the society, if personal costs are excessive. The good of the 
community cannot provide reasons for unconditional forgiveness.”411 However, as seen 
in his responses to victim testimonies, Tutu presents victim forgiveness as essential for a 
reconciled South Africa.  
Ernesto Verdeja argues against such harnessing of victims’ emotional responses. He 
writes, “The state cannot, of course, decree forgiveness. But though forgiving should be a 
free and unencumbered act, its de facto institutionalization in some truth commissions 
(such as South Africa’s) or in official apologies gives victims little free space for 
opposing it and demanding instead some sort of accountability.”412 Thus, depicting 
reconciliation as dependent on victim forgiveness is coercive. Verdeja concludes, 
                                                
411 Rajeev Bhargava, “Restoring Decency to Barbaric Stories,” in Robert I. Rotberg and 
Dennis Thompson, Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 45-67 (62-63). 
412 Ernesto Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree: Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Political 
Violence (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2009), p. 16. 
  157 
“Forgiveness may be morally praiseworthy, but it should not serve as the lodestar of 
reconciliation.”413 
A vision of the future that uses forgiveness as the basis for reconciliation and an end 
to all conflict can also preclude legitimate political debate by framing relations only in 
terms of good feelings and harmony.414 In such a utopia, negative emotions like 
resentment, anger, and outrage have no place. But defining relationships in terms of the 
forgiving abuse creates a community of constant pardon. Such an emphasis on 
forgiveness then paves the way for miscreants who know that no matter what they do, the 
onus will be on the victims to forgive them.  
Tutu’s view of forgiveness has not changed since the close of the TRC. Indeed, most 
of his writings in the last fifteen years capitalize on this veneration of forgiveness, with 
several books repeating verbatim his effusive praise for unconditional forgiveness.415 It is 
clear that he intends this message to be universal and timeless. Indeed, Tutu exhorts, 
“Forgiveness is practical politics,” not only during but also after the close of the TRC and 
                                                
413 Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree, p. 16. 
414 Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree, p. 17. Harmony is defined as peaceful relations 
characterized by forgiveness and reconciliation among former enemies and community 
members (p. 3). 
415 Pages of verbatim repeated text carry the theme of unconditional forgiveness across 
several decades of Tutu’s writings: The Rainbow People of God (1994; the volume 
collects Tutu’s letters and sermons 1974-94), No Future Without Forgiveness (1999), 
“Without forgiveness there is no future” (1998), The Sunflower symposium response 
(1998), God Has a Dream (2004), “Faith and the Problem of Evil and Suffering” (2010), 
God Is Not a Christian (2011).  
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into the future of the re-legitimized state.416 As far as Tutu is concerned, this applies not 
only to South Africa, but to every human community.417 
In her proposal for a moral theory of political reconciliation, Colleen Murphy 
considers whether the TRC should serve as a model for other transitional contexts. The 
TRC’s emphasis on forgiveness-as-reconciliation is problematic for a number of reasons, 
especially the attempt to map the model of interpersonal forgiveness onto political 
contexts. “In transitional contexts, the conception of a prior, normal, acceptable political 
relationship that has been ruptured by wrongdoing does not pertain,” writes Murphy.418 In 
personal relationships, the wrongdoing might be an aberration, but in political contexts it 
has been and might continue to be the rule. She continues, “Urging forgiveness and the 
overcoming of resentment in contexts where wrongdoing is systematic and ongoing 
seems at best naïve and at worst a form of complicity in the maintenance of oppression 
and injustice.”419 Thus, in some cases forgiveness fuels the discontent rather than helps to 
resolve it. That is not to say that forgiveness is inappropriate for any political context, 
only that it risks suggesting a simple, emotional solution to complex, multi-layered 
political problems.  
The TRC’s vision of forgiveness and reconciliation depends on an idealized vision of 
harmony with Edenic overtones. Tutu writes in his foreword to the TRC Report, “We are 
                                                
416 The phrase, “Forgiveness is practical politics” appears in the TRC Report (1998; vol. 
5, p. 351), the Sunflower symposium response (1998; p. 268), “Without forgiveness there 
is no future” (1998; p. xii), and God Has a Dream (2004; p. 53). 
417 See Tutu, “Foreword by Chairperson,” p. 22; No Future, pp. 31, 35, 196. Tutu 
expands his philosophy to apply to all of humanity: “To work for reconciliation is to want 
to realize God’s dream for humanity—when we will know that we are indeed members of 
one family, bound together in a delicate network of interdependence…True forgiveness 
deals with the past, all of the past, to make the future possible” (p. 274). 
418 Murphy, Moral Theory, pp. 10-11. 
419 Murphy, Moral Theory, p. 11. 
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sisters and brothers in one family—God’s family, the human family. Let us move into the 
glorious future of a new kind of society where people count, not because of biological 
irrelevancies or other extraneous attributes, but because they are persons of infinite worth 
created in the image of God.”420 This vision suggests a hope for the future as it recalls the 
past harmony of an original human family. Claire Moon writes, “Reconciliation is a story 
told in a single word. It tells a tale of prior harmony, a rupture (wrong perpetrated) and a 
subsequent reunion, predicated here on the confessional and forgiveness. Reconciliation 
relates these implied events in a causal and linear fashion—harmony, rupture, reunion—
and prefigures narrative closure as reconciliation, the end point of the story.”421  
This vision of reconciliation requires both victims and offenders to cast their 
testimonies in terms of hope for the future as a return to an Edenic ideal rather than 
moving forward and confronting the complicated present moment. Moon observes,  
[The TRC’s] workings were most powerfully manifest through its retrospective 
structuration of the individual testimonies where victims were largely compelled 
to speak in terms of reconciliation rather than revenge and seek restorative justice 
which sought to endow them with a recognition of their suffering. Similarly, 
perpetrators had to relate a particular account of violations that worked within the 
overall teleology of the reconciliation narrative.422  
Forgiveness as the emotional and spiritual substance of reconciliation emerges as a way 
back to this perfect South Africa that was created in God’s image and lost to the poison 
                                                
420 Tutu, “Foreword by Chairperson,” p. 22. 
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of apartheid.423 The narrative of the TRC adheres to this rewritten history and image of 
the future as restoration fueled by victim forgiveness. 
Murphy contends that there is no justification for a state (or a state body like the 
TRC) to encourage victims to forgive in the name of reconciliation. She writes, “Citizens 
reasonably disagree about the justifiability of forgiving both in general and especially in 
transitional contexts. State policies designed to encourage victims to forgive fail to 
acknowledge such disagreement.”424 Ultimately, the question becomes whether a state 
can be in the business of mandating reactive emotions, such as promoting forgiveness as 
well as discouraging anger and resentment, which may have reasonable bases and play 
constructive roles in conflict transformation.  
During the TRC, the promotion of forgiveness also serves to stabilize the sometimes-
controversial grants of amnesty. If victims offer forgiveness to perpetrators, then the 
amnesty decisions are strengthened. Moon points out that the TRC’s language of 
forgiveness was meant to make it seem like the amnesty decisions were supported by the 
victims. She writes, “Forgiveness worked retrospectively to legitimize the amnesty 
decision but was made to appear as if it had somehow been generated by popular will.”425 
Thus, the pressure on victims to forgive strengthens the overall narrative of forgiveness 
(including grants of amnesty) in service of the new South Africa, with all sides in 
agreement. 
What gets lost in these narratives of forgiveness-as-reconciliation is the idea that 
reconciliation, or the restoration of a broken relationship, can take hold and thrive 
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without interpersonal forgiveness. In the TRC Report, a section entitled “Reconciliation 
without Forgiveness” reluctantly acknowledges that “peaceful coexistence” may be the 
best South Africa can expect. It reports, “The emphasis on peaceful or non-violent co-
existence suggests that a weak or limited form of reconciliation [or ‘peaceful 
coexistence’] may often be the most realistic goal towards which to strive, at least at the 
beginning of the peacemaking process.”426 However, fewer than two pages of the seven-
volume, more than 4,000-page report are given to exploring this topic. Given that the 
words “weak” and “limited” are used to describe it, “reconciliation without forgiveness” 
is far from the TRC’s ideal. 
Such a limited account of reconciliation might prove to be the most promising way 
forward. Ernesto Verdeja writes, “Many people calling for forgiveness are simply trying 
to articulate the need to avoid a return to violence. They are not necessarily apologists for 
dictators. But it is also clear that expecting a victim to overcome resentment and ‘leave 
the past behind’ for the sake of solidarity does little to convince survivors that society 
takes them seriously.”427 He proposes a “weaker” form of forgiveness that is 
“normatively defensible and practically attainable.”428 This “partial pardon” is distinct 
from forgiveness in that it allows victims to maintain negative emotions and retributive 
desires while also committing to peaceful coexistence with the perpetrator. Verdeja 
writes, “Here, forgiveness is not so much about moral transformation on the part of 
                                                
426 TRC Report, vol. 5, pp. 400-401. See also Chapman, “Perspectives,” esp. pp. 88-89. 
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victims, perpetrators, and bystanders, but rather is about forswearing violence and 
coming to acknowledge the [humanity] of former enemies.”429  
This version of forgiveness is based on shared humanity and depends heavily on 
recognition of wrongdoing and victim harm on the part of the perpetrator. Verdeja 
argues, “[The partial pardon] is more robust than the thin coexistence because even to 
consider pardoning there must be some acknowledgment of past wrongs and recognition 
of victims. The pardon is premised on the belief that any stable and just future must focus 
on creating a common moral, political, and social space for former enemies.”430 In this 
proposal, victims contribute to reconciliation not with catharsis and moral transformation, 
but with the practical steps of accepting apology and forswearing retaliation. Central is 
the recognition of victim suffering and the expectation that perpetrators will make their 
own contribution by acknowledging and accepting responsibility for that suffering. The 
“partial pardon” stands in contrast to both amnesty, which “undermine[s] the rule of law 
and signal[s] that the interests of victims can be sacrificed for the common good of 
stability,”431 and forgiveness, which claims an unreasonable moral superiority and 
burdens victims with a requirement for reconciliation.432  
The Lord’s Prayer as a counterbalance 
Any understanding of interpersonal forgiveness must attend to the bilateral nature of 
wrongdoing. Forgiveness becomes coercive in the South African context when victims 
are pressed to forgive unilaterally and unconditionally and in service not to restoring a 
                                                
429 Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree, p. 169. 
430 Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree, p. 172. 
431 Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree, p. 108. 
432 Verdeja, Unchopping a Tree, p. 168. 
  163 
specific ruptured relationship, but to an ideal of national reconciliation. The TRC 
pressured victims to forgive both implicitly through its religious imagery and language, 
lavish praise for forgiving responses, and linking forgiveness to the hope for 
reconciliation, and explicitly through direct requests from commissioners. By separating 
victims and perpetrators into separate committees and official processes, the TRC headed 
off potentially ugly exchanges. As a result, “The TRC did not provide the official forum 
through which victim-perpetrator encounters, which might see to be the perfect exemplar 
of a reconciliation event, could be enacted.”433 
While the TRC’s final report acknowledges a bilateral process of forgiveness, on the 
ground things were quite different.434 Its reliance on unconditional, unilateral forgiveness 
as the source of reconciliation put the burden on victims to achieve internal, emotional 
changes and to create the reconciliation the new South Africa needed. A community that 
is reconciled in this way can only be imbalanced; victims must go forward to live 
alongside perpetrators they may have reason to fear. To be sure, while violence in South 
Africa is nowhere similar in terms of quantity or circumstance to what it was before the 
TRC, the post-reconciliation Eden is not a reality. “The post-apartheid crime figures in 
South Africa…suggest a society ill at ease with itself,” write Roger Mac Ginty and 
Andrew Williams. “So is this [“reconciled” South Africa] the ‘lesser of two evils?’”435  
In summary, this chapter argues that the TRC and specifically Tutu present a 
corrupted account of biblical forgiveness. By appealing to the Lord’s Prayer and other 
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435 Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew Williams, Conflict and Development (Routledge 
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biblical forgiveness texts, Tutu gives victims a mandate for unconditional, unilateral 
forgiveness. Instead, I argue that the biblical text consistently presents a bilateral process 
of forgiveness that must include repentance on the part of the perpetrator. The Lord’s 
Prayer, which Tutu interprets as a command to forgive unconditionally under the threat of 
the loss of divine forgiveness,436 in fact demonstrates the importance of this bilateral 
process and the connection between that process and right relationship with God. 
The Lord’s Prayer contains an acknowledgement that wrongdoing and forgiveness are 
ongoing, just like the need for food and the presence of temptation. The point of saying 
this prayer is not for sin to disappear and forgiveness to reign supreme. Rather, the point 
is to participate in the bilateral process of asking for forgiveness and giving forgiveness 
on a daily basis. The forgiveness petition is an acknowledgment that wrongdoing 
happens, and there is a mechanism for addressing it. Repentance and forgiveness are 
ongoing and intertwined, and they may often be connected to a community’s wholeness 
and relationship to God. In order to be in right relation to God, human beings must be in 
right relation to each other, and this includes forgiving with repentance. Communities 
will necessarily have injury and estrangement, along with forgiveness and reconciliation. 
But forgiveness and repentance work together, and according to the prayer, human beings 
receive forgiveness from God at least as far as they are willing to ask for it and give it to 
others. This daily prayer is a reminder: that being human is difficult work requiring daily 
maintenance, that conflict can be transformed, and that repentance and forgiveness both 
have a place. 
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Where the Lord’s Prayer provides a prescription for community cohesion, Tutu’s 
vision of unconditional, unilateral forgiveness leads to an uncomfortable integration of 
victims and offenders with varying commitments to communal harmony. The Promotion 
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act invokes ubuntu toward the end of a reconciled 
community, but ubuntu is an ethic of interdependence, not of solitary acts of victim 
forgiveness.  
Such a vision of shared humanity suggests an exchange. Lives can only be bound up 
in each other by reciprocal design; one has ubuntu only as far as others also have ubuntu. 
Unilateral, unconditional forgiveness does not fit this form since it needs only the 
singular. Ubuntu is profoundly plural; it is more adequately represented by the bilateral 
process of admission and absolution given in the Lord’s Prayer, which is another 
declaration of how human beings become persons: “Forgive us…as we forgive.” There is 
repentance (forgive us), and there is the offer of forgiveness (we forgive). Neither 
happens independently. Thus the Lord’s Prayer stands as a Christian correlate to ubuntu. 
Where Tutu says, “My humanity is inextricably bound up in yours,” he could just as 
easily say, “My forgiveness is inextricably bound up in yours.” Both victims and 
perpetrators must inhabit the new South Africa, and the work of reconciliation cannot fall 
only to the victims. So much emphasis on the astounding feats of unconditional 
forgiveness—indeed, declaring that there is No Future Without Forgiveness—neglects to 
hold the perpetrators responsible for their fair share of the future. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FROM PASSIONATE PRAYER TO PASTORAL PRESSURE: FORGIVENESS IN 
LUKE 23:34A AND THE PASTORAL CARE OF VICTIMS OF  
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
From Joy M.K. Bussert, “Letter from a Battered Wife”: 
 
I am in my thirties and so is my husband.…We have four children and live 
in a middle-class home with all the comforts we could possibly want. I have 
everything, except life without fear. For most of my married life I have been 
periodically beaten by my husband. What do I mean by ‘beaten’? I mean that 
parts of my body have been hit violently and repeatedly, and that painful bruises, 
swelling, bleeding wounds, unconsciousness, and combinations of these things 
have resulted. 
I have been kicked in the abdomen when I was visibly pregnant. I have 
been whipped, kicked and thrown, picked up again and thrown down again. I have 
been punched and kicked in the head, chest, face, and abdomen more times than I 
can count.…Few people have ever seen my black and blue face or swollen lips 
because I have always stayed indoors afterwards, feeling ashamed. I was never 
able to drive following one of these beatings, so I could not get myself to a 
hospital for care. 
 Now, the first response to this story, which I myself think of, will be 
‘Why didn’t you seek help?’ I did. Early in our marriage I went to a clergyman 
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who, after a few visits, told me that my husband meant no real harm, that he was 
just confused and felt insecure. I was encouraged to be more tolerant and 
understanding. Most important, I was told to forgive him the beatings just as 
Christ had forgiven from the cross. I did that, too. 
Everyone I have gone to for help has somehow wanted to blame me and 
vindicate my husband.…I have learned that the doctors, the police, the clergy, and 
my friends will excuse my husband for distorting my face, but won’t forgive me 
for looking bruised and broken. The greatest tragedy is that I am still praying and 
there is not a human person to listen.437  
 
According to the National Institutes of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control, 
approximately 1.5 million women are raped and/or physically assaulted by an intimate 
partner annually in the United States.438 Because many victims are assaulted more than 
once, approximately 4.8 million intimate partner assaults and rapes are perpetrated 
against U.S. women annually.439 Since domestic violence ranks among the most 
underreported of all crimes, the actual number of annual victims is likely much larger.440 
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While domestic violence crosses all demographic categories, this chapter focuses on 
the pastoral care of women who are victims of physical violence in heterosexual 
marriages. In one study of 350 victims of domestic abuse, twenty-eight percent sought 
help from clergy members. The primary responses these women reported hearing were 
instructions to remember their marital duties, to “forgive and forget,” and to avoid 
involving the church.441 In another study of 5,700 Protestant clergy in the United States 
and Canada, seventy-two percent reported that they would not counsel a woman to leave 
an abusive husband and ninety-two percent stated that they would never tell a woman to 
divorce an abusive husband.442  
As seen in the opening story, pastors often raise the topic of forgiveness in the 
pastoral care of victims of domestic abuse. Clergy and other pastoral caregivers 
frequently use Scripture to encourage women to forgive and endure patiently. In the 
above example, the pastor calls on Jesus’ example by advising, “forgive him the beatings 
just as Christ had forgiven from the cross.”443 While not all pastoral care providers advise 
women to stay in abusive marriages, many will discuss with victims the importance of 
forgiveness, either in the context of reconciling the marital relationship or in promoting 
the individual health and well-being of the victim. I examine how Christian women are 
sometimes encouraged to follow the model of Christ on the cross when he prays for the 
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forgiveness of his executioners (Lk. 23:34a) and so, as their encouragers prompt, forgive 
without condition. Nancy Nason-Clark writes, “The famous cry of Jesus from the 
cross…is often portrayed as the exemplary pattern that abuse victims ought to imitate as 
they approach their aggressors.”444 I suggest that Jesus’ dying words—”Father, forgive 
them, for they do not know what they are doing” (Lk. 23:34a)—instead reflect an absence 
of forgiveness and an opening for victims to remain faithful to the biblical model without 
forgiving their abusers. 
In this chapter, first I review the history of interpretation of Luke 23:34a, “Father 
forgive them; they do not know what they are doing.” I show how this verse has been 
used in both ancient and contemporary contexts to promote unconditional forgiveness. In 
light of the other forgiveness texts in Luke’s Gospel—including the healing of the 
paralyzed man (5:17-26), the sinful woman forgiven (7:36-50), the seven-times-seven 
instructions (17:3-4), and the instruction for reciprocal forgiveness (6:37-38)—Jesus 
might be expected to forgive his executioners or at least announce their forgiveness as he 
does with the paralyzed man and the sinful woman. However, he does not do so. Instead, 
he prays that God might forgive them. Such prayer is consistent with his teachings on 
enemy love (“Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse 
you, pray for those who abuse you” [Lk. 6:27-28]), but it does not constitute a first-
person act of forgiveness according to his earlier instructions (see esp. Lk. 17:1-4).  
Next, I show how Christian pastoral care practices impose explicit or tacit pressure on 
victims of domestic abuse to forgive their abusers. Pastoral caregivers put women in 
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danger when they counsel that forgiveness is the right response to an abusive spouse and 
suggest that forgiveness should lead to reconciliation. Further, the emphasis on 
forgiveness—even in the context of separation and safety planning—implies that it is the 
victim’s responsibility to respond to the abuse with unilateral or unconditional 
forgiveness. Such forgiveness is presented as the imitation of Christ, the moral duty of 
the victim, or the only way to heal from abuse.445 Here I demonstrate how pastoral 
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New York: T & T Clark International, 2003), pp. 29-38; Angela Standhartinger, “The 
Epistle to the Congregation in Colossae and the Invention of the ‘Household Code,’” in 
Levine and Blickenstaff (eds.), A Feminist Companion to the Deutero-Pauline Epistles, 
pp. 88-97; Betsy J. Bauman-Martin, “Feminist Theologies of Suffering and Current 
Interpretations of 1 Peter 2.18-3.9,” in Amy-Jill Levine with Maria Mayo Robbins (eds.), 
Feminist Companion to the Catholic Epistles and Hebrews (London and New York: T & 
T Clark International, 2004), pp. 63-81; Catherine Clark Kroeger, “Toward a Pastoral 
Understanding of 1 Peter 3.1-6 and Related Texts,” in Levine and Robbins (eds.), 
Feminist Companion to the Catholic Epistles and Hebrews, pp. 82-88; Alan G. Padgett, 
As Christ Submits to the Church: A Biblical Understanding of Leadership and Mutual 
Submission (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011); Teresa J. Hornsby, Sex Texts 
from the Bible: Selections Annotated and Explained (SkyLight Illumination Series; 
Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths Publishing, 2007), Dale B. Martin, Sex and the Single 
Savior: Gender and Sexuality in Biblical Interpretation (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2006), pp. 112-14 (“The Pro-family Paul”); Peter H. Davids, “A Silent 
Witness in Marriage: 1 Peter 3:1-7,” in Ronald W. Pierce and Rebecca Merrill Groothuis 
(eds.), Discovering Biblical Equality: Complementarity without Hierarchy (Downer’s 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), pp. 224-240; I. Howard Marshall, “Mutual Love 
and Submission in Marriage: Colossians 3:18-19 and Ephesians 5:21-33,” in Pierce and 
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caregivers downplay the role of offender repentance and enlarge the biblical definition of 
forgiveness to include contemporary psychological understandings such as suggesting 
that forgiveness is required for the victim’s mental health. In many pastoral care settings, 
whether a woman is counseled to forgive and stay in her marriage or she is told that 
forgiveness is the only way for her to heal apart from her abuser, forgiveness plays a role 
in subjugating women to abuse. 
Scripture provides an alternative. When Jesus prays, “Father, forgive them,” he turns 
the matter of forgiveness over to God. As he endures violence to the point of death, he 
shows victims that forgiveness in the midst of suffering is not an obligation and maybe 
not even possible. Jesus’ prayer in place of forgiveness provides an alternative model for 
responding to abuse, relieves them of the burden of forgiveness, and restores moral 
agency to victims of abuse. 
A note on language 
Domestic violence goes by a number of names, including domestic abuse, intimate 
partner abuse, intimate partner violence, wife battering, family abuse, family violence, 
intimate abuse, relationship abuse, and spouse abuse. The term favored by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (BJS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is 
“intimate partner abuse,” a broad category that includes physical or psychological 
violence committed in the context of heterosexual or same-sex dating or marriage 
relationships by current or former partners.446 Since my subject is limited to female 
                                                
Groothuis, Discovering Biblical Equality, pp. 186-204. 
446 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) define intimate partner 
violence as “physical, sexual, or psychological harm by a current or former partner or 
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victims of physical violence in the context of marriage, I employ the terms that are used 
most commonly in the literature and media to refer to this kind of offense: “domestic 
abuse” and “domestic violence.” Both the BJS and the CDC use these terms 
interchangeably with “intimate partner violence.”447 
There is an ongoing debate about the use of the words “victim” and “survivor” in the 
context of domestic violence. Some authors define a trajectory of healing from abuse that 
includes moving “from victim to survivor.”448 In this chapter, I will refer to victims of 
domestic violence as “victims.” This is not to suggest that they are weak, continue to be 
                                                
spouse. This type of violence can occur among heterosexual or same-sex couples and 
does not require sexual intimacy” 
(http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/index.html). The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) specifies, “Intimate partner violence includes 
victimization committed by spouses or ex-spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends, and ex-
boyfriends or ex-girlfriends” (http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=971). 
447 For examples of “domestic violence” as a default term interchangeable with other 
descriptors, see Stacy L. Mallicoat, Women and Crime: A Text/Reader (Los Angeles, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2012), p. 136; Nancy Berns, Framing the Victim: Domestic Violence 
Media and Social Problems (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004), p. 20; 
Richard L. Davis, Domestic Violence: Intervention, Prevention, Policies, and Solutions 
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008); pp. 1-12; Mary P. Brewster, “Domestic Violence: 
Theories, Research, and Practice,” in Albert R. Roberts (ed.), Handbook of Domestic 
Violence Intervention Strategies: Policies, Programs, and Legal Remedies (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 23-48 (24). 
448 Pamela Cooper-White, The Cry of Tamar: Violence Against Women and the Church’s 
Response (2nd ed.; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2012), p. 253; Nason-Clark, 
“Christianity and Domestic Violence,” p. 164; Nancy Werking Poling and Marie M. 
Fortune (eds.), Victim to Survivor: Women Recovering from Clergy Sexual Abuse 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009); Juliann Mitchell and Jill Morse, From Victims to 
Survivors: Reclaimed Voices of Women Sexually Abused in Childhood by Females 
(Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, 1998); Cheryl L. Karp and Traci L. Butler, 
Treatment Strategies for Abused Children: From Victim to Survivor (Interpersonal 
Violence: The Practice Series, 19; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996); James 
Leehan, Defiant Hope: Spirituality for Survivors of Family Abuse (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), p. 123. 
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abused, or are somehow lacking in healing. Here, I intend the label “victim” to indicate 
only that a woman is or has been subjected to domestic abuse.449  
Forgiveness in Luke 23:34a 
Jesus’ cry from the cross in Luke—”Father, forgive them; they do not know what 
they are doing” (23.34a)—is most commonly interpreted as an outpouring of 
unconditional forgiveness from a suffering man to his executioners.450 This verse marks 
the only example in the Gospels in which Jesus speaks about forgiveness with regard to 
someone committing an offense against him directly. Elsewhere in Luke, he either 
instructs his followers on when and how to forgive or pronounces the sins of others to be 
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14 (2008), pp. 13-24. 
450 For examples of this interpretation across several disciplines, see Anthony Bash, 
Forgiveness and Christian Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 79; Célestin Musekura, An Assessment of Contemporary Models of Forgiveness 
(American University Studies, VII; Theology and Religion, 302; New York: Peter Lang, 
2010), p. 73; Geraldine Smyth, “Brokenness, Forgiveness, Healing, and Peace in Ireland” 
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Healing Process, p. 14; Dan B. Allender, “‘Forgive and Forget’ and Other Myths of 
Forgiveness,” in Lampman and Shattuck (eds.), God and the Victim, pp. 199-216 (212). 
For early examples, see St. John Chrysostom, “Homily LXXIX on Matthew,” NPNF, 
series 1, Vol. 10, p. 478; St. Irenaeus of Lyons, “Against Heresies,” Book III, Ch. 18, 
ANF, Vol. 1; St. Jerome, “Letter 50: To Domnio,” NPNF, series 2, Vol. 6.  
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forgiven. The forgiveness petition follows from his earlier instruction to “pray for those 
who abuse you” (Lk. 6:28), but it raises questions in light of his teachings about 
unlimited forgiveness (Mt. 18:21-22; Lk. 17:3-4).  
Forgiving the soldiers, the Jews, and all humanity 
The question of the prayer’s object is the subject of much debate. The immediate 
context suggests that Jesus means to pray for the soldiers who are executing him.451 
However, the direct antecedent of “them” in this verse is the “chief priests, the leaders, 
and the people” (23:13). Later material in Acts such as Stephen’s similar prayer for his 
Jewish tormentors (7:60) and Peter’s speech—“Therefore let the entire house of Israel 
know with certainty that God has made him both Lord and Messiah, this Jesus whom you 
crucified” (2:36; emphasis mine)—indicate that Luke intends to hold the Jewish leaders 
responsible as well.452 Other interpretations expand the object of the prayer to include not 
only the soldiers or the Jewish leaders, but also all humanity for all time.453 
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Whether the object of the prayer is the soldiers, the Jews, or all of humanity, the 
important point is that Jesus prays for the forgiveness of whoever is responsible for his 
suffering. He also applies the excuse of ignorance as a reason they should be forgiven. 
Ignorance as a basis for forgiveness coincides with Aristotle’s “excuse of ignorance,” 
which absolves the offender of the crime, but only insofar as the offender regrets what he 
has done.454 But Luke gives no indication that the soldiers feel bad for having killed 
Jesus; on the contrary, in the same verse just after Jesus’ prayer for forgiveness Luke 
reports, “And they cast lots to divide his clothing” (23:34b). The soldiers likely did not 
have a choice in whether they killed Jesus that day, but they did voluntarily roll dice to 
divide up his belongings.  
The prayer prefigures the motif of ignorance that is evident in Acts.455 Peter indicts 
the Jewish audience for the crucifixion of Jesus, but offers the ignorance excuse: “And 
now, friends, I know that you acted in ignorance, as did also your rulers…Repent 
therefore, and turn to God so that your sins may be wiped out” (3:17, 19). Later, Paul 
preaches, “While God has overlooked the times of human ignorance, now he commands 
                                                
Exegetical and Theological Exposition of Holy Scripture; Nashville, TN: B & H 
Publishing Group, 1992), pp. 589, 591.  
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sulla croce: «Padre, perdona loro...»” (16 Novembre 1988; Udienza Generale, in 
Catechesi sul Credo, parte II: Gesù Figlio e Salvatore; Internet Office, Vatican 2002), 
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454 D.S. Hutchison, “Ethics,” in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Aristotle (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 195-232 (208); 
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book III. See also Konstan, Before Forgiveness, p. 121. 
455 William S. Kurz, Reading Luke-Acts: Dynamics of Biblical Narrative (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), p. 149. 
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all people everywhere to repent” (17:30). In these verses, it is clear that ignorance must 
be followed by repentance. As with Aristotle’s instruction, sins committed in ignorance 
may be overlooked when there is remorse (or repentance, given here as metanoei=n). 
Forgiveness in Luke-Acts 
The first instance of forgiveness in the Gospel of Luke occurs when Jesus encounters 
the paralyzed man (5:17-26). Upon restoring the man’s ability to walk, Jesus declares, 
“Friend (a0nqrwpe, lit. “man”; there is no prior relationship between Jesus and this man), 
your sins are forgiven you” (v. 20). Here, the passive voice (a0fe/wntai) suggests that 
Jesus is announcing forgiveness performed by God. However, when the scribes and 
Pharisees question Jesus’ ability to forgive sins, Jesus counters, “The Son of Man has the 
authority on earth to forgive sins” (v. 24). Later, when the woman identified as a sinner 
anoints Jesus (7:36-50), he offers identical words of forgiveness first to the onlookers and 
then to the woman herself: “Therefore, I tell you, her sins, which were many, have been 
forgiven” (v. 47; a0fe/wntai), and “Your sins are forgiven” (v. 48; a0fe/wntai). These 
pronouncements also arouse suspicion among those present who “began to say among 
themselves, ‘Who is this who even forgives sins?’” (v. 49). 
Both episodes use the passive voice to deflect the agency for forgiveness from Jesus 
to God.456 Both consequently raise but do not explicitly answer the question of Jesus’ 
                                                
456 On the use of the “divine passive” in the Gospels, see Joachim Jeremias, New 
Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus (trans. J. Bowden; New York: 
Scribner’s, 1971), pp. 9-14; William R. Herzog, Prophet and Teacher: An Introduction to 
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own ability to forgive sins vs. the ability of any person – any ‘son of man’ or ‘human 
being’ – to do so. Jesus heals the paralyzed and declares that the “son of man” has 
authority to forgive sins. However, this action proves only that Jesus has the ability to 
heal, something that was true for other miracle-workers at the time.457 It is Jesus’ 
interlocutors who conclude that Jesus is claiming the ability to forgive on his own 
authority by asking, “Who can forgive sins but God alone?” (5:21) and “Who is this who 
even forgives sins?” (Lk. 7:49). It is clear from these passages that Jesus understands 
himself as having the authority to speak for God in matters of forgiveness.458 
In the Sermon on the Plain (Lk. 6:17-49), forgiveness and love of one’s enemies are 
prominent themes. Jesus instructs, “Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, 
bless those who curse you, pray for those who abuse you… Forgive, and you will be 
forgiven” (6:27-29, 37). These words anticipate Jesus’ prayer from the cross. Indeed, 
Jesus does offer a prayer for those who torment him (23:34a), but he does not forgive 
them even though he has both asserted his authority to do so (5:24) and instructed his 
listeners that it is possible and necessary for humans to forgive (6:37). 
The Lord’s Prayer reinforces the point that human beings have the ability and 
obligation to forgive one another: “When you pray, say . . . forgive us our sins, for we 
ourselves forgive everyone indebted to us” (Lk. 11:2, 4). Jesus instructs the disciples 
further on forgiveness when he tells them, “If the same person sins against you seven 
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457 Culpepper, Luke, p. 124. 
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times a day, and turns back to you seven times and says, ‘I repent,’ you must forgive” 
(17:3-4; see discussion of these texts in Chapter Two). Jesus teaches his disciples to be 
forgiving of one another, although where Matthew leaves a similar instruction for 
unlimited forgiveness in vague terms (18:21-22), Luke makes the condition explicit: the 
offender must repent.  
These examples demonstrate that according to the Lucan program, forgiveness is not 
the exclusive province of God. They show that Jesus, and indeed everyone, also have the 
ability to forgive others. In light of this, we might expect Jesus to say, “I forgive you! 
You don’t know what you’re doing.” Given Luke’s emphasis on repentance, such 
forgiveness might not be in order. However, having already claimed the authority to 
speak on God’s behalf (“the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins,” Lk. 
5:24), he might say as he did before to both the paralyzed man and the tearful woman at 
his feet even though any repentance on their part wasn’t immediately obvious, “Your sins 
are forgiven you! You don’t know what you’re doing.” Instead, in the midst of a violent 
death, Jesus pleads, “Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing” 
(23:34a).459  
Jesus’ language in this prayer is identical to the words he uses to exhort his disciples 
to forgive one another. Speaking to the disciples about interpersonal forgiveness, Jesus 
uses the imperative, a1fev au0tw~| (“if there is repentance, you must forgive him”; 17:3). 
On the cross, Jesus utters the same words, a1fev au0toi=v (“forgive them”; 23:34a), an 
imperative plea for God to forgive. But as he is dying, Jesus does not follow the 
instruction he issued to his disciples or exercise his own authority to forgive. His words 
                                                
459 On the textual authenticity of Lk. 23:34a, see the Excursus, pp. 127-29. 
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from the cross raise the issue of forgiveness, but the prayer suggests that Jesus was 
unable or unwilling to offer forgiveness to his attackers.  
Although Jesus does not directly forgive his executioners, he does pray for them in 
accordance with his earlier instruction: “Love your enemies, do good to those who hate 
you. Bless those who curse you, pray for those who abuse you” (Lk. 6:27-28). The point 
is not that enemies or persecutors will stop cursing and abusing. What should change is 
one’s disposition to them. Jesus issues the instructions as an ethical challenge:  
If you love those who love you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners love 
those who love them. If you do good to those who do good to you, what credit is 
that to you? For even sinners do the same. If you lend to those from whom you 
hope to receive, what credit is that to you? Even sinners lend to sinners, to receive 
as much again. But love your enemies, do good, and lend, expecting nothing in 
return. Your reward will be great, and you will be children of the Most High; for 
he is kind to the ungrateful and the wicked. Be merciful, just as your Father is 
merciful. (6:32-36) 
These words immediately precede the reciprocal forgiveness formula, “Forgive, and you 
will be forgiven” (6:37). Here it is clear that Jesus considers forgiveness to be a kind 
action on the order of loving and praying for one’s enemies. He gives no precondition for 
that forgiveness, just as there is no precondition for enemy love or prayer. This is not to 
say that women who are victims of abuse should stay in violent situations and love and 
pray for their abusers. On the contrary, each of these actions may be performed from a 
safe distance. 
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The martyrdom of Stephen provides a second example of substituting prayer for 
direct forgiveness during a violent act: “[Stephen] prayed, ‘Lord Jesus, receive my spirit.’ 
Then he knelt down and cried out in a loud voice, “Lord, do not hold this sin against them 
(ku/rie, mh\ sth/sh|v au0toi=v th\n a9marti/an tau/thn). When he had said this, he died” 
(Acts 7:59-60). Stephen prays not to God, but to “Lord Jesus” whom he sees standing at 
the right hand of God (7:56), and while he does not use language of forgiveness, Stephen 
indicates that he wishes Jesus will deal mercifully with his attackers (there is no question 
here that the antecedent of “them” is the Jewish mob who is stoning him to death). 
Stephen does not call out, “I forgive you,” although he might have done so given Jesus’ 
teachings in the Gospel. Instead, he prays in imitation of his Lord, “Do not hold this sin 
against them” (7:60).460 However, refraining from holding a sin against someone is not 
the same thing as forgiving that person. This becomes clear in Jesus’ encounter with the 
adulterous woman in the Gospel of John. He does not hold her sin against her, but he 
does not forgive her. He says simply, “Neither do I condemn you. Go your way, and from 
now on do not sin again” (ou0de\ e0gw/ se katakri/nw: pore/ou kai\ mhke/ti a9ma/rtane; 
8:11). Stephen’s model is potentially more useful to victims of domestic violence 
struggling with whether to forgive. As Jesus demonstrates in John, such passing over or 
not condemning does not require a continued relationship, but it does require a change in 
behavior. Jesus tells the woman, “Go your way, and from now on do not sin again” (Jn. 
8:11).  
                                                
460 See the excursus for a discussion of the text-critical issues with this verse. 
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Early interpretations of Luke 23:34a 
Many ante- and post-Nicene interpreters distinguish between Jesus’ prayer for his 
executioners and a direct act of forgiveness. Augustine (354-430) understands the prayer 
in the context of the hypostatic union of human and divine, both praying (and thus setting 
an example) and also hearing the prayer for the forgiveness.461 The example of prayer is 
also central to Pseudo-Clement (writing ca. 140-160). He explains, “For the Teacher 
Himself, being nailed to the cross, prayed to the Father that the sin of those who slew 
Him might be forgiven. They also therefore, being imitators of the Teacher in their 
sufferings, pray for those who contrive them, as they have been taught.”462  
Like Pseudo-Clement, both Irenaeus (130-202) and John Chrysostom (347-407) 
connect Jesus’ cry to his instructions to love enemies (Lk. 6:27) and pray for persecutors 
(Lk. 6:28). Chrysostom writes, “As therefore He commanded men to pray so does He 
Himself pray, instructing you to do so by his own unflagging utterances of prayer. Again 
He commanded us to do good to those who hate us, and to deal fairly with those who 
treat us despitefully.”463 Irenaeus echoes this sentiment: “The long-suffering, patience, 
compassion, and goodness of Christ are exhibited. For the Word of God, who said to us, 
Love your enemies, and pray for those that hate you, Himself did this very thing upon the 
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cross.”464 In these interpretations, Jesus’ prayer from the cross is consistent with his 
instructions on enemy love and an ideal for Christian piety. 
Later interpreters also focus on Jesus’ act of prayer. Martin Luther preaches that as he 
prays, Jesus is fulfilling the role of high priest: Jesus “prays for us and all men, who by 
our sins had furnished the cause for His crucifixion and death. For this reason we should 
not regard the gallows, or the cross, on which Christ suffered, as anything else than that 
altar, upon which He offers up His life and at which He discharges the priestly duty of 
prayer.”465 For Luther, Jesus’ prayer for forgiveness is actually a prayer for all humanity. 
In that the crucifixion secures forgiveness for everyone, the prayer serves as a narration 
for the atonement that is enacted with his suffering and death.466 
Luther stops short of claiming this verse as a mandate for human forgiveness. Rather, 
he aligns with earlier interpreters in citing it as an example of right prayer and enemy 
love. He explains, “Therefore if thou wilt be a Christian, thou shalt then imitate thy Lord, 
and have compassion on those who cause thee suffering, and even pray for them that God 
might not punish them.”467 For Luther, wrongdoing is more an occasion for pity and 
prayer than it is forgiveness, at least in the context of this verse. Forgiveness is a foregone 
conclusion for Christians, secured by the death and resurrection of Jesus and embodied in 
this prayer on the cross. He writes, “Therefore you ought to be so pious as to rather pity 
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[the ones who wrong you]…as Christ also himself has done toward us, when he prayed 
on the cross, ‘Father forgive them.’”468 
The prayer as lacking forgiveness 
Contemporary interpreters note the absence of forgiveness in this verse. John K. Roth 
cites Jesus’ earlier claim that “the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins” (Lk. 
5:24), as well as his pronouncements of forgiveness for the paralyzed man (5:24) and 
sinful woman (7:47) and asks, “Why doesn’t Jesus just forgive the offenders himself?”469 
Like earlier interpreters, Roth distinguishes between the prayer and forgiveness, and 
emphasizes consistency with the earlier teachings on enemy love.470 He is not forgiving 
them. Roth concludes that the primary reason Jesus does not directly forgive his 
executioners is that there is no display of repentance.471 It is for this reason that the prayer 
may well represent a circumlocution for forgiveness. 
In accounting for the lack of forgiveness in the prayer, Frederick W. Keene explains 
that the prayer is a reflection of how one in a weak position cannot forgive the stronger 
party.472 He argues that had Jesus wanted to show that the weak should forgive the 
strong, this would have been a perfect opportunity. However, Jesus turns the matter over 
to the one who is more powerful than either the victim or the abuser. Keene explains, 
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“Surely the idea of a forgiving Christ would tell us that if he could he would forgive. But 
he did not, and thus no one should be asked or expected to forgive those who retain the 
power in a relationship where forgiveness might be applicable.”473  
However, Jesus’ forgiveness instructions in the Gospel of Luke suggest the contrary; 
any person may forgive another person regardless of his or her standing in the 
community. In both the Lord’s Prayer (“forgive us…as we forgive,” 17:4) and the 
reciprocal formula (“Forgive, and you will be forgiven,” 6:37), Jesus speaks in terms 
general enough to imply that everyone has the ability to forgive. Even if Jesus’ intended 
his instructions for unlimited forgiveness for a particular community (suggested by the 
“brother” language in 17:3-4), there is no suggestion here or elsewhere that such 
forgiveness is governed by considerations of power. Therefore, Jesus’ withholding of 
forgiveness from the cross may not be explained simply by out-of-balance power 
dynamics. 
Jesus as stoic or martyr 
Jesus’ forgiveness prayer fits both the stoic and martyrological traditions of his time. 
Because the stoic sage is considered to be invulnerable to injury, he would not feel 
resentment and it would not be appropriate for him to forgive.474 Moreover, the stoic wise 
man “acts according to what is due, and so he will not remit the penalty for an intentional 
wrong.”475 In keeping with this, Jesus provides the ignorance excuse (“for [gar, also 
“because”] they do not know what they are doing,” 23:34a) as a causative for God’s 
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474 Griswold, Forgiveness, pp. 12-13. 
475 Konstan, Before Forgiveness, p. 32. 
  185 
forgiveness. For the stoics, however, the issue of forgiveness is moot because the wise 
man cannot be harmed.476 Thus, there would be no reason to forgive. Nietzsche reveals a 
similar understanding when he argues that the strong person will not allow wrongdoing to 
affect him in such a way that forgiveness is necessary. He writes, “To be incapable of 
taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long—that 
is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to 
mold, to recuperate and to forget.”477 Jesus may be seen as exemplifying this detachment 
by neither forgiving nor calling for vengeance for his persecutors. 
At the time of Jesus, the martyrological tradition included the belief that God would 
emerge on the side of the righteous and judge those who tormented them.478 The typical 
martyr’s cry for vengeance reflects this idea.479 This is seen in the murder of Abel, the 
prototypical martyr, whose spilled blood calls for vengeance. God speaks to Cain: 
“Listen; your brother’s blood is crying out to me from the ground! And now you are 
cursed from the ground, which has opened its mouth to receive your brother’s blood from 
your hand” (Gen. 4:10-11). However, Jesus’ words as he is dying call for mercy rather 
than vengeance; this prayer becomes a model that Christian martyrs will follow, 
beginning with Stephen. 
Regarding both Jesus’ prayer from the cross and Stephen’s plea as he is being stoned 
in Acts, Matthews argues, “The forgiveness prayer in itself is a dramatic overturning of 
the expected cry of the martyr for vengeance. As an expression of self-mastery and the 
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ability to refrain from retaliating in the face of undeserved violence, it is an assertion of 
the ethical superiority of Christianity over Judaism.”480 However, the prayers may not 
represent such a stark reversal as Matthews suggests. Martyrs’ prayers for the forgiveness 
of their killers may serve to amplify blame on their attackers. According to Irenaeus, the 
forgiveness prayer only postpones the vengeance God has in store.481 Knust even 
suggests that the prayer may have an element of sarcasm; instead of an expression of 
mercy, Jesus’ words contain a wish for the divine punishment of the executioners (who 
include both the Roman soldiers and also, as becomes clear in Acts, the Jewish 
authorities) and a proclamation of the superiority of Christianity over Judaism.482 
Matthews demonstrates that Jesus’ prayer models a new way of being in the world for 
his followers. She writes, “The prayer radically challenges both the stoic silence of the 
suffering righteous one, who is confident in God’s ultimate vengeance, and the martyr 
whose dying cry to God is that vengeance be done. This unprecedented plea for mercy 
upon those tormentors is the assertion of a ‘new testament’ for a new social group.”483 
Matthews suggests the prayer reflects the marcionite concern for dividing the Jewish 
martyrdom tradition from the kinder, gentler Christianity expressed in Jesus’ prayer.484  
Jim Harrison also sees the prayer as countering popular notions of social relations. 
“Jesus’ logion…radically undermined the ancient politics of hatred, irrespective of its 
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religious and cultural context.”485 Harrison also points out that Jesus’ willingness to 
appeal on behalf of his attackers go against the Greco-Roman ethic of “helping friends 
and harming enemies” and could have made Jesus appear weak.486 He writes, “Above all, 
at the most basic level of ancient civil ethics, Jesus had not helped his friends at all by 
loving his enemy.” With this prayer, Jesus overturns the prevailing ethic and, according 
to Harrison, institutes a “radical new ethic and paradigm of behavior.”487 Harrison 
interprets the prayer as running counter to a variety of social conventions, thus presenting 
Jesus on the cross as heralding social reform even as he prays in the moment of his death. 
Regardless of whether enemies are loved or hated, they are still enemies. Jesus’ prayer 
presents a new way to approach those enemies—by interceding for forgiveness on their 
behalf—and is therefore consistent with his earlier teachings. While such analyses shed 
light on relationships of power in the time of Jesus, they do so by playing to popular ideas 
of Jesus as a revolutionary leader bent on overturning oppressive social attitudes.488 Thus, 
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Jesus’ merciful prayer is cast as heroically undermining the vague “ancient politics of 
hatred.” 
Jesus suffers and struggles 
Understanding Jesus as a stoic or a martyr portrays him as in complete control of his 
actions and emotions as he is being crucified. However, there is no reason to believe that 
Luke intended to present Jesus as a martyr or stoic figure.489 Interpreting Jesus as a stoic 
sage incapable of feeling pain is not useful for the pastoral care of victims of domestic 
violence. Calm forbearance of injury only permits injury to continue, and martyr-esque 
cries for vengeance likely beget more severe abuse. Instead of reading Jesus in these 
ways, I suggest using Luke’s account of Jesus’ last words to construct a model of a 
suffering Christ who struggles with forgiveness as victims may also struggle.  
In his passion narrative, Luke depicts Jesus’ emotional conflict: “Father, if you are 
willing, remove this cup from me” (Lk. 22:42). The next verses recount, “Then an angel 
from heaven appeared to him and gave him strength. He prayed in agony more earnestly, 
and his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down on the ground” (22:43-
44).490 Even after the angel strengthened him, Jesus was still “in agony” (e0n a0gwni/a|). 
                                                
Blessing: Living the Countercultural Reality of the Beatitudes (Downer’s Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2004). 
489 G.N. Stanton, Jesus of Nazareth in New Testament Preaching (Society for New 
Testament Studies Monograph Series, 27; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1974), p. 36. 
490 These verses are textually disputed, with some scholars arguing that the verses were 
interpolated later to protect Jesus’ divinity in light of his suffering. Others find the verses 
thematically consistent with Luke. The manuscript evidence is split evenly; I err on the 
side of inclusion. See Johnson, Luke, p. 351; C.M. Tuckett, “Luke 22,43-44: The ‘Agony’ 
in the Garden and Luke's Gospel,” in A. Denaux (ed.) New Testament Textual Criticism 
and Exegesis: Festschrift J. Delobel (Bibliotheca Ephemeridim theologicarum 
  189 
The sweat that poured off his skin was so copious that it is said to be “like great drops of 
blood.”491 While some argue that Luke’s Gospel portrays an “imperturbable Jesus,”492 
these visceral physical descriptions suggest that he was already struggling to accept the 
fate that awaited him on the cross. 
Moreover, death by crucifixion was remarkably painful and protracted, and it is fair 
to assume that Jesus was at least in physical distress during the hours he hung conscious 
on the cross in Luke’s account. While Luke omits the cry of dereliction (“My God, my 
God, why have you forsaken me?” Mk. 15:34//Mt. 27:46), there is still copious evidence 
that Jesus suffered. For Luke, Jesus’ suffering is an integral part of what gives meaning to 
his death and resurrection. Throughout the Gospel and Acts, Jesus’ suffering understood 
to be both necessary and a foregone conclusion (“The Son of Man must undergo great 
suffering,” 9:22; “first he must endure much suffering,” 17:25; “I have eagerly desired to 
eat this Passover with you before I suffer,” 22:15; “Was it not necessary that the Messiah 
should suffer these things?” 24:26; “it is written, that the Messiah is to suffer,” 24:46; 
“After his suffering he presented himself alive to them,” Acts 1:3; “God fulfilled what he 
had foretold through all the prophets, that his Messiah would suffer,” Acts 3:18; “it was 
necessary for the Messiah to suffer and to rise from the dead,” Acts 17:3).  
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The most convincing evidence that Jesus experienced pain and struggled on the cross 
comes in his final words. Luke reports that just after the forgiveness prayer, Jesus tells 
the thief beside him, “Truly I tell you, today you will be with me in Paradise” (23:43). 
Several hours later, the sky darkened and Jesus spoke his last words. “Crying with a loud 
voice, [he] said, ‘Father, into your hands I commend my spirit.’ Having said this, he 
breathed his last” (23:46; emphasis mine). This last request does not reflect a calm and 
composed Jesus. Instead, he is crying out (fwnh/sav fwnh=| mega/lh|, “calling out in a 
loud voice”), and while he entrusts his spirit to God, the shouting portrays Jesus as 
pleading for rescue as much as it indicates acceptance of his fate. Understanding Jesus 
this way allows for an interpretation of the forgiveness prayer as another example of his 
struggle on the cross. While he has claimed the authority to forgive sins on earth (Lk. 
5:23), Jesus cannot bring himself to pronounce forgiveness for his executioners. 
The prayer as a direct act of forgiveness 
Other expositors read the prayer as a direct act of forgiveness. A few early 
interpreters hint at this exegesis,493 but contemporary interpreters make it explicit. 
Forgiving one’s abusers—not simply praying for them—is what should be imitated. 
Miroslav Volf writes, “Under the foot of the cross we learn that in a world of irreversible 
deeds and partisan judgments redemption from the passive suffering of victimization 
cannot happen without the active suffering of forgiveness.”494 Volf sees Jesus’ prayer as 
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the enactment of the possibility of human reconciliation and communion. Like many 
contemporary readers, he downplays the prayer’s significance as a prayer per se (as 
opposed to an act of forgiveness) and presents it as an act of transformative forgiveness.  
A great number of scholars and ministers regard the prayer as a model for Christian 
practice,495 an example of the kind of unconditional forgiveness Christians should aspire 
to imitate.496 Raymond E. Brown notes that Jesus’ forgiveness models the right response 
to persecution for Christians.497 And describing a mother whose son had been murdered, 
Michael Henderson recounts how she looked to the example of Jesus on the cross when 
choosing to forgive his killers. Henderson even allows the verse to stand misquoted: “At 
the point of death, Jesus said, ‘I forgive them.’”498 Henderson reports that the mother 
said, “I forgive them” rather than “I forgive you.” Holding on to the third-person-plural 
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pronoun (just as Jesus did) gives her some necessary distance in the midst of trying to 
forgive the men who killed her son. 
Theologians and pastoral caregivers often import contemporary psychological 
categories such as self-forgiveness, insecurity, depression, and self-esteem into their 
interpretations of Luke’s verse. “Jesus forgave his own murderers because he understood 
all to which they were enslaved—the social and religious prejudices of the day, their own 
insecurities, their ordinary, passive minds, and their self-centered motivations,” writes 
Augusto Curry.499 Ron Clark also cites Jesus’ prayer as an example of the therapeutic 
value of forgiveness. He counsels, “Through forgiveness, victims choose not to be like 
the abuser who is full of fear, anger, confusion, and low self-esteem. Victims and families 
can face the future with hope and can choose not to let the abuser determine their 
happiness and spiritual choices.”500  
With regard to the crucifixion, though, there is no indication in the biblical text that 
the soldiers or Jewish leaders suffered from “fear, anger, confusion, and low self-
esteem.” Earlier in Luke, Jesus does not elaborate on any mitigating psychological factors 
(unless repentance might count as “psychological”) that might prequalify an offender for 
forgiveness. Some interpreters suggest that the psychological benefit of forgiveness 
belongs to the forgiver.501 Considering that crucifying Jesus was all in a day’s work for 
these men, they were unlikely to consider their actions to have been wrong.  
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Such an emphasis on the therapeutic value of forgiveness is anachronistic, as 
interpreters import post-Enlightenment psychological categories into the story of the 
crucifixion, but it also asserts pressure as sacred texts are mobilized to advocate 
psychological or emotional responses from victims of domestic violence. Jesus does not 
say, “Father, forgive them because they are insecure and self-centered,” or “Father, 
forgive them so I will not be locked into victimhood.” In such readings, the prayer of 
Jesus is transformed into an act of unconditional forgiveness to fit current models of 
offense as psychologically understandable and forgiveness as the key therapeutic 
response. This is not to say that psychological categories did not exist at the time of 
Jesus, nor that the Bible is never a suitable source of direction for Christian readers.  
My reading of Luke 23:34a is careful not to over-interpret the prayer for forgiveness 
as a direct act of forgiveness. Uttered in the midst of terrible violence and excruciating 
pain, the prayer is a cry, a demand, even, for God the Father to do what Jesus either 
cannot or is not willing to do in that moment. As Luke emphasizes throughout his 
Gospel, repentance is a precondition for forgiveness (see esp. 17:3-4, “if there is 
repentance you must forgive’). The idea of unilateral, unconditional forgiveness for the 
sake of emotional health would have been foreign to both Jesus’ context and Luke’s 
readers. 
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Forgiveness and the pastoral care of victims of domestic violence 
Many women who are victims of abuse seek help from the church because they see it 
as a safe place.502 As a result, Christian clergy and pastoral caregivers play a crucial role 
in responding to domestic violence. Religious beliefs very often play a role in abusive 
relationships. Batterers sometimes cite Scripture to defend their actions (Eph. 5:22, 
“Wives, be subject to your husbands as you are to the Lord,” taken as obedience, even to 
physical abuse), as well as to pressure victims to forgive and reconcile (Mt. 6:9-15 and 
Lk. 11:2-4, the Lord’s Prayer; Mt. 18:21-22 and Lk. 17:3-4, forgive without bound; Lk. 
23:34a, “Father, forgive them”).503 As a result, pastoral caregivers must address issues of 
domestic violence, submission, and forgiveness not only in the private counsel of victims 
but also in the life of the church body through preaching, education, and social action 
against domestic violence. 
This section focuses specifically on the question of forgiveness in the pastoral care of 
victims of domestic violence. I identify three main problems in pastoral writings about 
forgiveness. First, while most sources advise against pressing victims to forgive in the 
                                                
502 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), “When I Call For Help: A 
Pastoral Response To Domestic Violence Against Women” (2002), 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/domestic-
violence/when-i-call-for-help.cfm.  
503 On abusers using Scripture (esp. Eph. 5:22) to defend their actions, see John J. Pilch, 
“Family Violence in Cross-Cultural Perspective: An Approach for Feminist Interpreters 
of the Bible,” in Athalya Brenner and Carole Rader Fontaine (eds.), A Feminist 
Companion to Reading the Bible (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), pp. 
306-25 (308); Carol Klose Smith and Darcy Davis-Gage, “The Quiet Storm: Explaining 
the Cultural Context of Violence Against Women within a Feminist Perspective,” in 
Dereck Daschke and Andrew Kille (eds.), A Cry Instead of Justice: The Bible and 
Cultures of Violence in Psychological Perspective (Library of Hebrew Bible/Old 
Testament Studies, 499; New York and London: T & T Clark International, 2010), pp. 
107-130 (121); Mark-Peter Lundquist, “Beaten into Submission,” The Clergy Journal 
77.8 (2001), pp. 13-14 (13).  
  195 
crisis moment, forgiveness remains the goal. Second, pastoral caregivers often conflate 
biblical forgiveness with contemporary therapeutic definitions of the term, which can 
result in pressure on victims to forgive without any repentant expression from their 
abusers. Finally, forgiveness is often presented as the only alternative to being consumed 
by anger, bitterness, and resentment. In the pastoral care context, the prayer from the 
cross becomes the ultimate example of the unconditional forgiveness that victims should 
imitate. 
Pastoral caregivers could better serve victims of domestic violence by more carefully 
interpreting the biblical material. Forgiveness in the teachings of Jesus is neither 
unconditional nor a matter of improving the victim’s mental health. In the Gospel of 
Luke, Jesus insists that forgiveness requires repentance (17:3-4), and the Lord’s Prayer 
also presents a model of forgiveness that is paired with an expression of repentance 
(“Forgive us,” 11:4). Moreover, the cry from the cross actually represents a prayer—an 
imperative that demands action—for forgiveness rather than a direct act of forgiveness. 
The image of Jesus struggling with forgiveness in the face of violence can be an 
empowering one for victims who also struggle. The prayer represents an alternate 
response for faithful Christians in accordance with Lk. 6:26 (“Pray for those who abuse 
you”). Thus, instead of an impossible example for victims to imitate, Jesus choosing to 
pray on the cross becomes a model for victims to reclaim their agency by choosing not to 
forgive their abusers. This is not to say that all victims of domestic violence must pray for 
their abusers in order to be faithful to the text. Adopting a prayerful stance at a distance is 
one response, but it is not the only one. As demonstrated in the introduction, non-
forgiveness is consistent with Jesus’ teachings in the Gospel of John, when he instructs 
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the disciples and the community to use their own judgment in deciding which sins to 
forgive and which to retain (Jn 20:23). 
Psychology and pastoral care 
Drawing on the biblical image of the shepherd, “pastoral” care “refers to the 
solicitous concern expressed within the religious community for persons in trouble or 
distress.”504 Pastoral care may take the form of private counseling, but it should extend 
beyond this model. Liston Mills writes, “[Care] may refer to any pastoral act motivated 
by a sincere devotion to the well-being of the other(s). In this sense liturgical forms and 
ritual acts may reflect care as may education and various forms of social action.”505 
Pastoral care became increasingly influenced by psychology around the turn of the 
twentieth century. Psychology has had such an impact on pastoral care that some have 
worried that it has supplanted theology as basis of contemporary pastoral practice.506 This 
chapter focuses specifically on pastoral care in the context of Christian practice (mostly 
Protestant), primarily in the United States.  
In the context of domestic violence, pastoral caregivers often offer psychological 
solutions conflated with theological or biblical guidance. A primary example of this is 
seen in the emphasis on forgiveness. Where the forgiveness advocated by Jesus is 
conditional and closely related to repairing broken relationships within the community, 
pastoral caregivers often promote a kind of forgiveness that takes place only in the mind 
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and heart of the victim. This kind of forgiveness is touted as “healing” and the only way 
to avoid being eaten up by anger and resentment. 
At its worst, such forgiveness can lead victims to forgive their abusers and return to 
dangerous home situations. Any return to a previously abusive relationship is fraught 
with danger, but urging victims to “forgive” before the abuser has made any change can 
be especially problematic. At its best, it provides victims with a way of thinking about 
forgiveness that lets them control its conditions and its timing, but still holds them 
responsible for forgiving their abusers as the ideal Christian outcome. Pastoral caregivers 
who present this account of forgiveness draw heavily on psychological explanations in 
place of biblical illustrations.  
In the context of abuse, pastoral caregivers are called to a more complex vision of 
care. Bonnie Miller-McLemore writes, “Pastoral care disturbs as well as comforts, 
provokes as well as guides…[it] calls for confession, and moves vigilantly toward 
forgiveness and reconciliation, knowing that both are more difficult to effect than people 
have hoped.”507 In other words, pastoral caregivers must challenge victims as well as 
console them by making “a space for difficult change.”508 The acknowledgment that 
forgiveness is difficult is an important one, but forgiveness as the way to repair the 
marriage still emerges as the goal.  
I propose a further step. The Gospel account requires repentance from the offender 
(Lk. 17:3-4) and accountability from the community (Mt. 18:15-20). Relying on these 
biblical instructions and examples, pastoral caregivers light the way for victims to assert 
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their moral agency in the face of abuse and refuse forgiveness where such conditions are 
not met. Instead, the refusal to forgive may reflect strength and self-protection in the face 
of abuse. Even in cases where repentance is visible and sincere and the community is 
supportive, a victim may still choose not to forgive. Along with his instructions on 
forgiveness and repentance, Jesus commissions his followers to make their own decisions 
about what to forgive and God will follow suit (Jn 20:23). Repentance, then, is a 
necessary but not sufficient requirement for forgiveness. 
Redemptive suffering 
In the context of pastoral care, well-meaning advice from pastors about the 
redemptive value of suffering and the importance of forgiveness sometimes leads to 
women returning to dangerous situations only to be further abused. It is not uncommon 
for victims of domestic violence to be told they should endure their suffering patiently. 
Joanna Dewey observes, “Many a woman…has embraced or endured suffering that could 
be alleviated because she has come to believe that such a way of life is pleasing to God 
and an imitation of Christ.”509  
Indeed, for many Christians, the suffering of Jesus has a redeeming value for all 
humanity. Citing Isaiah’s description of the “suffering servant” (53:5, “But he was 
wounded for our transgressions, crushed for our iniquities; upon him was the punishment 
that made us whole, and by his bruises we are healed”) and reading these words as a 
prophecy of Christ, they understand his suffering as necessary for “healing” 
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humankind.510 It is likely that Jesus interpreted his own experience in this way, argues 
N.T. Wright: that the sufferings of Israel would be focused on one person, that that 
suffering would have redemptive significance, and that this person would be Jesus 
himself.511 Paul develops this theme of redemptive suffering as in Romans 5:3, “We also 
boast in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance” and Philippians 1:29, 
“For he has graciously granted you the privilege not only of believing in Christ, but of 
suffering for him as well.” Just as Christ’s suffering on the cross served to redeem 
humanity whether as atoning sacrifice or sign of righteousness or even as confrontation 
of Roman oppression, victims of domestic violence are sometimes advised that their own 
suffering may serve a greater purpose.  
And finally, 1 Peter presents God as approving of righteously motivated human 
suffering: “If you endure when you do right and suffer for it, you have God’s approval. 
For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an 
example, so that you should follow in his steps” (2:20-21). Such an understanding of 
suffering as redemptive, morally good, and in imitation of the Christ stands to trap 
women in abusive situations. That this interpretation of suffering may have comforted 
early Christian martyrs who suffered under persecution for their faith is of little help to 
twenty-first century women who suffer at the hands of abusive spouses. As Betsy J. 
Bauman-Martin observes, “to use the text to encourage women to remain in abusive 
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relationships is a blundering cross-cultural misapplication of the text.”512 Of course, not 
all women have the means or social support to escape from abusive relationships, and for 
these women, the idea that suffering is somehow redemptive may be all they have to hold 
onto. For these women, the vision of Jesus on the cross—also struggling, also unable to 
escape—can give meaning to suffering that may continue indefinitely.513  
Enduring suffering is not the only way women are instructed to follow Christ’s 
example; pastoral caregivers often present forgiveness as a non-negotiable Christian 
virtue. Pastoral counselors Robert W. Harvey and David G. Benner write, “It is obvious 
that pastors must make the understanding of forgiveness central to their care for the 
members of the body of Christ. The unforgiving cannot grow into the image of Christ 
when the most Christ-like virtue is resisted.”514 Speaking directly to victims of domestic 
violence, Patricia Diann Heathman emphasizes that forgiveness is necessary for victims 
both to follow Jesus’ example and to secure their own salvation. She writes, “While He 
was still on the cross, enduring the shame, anguish and pain of the crucifixion, Jesus 
prayed that God would forgive his abuser. Christ-likeness requires that we do the 
same.”515 Along with patient suffering, forgiveness of one’s abuser thus becomes the 
ultimate imitation of Christ.  
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Many pastoral theologians are critical of such approaches. Nancy Nienhuis writes, “If 
we encourage the belief that suffering should be accepted as a means of becoming like 
Christ, we are endorsing violence as a vehicle for Christian character development.”516 
Many note the destructive results of such pastoral counsel to forgive and return to falsely 
repentant abusers.517 Joy M.K. Bussert argues, “Although the cross as a symbol of 
comfort and hope does give significant meaning and dignity to the suffering, it is not 
enough. I find in working with battered women that all too often the direct application of 
this theological perspective to a woman’s life-experience actually serves to glorify 
suffering and reinforces her belief that it is ‘Christ-like’ to remain in a violence 
relationship.”518 While the cross may provide dignity and meaning, the symbol alone 
does not point to a way forward for women who suffer in abusive relationships. Pastoral 
caregivers would do well to point to the ultimate outcome of the crucifixion. On the third 
day Jesus reappeared. With the wounds still on his hands, he talked and ate with the 
disciples, offered them a blessing, and ascended to heaven (Lk. 24:28-51). Jesus’ story 
doesn’t end with suffering, and neither should the stories of victims of domestic violence.  
Pastoral caregivers counter the notion of abuse as redemptive suffering in several 
ways. James Leehan writes, “Jesus’ suffering and death on the cross was not redemptive 
because it was painful. Its redemptive value was made possible through the 
resurrection.”519 In the first century, suffering could be redemptive because it was one 
way of expiating sin. Such understandings do not hold in contemporary contexts. 
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According to Leehan, the suffering is not what “redeems” humanity, but rather the 
resurrection and defeat of death. Abused women who are counseled to imitate Christ may 
do well to remember that they not likely survive their own murders.  
Marie M. Fortune counsels victims to focus on the transformation of Jesus’ suffering 
through the resurrection instead of on the suffering itself. Just as the resurrection 
transforms the suffering of Christ, women are called to transform their own suffering into 
something better rather than remaining patiently in an abusive relationship. Marie 
Fortune writes, “Transformation is [having faith] that the way things are is not the way 
things have to be…the means by which, refusing to accept injustice and refusing to assist 
its victims to endure suffering any longer, people act. By refusing to endure evil and by 
seeking to transform suffering, we are about God’s work of making justice and healing 
brokenness.”520 In this view, standing up against abuse becomes a way of following 
Christ’s example in transforming suffering. Where Jesus’ suffering is transformed, it 
follows that victims of abuse may accomplish their own transformations by protecting 
themselves or leaving their abusers. Jesus is resurrected in spite of his suffering, not 
because he suffered. 
However, Jesus’ suffering is very different from domestic abuse. There is a 
qualitative difference between being summarily executed by the state and being 
systematically abused in one’s home. For this reason, Nienhuis calls for transformation 
rather than veneration of suffering. “In the Christian tradition, if we are told to imitate 
Christ, and Christ was crucified, and the story ends there, we are left to endure suffering,” 
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she writes.521 However, Christ’s suffering is different in two ways. First, Jesus went to 
the cross on his own volition. Second, the point of the cross was not Jesus’ suffering, but 
his resurrection.”522 Calling attention to these differences allows victims of domestic 
violence to see the limits of the call to imitate Christ in either his suffering or forgiveness. 
Jesus made a choice to go forward into his own suffering and death; victims of domestic 
abuse have suffering imposed on them. The idea that the crucifixion is meaningless 
without the resurrection may help victims of domestic violence understand that the most 
exacting imitation of Christ is to release themselves from suffering into better futures for 
themselves and their children. 
The crucifixion may serve as a model of empowerment for victims of domestic 
violence. Carol J. Adams suggests harnessing the image of Christ suffering on the cross 
in a way that encourages women to take action rather than pressures them to forgive their 
abusers. She urges ministers to say to victims, “Let Jesus off the cross. We are a 
resurrection people. Let yourself off the cross. Your suffering should be over, too. 
Because of Jesus you do not need to die to experience the meaning and power of 
resurrection [here understood as new life, an end to suffering, and a new beginning]. If 
you don’t get off the cross, however, you very well may die.”523 Adams writes, “In the 
case of battering, the death of Jesus is the metaphor for the death of the marriage as it 
now exists. The resurrection is the new possibility of a relationship without violence, 
either with or without the man who batters.”524 Thus, not only the victim may hope for 
new life, but also the abuser and the relationship may not be beyond repair. However, the 
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metaphor of murder may not be helpful in cases of domestic abuse. If the marriage is 
dead, the implication is that someone killed it. There is no room in this analogy for that 
person to be held accountable. Moreover, Jesus does not rise as a new-and-improved 
version of his former self; he still bears the wounds that caused his death. While the hope 
for “new life” as seen in the resurrection may be a powerful image for victims, 
envisioning the marriage as murdered and resurrected may not get them there.  
Forgiveness as a double bind 
In the pastoral care of victims of domestic violence, authors identify “premature 
forgiveness”525 and “cheap grace”526 as problems. Pastoral caregivers often counsel 
victims to withhold forgiveness until there is genuine repentance (or repentance the 
victim judges to be genuine or sufficient for forgiveness),527 or suggest that forgiveness is 
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a process that may be difficult or take time.528 Even so, an ideology of forgiveness 
persists and whether tacit or explicit, a preference for forgiveness comes through.  
Even though she leaves room for non-forgiveness, Pamela Cooper-White describes 
forgiveness in religiously appealing terms. She suggests pastors say to victims, “Do not 
blame yourself if you cannot forgive yet. Forgiveness is a gift of grace, and if it is right to 
happen, it will be given to you by God and in God’s own time. In the meantime, don’t 
worry, and let it go.”529 Such platitudes contain tacit pressure to forgive; what Christian 
victim doesn’t want to receive such a “gift of grace” from God? The flip side of this is 
that such language relieves victims of the burden to summon forgiveness on their own as 
a psychological challenge. Instead, they can wait for God’s “gift of grace” just as Jesus 
waits on the cross. 
Rita Lou Clarke warns against rushing women into forgiveness and cites the necessity 
of repentance and confession, and an acknowledgment by abusive men of the damage 
they have done to their wives.530 With that condition, forgiveness can and should 
proceed. She writes, “Forgiveness means recognizing that the batterer is human and that 
both he and she are made in the image of God. Forgiveness does not mean condoning his 
behavior or excusing it, but it does mean being able to accept God’s gift of the future 
                                                
Violence, p. 185; Adams, Woman-Battering, p. 49; Lehner-Hartmann, “Familial 
Violence,” p. 128; Catherine Clark Kroeger and Nancy Nason-Clark, No Place for 
Abuse: Biblical and Practical Resources to Counteract (Downer’s Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2001), p. 70; Fortune, “The Last Step,” p. 202; Boss, “Throwing 
Pearls,” p. 242. 
528 Miller-McLemore, Christian, p. 309; Mary White, “Every Knee Shall Bow,” in 
Lampman and Shattuck (eds.), God and the Victim, pp. 183-98 (187); Atkinson, “On 
Forgiving Too Soon,” p. 23.  
529 Cooper-White, Cry of Tamar, p. 259. 
530 Clarke, Pastoral Care of Battered Women, p. 79. 
  206 
possibilities [for a restored relationship] in spite of what has happened.”531 For many 
conservative Christian women, however, the “image of God” is a dominating male figure, 
and so not necessarily a helpful conceit in this instance. Here again, forgiveness comes as 
“God’s gift,” so there is no need for victims to rush to enact it. In this way, foregrounding 
theological ideas rather than psychological concepts allows victims to collaborate with 
God toward forgiveness rather than confronting the entire task by themselves.  
Many pastoral counselors paint an attractive picture of forgiveness against the 
backdrop of the dark alternative of negative emotions. Ron Clark writes, “Through time, 
healing, and validation, victims can one day forgive those who abused them. They do not 
have to live the rest of their lives with anger, bitterness, and guilt. They are not forced to 
forgive, but they can one day make that choice.”532 No Christian victim would refuse the 
hope and opportunities provided by the resurrection, or choose to live with the other 
option: anger, bitterness, and guilt. In this context, forgiveness may be a choice, but for 
the faithful Christian, there is only one option. 
When a victim is faced with the implicit “choice” of forgiveness now or forgiveness 
later, she becomes alienated from the very faith community that should be a source of 
support. Carol Klose Smith and Darcy Davis-Gage write, “The Christian tradition, with 
its emphasis on ‘preserving the family’ and ‘forgiveness,’ has placed the battered woman 
in a no-win situation. What choice does she really have?” When forgiveness is held out as 
a goal—immediate or ultimate—a victim remains defined by her response to the abuser. 
If she chooses to forgive, that may mean reconciliation and a return to the cycle of 
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violence. If she doesn’t forgive, she could feel she is not being a good conservative 
Christian. 533  
Conflating biblical and therapeutic forgiveness 
Pastoral care authors conflate therapeutic forgiveness with biblical forgiveness in two 
ways. First, they advise victims that forgiveness need not involve the offender or the 
community and that it must be achieved for their own emotional and physical health. 
Second, they present victims with a false dichotomy with forgiveness together with its 
concomitant categories of healing, freedom, and peace on the one side, and on the other 
side they place the dark world of negative emotions: anger, bitterness, indignation, 
vengeance, resentment, rage. Either a victim forgives, or she is consumed by these 
negative emotions. Neither of these ideas has biblical warrant.  
When biblical forgiveness is conflated with contemporary psychological quick fixes, 
the communal character of forgiveness gets lost. Peter Horsfield writes, “The practice of 
forgiveness is more than just the psychological action of an individual…I believe that in 
our current [cultural and historical context], much of our thinking about what forgiveness 
is has become ‘unethical,’ i.e. separated from the ethos of its origins and from the 
communal context within which it has meaning.”534 Thus, the presumption that the victim 
alone can (and should) forgive the offender neglects the basic structure presented in the 
teachings of Jesus; namely, that forgiveness involves the community holding the offender 
accountable for his actions (Mt. 18:15-17). 
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Reading the prayer from the cross as non-forgiveness has two direct effects for 
victims of domestic violence. First, it discloses that there are circumstances in which 
forgiveness is morally wrong. Second, it restores the moral agency of victims by allowing 
them to choose a course that is not defined by their response to abuse. The question, 
“Why doesn’t she forgive him?” is closely related to another common question in 
situations of domestic abuse: “Why doesn’t she leave?” Rather than having her responses 
to abuse questioned, I suggest the victim does not have any primary obligation to forgive 
or otherwise correct the violent situation. Rather, the question ought to be, “Why doesn’t 
he stop hitting her?” and pastoral caregivers and the church community should be the 
ones asking it. It is not the victim’s responsibility to escape abuse—as though she is 
responsible for her own continued injury because she doesn’t leave the home or the 
relationship—or resolve the question of forgiveness—by forgiving an abuser who makes 
no effort to repent or change his behavior.  
Imitatio Christi and the ideology of forgiveness 
I propose a model of responding to domestic violence that takes into account Jesus’ 
forgiveness instructions, the moral agency of the victim, and considerations of the impact 
of forgiveness on the future as well as its effort to reconcile past wrongdoing. Where 
victims of domestic violence are often pressured to suffer in silence and to forgive their 
abusers in imitation of Christ on the cross, I say that there is more than one way to imitate 
Christ.  
The ideology of forgiveness raises it to the level of an idol to be venerated. 
Forgiveness is a good thing simply because it is forgiveness. A reexamination of the 
biblical texts about forgiveness can counteract this overvaluing of the concept. What 
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Jesus demonstrates in the Gospels is that forgiveness is not a good thing at all times and 
in all places. There is at least one sin that cannot be forgiven, by human beings or by God 
(Mt. 12:31; Mk. 3:26; Lk. 12:10), and there are conditions for forgiveness that involve 
community rebuke (Mt. 18:15-17) and offender repentance (Lk. 17:3-4). Individual 
disciples are charged to forgive and retain according to their own judgment and assured 
that God will follow suit (Jn 20:23). In light of this, Jesus’ prayer from the cross is not 
surprising. It is possible that he determined that he simply could not forgive his attackers 
or the Jewish leaders at that time. At the very least, he is unable to forgive them in the 
absence of repentance. In either case, he recalls his earlier instruction (Lk. 6:28) and 
prays for them instead. 
In doing so, Jesus becomes an empathetic partner in suffering rather than an 
impossible example for victims to imitate. In the midst of abuse, victims often see 
forgiveness as impossible or distant at best. On the cross, Jesus struggles, just as victims 
of domestic violence struggle. Even though he has chosen to accept this suffering, the 
fact remains that he is suffering. He is in excruciating pain. For Jesus in this moment, 
prayer is an option, but forgiveness is not.  
There are occasions—and the crucifixion might be one of them—where forgiving is 
morally wrong. When abuse is ongoing and a woman’s life is in danger, pastors agree 
that forgiveness [that leads to reconciliation] is not advisable.535 However, in such cases 
forgiveness is usually deferred to some future time or circumstance, not canceled. On the 
other hand, reading Jesus’ words on the cross as non-forgiveness offers victims a faithful 
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alternative that is not primarily reactive. Peter Horsfield suspects this reading might 
reveal a faithful understanding. He asks, “What if, when women survivors of abuse say 
they are not able to forgive, they are not being weak, aberrant, or damaged, to be 
quarantined through prayer or counseling until they have recovered normality, but are 
reflecting a profound insight into the nature of Christian forgiveness?”536 Indeed, the 
refusal to forgive is in exact imitation of Christ on the cross, and it suggests strength 
rather than weakness. 
Further, the refusal to forgive allows victims to stand in defiance to the abuse that was 
perpetrated on them. “Holding wrongs ‘unforgivable’ is a way to mark the enormity of 
injury and the malignancy of wrongdoing as exceeding anything that could be made to fit 
back into a reliable framework of moral relations.”537 There are abusers who will never 
stop abusing, and there are acts of violence that may be beyond the reach of forgiveness. 
This does not mean that the unforgiving victim is morally deficient. Rather, it testifies to 
her agency in looking ahead to define the moral world and its boundaries. Jesus’ prayer 
from the cross is consistent with this concern for the future. By praying that those 
responsible for his execution might be forgiven, he accomplishes two things. First, he 
moves the responsibility for forgiveness from himself to God. Second, he looks to a 
future of restored moral relations. In order for the soldiers and Jewish leaders to be 
forgiven, they must repent their actions. Given that they are ignorant of their own 
wrongdoing, this is unlikely, but Jesus’ prayer contains the hope that they will do so. 
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Following Jesus’ example is one way victims may communicate the seriousness of 
their suffering by refusing to forgive their abusers. For victims of domestic violence, this 
account of forgiveness as unconditional and unilateral holds little hope. Here I argue that 
a close reading of forgiveness in Gospels reveals a more limited portrayal that requires 
repentance as a necessary but not always sufficient condition for forgiveness and makes 
room for individual discernment (as in Jn 20:23) with non-forgiveness as a morally 
acceptable response. In imitating Christ by refusing to forgive their abusers, victims of 
domestic violence reclaim their moral agency and protect the life of the world to come. 
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Excursus: Luke 23.34a and the Question of Authenticity 
 
The text-critical debate 
There are four possibilities about the origin of the Luke 23:34a (“Father, forgive 
them; they do not know what they are doing”): 1.) the verse was spoken by Jesus and 
recorded only by Luke, then removed by later copyists who found it unacceptable; 2.) the 
verse was spoken by Jesus and not recorded by Luke, then inserted by later copyists who 
thought it fit with the Gospel’s message; 3.) it was not spoken by Jesus but was 
formulated by Luke, then removed by later copyists; 4.) it was not spoken by Jesus but 
was invented in post-Gospel thought, inserted by a later copyist who thought it was 
appropriate to the context.538  
The verse is absent in many of the oldest and most complete New Testament 
manuscripts (P75, B, אc, D*, W), but is included (with only minor variations) in other 
early witnesses (A, Dc, א*). The verse is present in the earliest extant manuscript of 
Codex Sinaiticus (330-360), but is removed in later versions of the same text (e.g., אc).  
That the verse is present in the original hand of Codex Sinaiticus suggests anti-
Judaism in the early church may account for the verse’s later excision since Jesus appears 
to forgive the Jews for his execution. Robert Tannehill points out that Luke 23:28-31 (in 
which Jesus tells the daughters of Jerusalem, among other things, “Blessed are the barren, 
and the wombs that never bore, and the breasts that never nursed,” v. 29) if understood as 
an indication of God’s final rejection of the Jews, would seem to conflict with 23:34.539 
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Bruce Metzger considers the absence of the verse from some early manuscripts to be the 
result of copyists who viewed the fall of Jerusalem as evidence that God had not forgiven 
the Jews, so they removed the prayer that seemed to go unanswered.540 Such arguments 
based on anti-Judaism and high Christology in the early church could account for the 
verse’s absence in such major witnesses as later versions of the Codex Sinaiticus. 
The presence of the Aristotelian “excuse of ignorance”541 suggests that the verse was 
likely original and later excised. Instead of an addition, the verse was more likely excised 
by later scribes who didn’t like the suggestion that those responsible for Jesus’ death 
were absolved of their crime. The ignorance motif here and in Acts also suggests the 
verse is original to Luke.542  
Literary and theological analyses tend to judge Luke 23:34a as authentic based on its 
thematic coherence with the entire Lucan project.543 The language and thought match 
Lucan theology, and the narrative unity of Luke-Acts shows that Luke 23:34a is 
connected to the overall themes of ignorance and prayer for adversaries, as seen in the 
martyrdom of Stephen (“Lord, do not hold this sin against them,” Acts 7:60). While this 
prayer is directed at Jesus rather than God, it lacks the excuse of ignorance, and it doesn’t 
mention forgiveness, it is still considered to be in imitation of Jesus’ prayer for his 
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adversaries in Lk. 23:34a.544 Thus, the cry from the cross prefigures this theme of 
ignorance that runs throughout Acts.  
The canonical argument for later inclusion suggests that the verse was ultimately 
included after the four Gospels were collected out of a desire for Jesus to speak seven 
rather than six “last words” from the cross.545 Locating a four-gospel tradition from the 
mid-second century, Whitlark and Parsons demonstrate that trends aimed at harmonizing 
these gospels would have highlighted the group of six (an undesirable number; see Rev. 
13:18; Jn. 2:6, 19:14; Lk. 23:44) last sayings of Jesus. Thus, the verse (which likely was 
already in circulation as a “floating tradition”546) was added by gospel harmonizers to 
achieve the typologically significant number seven. The verse is in place yet out of order 
in Tatian’s Diatesseron (170; the earliest extant witness collecting the words of Jesus 
from the cross), suggesting that its position in the Gospel of Luke was not yet secure. 
Some argue for the verse’s authenticity based on purely aesthetic grounds.547 Brown 
asks, “Why would copyists have omitted this beautiful passage from mss. that contained 
it?”548 In the final analysis, he reveals his investment in the verse to be an aesthetic and 
emotional one. He writes, “It is ironical that perhaps the most beautiful sentence in the 
Passion Narrative should be textually dubious. The sentiment behind it is the essence of 
responding to hostility in what came to be thought of as a Christian manner.”549  
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Questioning authenticity 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I leave the question of textual authenticity open. 
Those arguing against the authenticity of the verse cite the verse’s thematic, stylistic, and 
theological consistency with the rest of Luke’s gospel as evidence for interpolation; 
supporters cite the same consistency as evidence for authenticity. The fact remains that 
the verse is present in the Byzantine text type (Textus Receptus) and thus it is in the King 
James Version. Therefore, it is printed in every modern version (although in double-
brackets). The modern church has always had this verse, and regardless of its textual 
authenticity, pastors, priests, scholars, and individual believers have to deal with it.  
The important point for my project is not that the verse appears in double-brackets 
with a microscopic text-critical apparatus in a footnote; the point is that the verse is there. 
In red-letter Bibles, the verse appears in red letters. The anguished cry, “Father, forgive 
them; they don’t know what they are doing” (uttered in Aramaic and subtitled in English) 
is the centerpiece of the bloody crucifixion scene in Mel Gibson’s “The Passion of the 
Christ.”550 The verse is considered by many to be an awe-inspiring, and crucial 
instruction on how to live a perfect Christian life in the imitation of Christ. Textual 
authenticity has little bearing on the use of this verse in today’s culture to encourage 
victims of violence or other offenses to forgive perpetrators without bound. For most 
contemporary readers, the model of unconditional forgiveness on the cross supersedes 
any text-critical concerns. 
                                                
550 Timothy K. Beal and Tod Linafelt, Mel Gibson’s Bible: Religion, Popular Culture, 
and “The Passion of the Christ” (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 
202. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
THE FUTURE OF FORGIVENESS 
In the United States, restorative justice is receiving new attention thanks in part to a 
recent feature in the New York Times Magazine, appearing under the headline, “Can 
Forgiveness Play a Role in Criminal Justice?”551 After Ann Grosmaire, 19, was shot and 
killed during an argument by her boyfriend, Conor McBride, also 19, her parents chose to 
engage in victim-offender mediation with McBride. The article embraces the restorative 
justice rhetoric of an idealized forgiveness, especially the notion of forgiveness-as-
healing: “The [parents] said they didn’t forgive Conor for his sake but for their own.”552 
That forgiveness extended into influence over the prosecuting attorney and resulted in a 
somewhat lighter sentence for McBride. According to the article, restorative justice—
packaged as forgiveness—gets the credit for allowing the girl’s parents to move forward. 
While in this case McBride is repentant and expresses remorse, nowhere does the article 
indicate that this is a requirement for the restorative justice process or the parents’ 
forgiveness. 
In 2008 in South Africa’s North West Province, Alex Ndlovu, a black squatter-camp 
resident, survived being shot in the shoulder while he was cleaning up his yard. Four 
other black South Africans were killed in the shooting spree, including a three-month old 
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child. Later, white South African teenager Johan Nel was sentenced to 169 years for the 
racially motivated attack. 
Recently, reporters asked Ndlovu to respond to the call for forgiveness from the 
mayor of his community. “I find it very difficult to forgive someone who went out to kill 
us for no reason at all,” Ndlovu responded. “Even during his court appearances, he would 
look at us and smirk. That made me very angry.”553  
Nearly twenty years after the end of apartheid and the opening of South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, racial violence and calls for forgiveness continue 
to make headlines. Forgiveness has not brought an end to all racial conflict in South 
Africa, nor does it come easy to victims of continued violence. Moreover, the systemic 
racism many South Africans hoped the TRC would address only continues. Millions of 
black and coloured South Africans continue to live in abject poverty in townships and 
improvised housing—including Ndlovu—even so many years after the TRC was declared 
a success and forgiveness heralded as a vehicle for change. 
Another recent publication calls attention to the role of forgiveness in cases of 
domestic abuse.554 Jill Filipovich warns against turning the focus to the victim to forgive 
the offender rather than to the offender to cease his abusive behavior. She writes, “While 
most people profess disgust at domestic violence, in reality, abuse victims are often 
pressured to work on the relationship or told they must have done something to provoke 
                                                
553 Mogomotsi Selebi, “It’s Not Easy to Forgive,” Sowetan Live (January 8, 2013), 
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2013/01/08/it-s-not-easy-to-forgive.  
554 Jill Filipovic, “Restorative Justice in Domestic Violence Cases Is Justice Denied,” The 
Guardian (January 12, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jan/12/restorative-justice-domestic-
violence.  
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the abuse.”555 Filipovich is critical of the McBride article and especially of how the issue 
of domestic abuse—McBride had been physically abusive of his girlfriend leading up to 
the murder—is dwarfed by that story’s celebration of forgiveness. She asks, “Does [the 
victim] have the support to get what she really needs – which is to get away from her 
abuser, and to have her community and her society take seriously acts of violence against 
her?” 
This dissertation makes a constructive contribution to that discussion. Each of the 
three cases under consideration here reveals a preference for an idealized version of 
forgiveness presented as a biblical imperative. Restorative justice advocates claim 
biblical warrant but promote unilateral, unconditional forgiveness to victims engaging in 
VOM practices. In post-apartheid South Africa, Desmond Tutu and the TRC—often cited 
as a grand achievement of restorative justice—also promoted a brand of forgiveness that 
began and ended with a change in the victim’s emotional disposition toward the crime. 
Such forgiveness is fastened to the future of the reconciled state, and victims are 
pressured to forgive and thus participate in the “new South Africa.” Pastoral caregivers 
also posit a version of forgiveness that claims both biblical and psychological 
foundations. Victims are pressed to imitate Christ on the cross and forgive their abusers 
even in the absence of repentance.  
As a result of these appropriations of forgiveness, victims may find themselves 
physically or emotionally vulnerable to those who injured them. Premature forgiveness 
(and reconciliation) can endanger victims. In restorative justice contexts, advocates claim 
to work on behalf of victims but neglect to consider the difficulty of promoting a 
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particular emotional response to victims, especially victims of violence. Restorative 
justice advocates—who are often legal professionals in positions of authority—might 
succeed in coaxing a forgiving response from a victim using moral or religious pressure. 
However, such forgiveness might come at the expense of the victim, whose emotional 
responses might change with the day or hour, and who may quickly regret succumbing to 
pressure to forgive. 
In Chapter 2, I present an alternative version of forgiveness that takes into account the 
seventy-times-seven instructions that advocates of restorative justice often cite as 
foundational. A more rigorous interpretation of these passages reveals a complex model 
of forgiveness that involves community rebuke and offender repentance before victims 
are expected to forgive. I challenge restorative justice proponents to consider the seventy-
times-seven material in the fullness of its biblical context and to incorporate calls for 
offender repentance alongside their forgiveness imperatives. Moreover, I call for a 
scaled-back model that relies on a bilateral process rather than idealized notions of 
unilateral and unconditional forgiveness. Presenting victims with a forgiveness 
imperative that includes such emotional and psychological feats can serve to derail their 
ability to deal with their experience. Suggesting that a failure to achieve this kind of 
forgiveness represents a moral or religious failure only makes things worse. 
Chapter 3 takes up similar questions in the context of post-apartheid South Africa. 
Through an analysis of the discourse around the end of apartheid and the TRC hearings, I 
show that Desmond Tutu and others also adopt an idealized version of forgiveness that 
while they claim comes from biblical sources, actually has its roots in psychological 
understandings. Tutu and others demonize negative emotions such as anger and 
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resentment, and victims are seduced with visions of unconditional forgiveness in which 
they contribute to the new, reconciled South Africa. By reading this discourse through the 
lens of the Lord’s Prayer, I show that Tutu and other commissioners adopt the prayer’s 
forgiveness imperative (“as we forgive”), but overlook the plea for forgiveness (“forgive 
us”) that should be interpreted as an expression of repentance. Offenders are not expected 
to repent or apologize for their crimes in order to receive amnesty, but the pressure to 
forgive is immense. I suggest that a national ethic based on a more balanced approach 
stands to be more successful in the long term. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 I consider forgiveness in the context of the pastoral care of 
victims of domestic violence. Here again, psychological understandings of forgiveness as 
unilateral and unconditional become conflated with biblical teachings. In this case, I offer 
a close reading of Jesus’ cry from the cross (Lk. 23:34a) to demonstrate how the biblical 
understanding of forgiveness provides an opening for victims not to forgive their abusers. 
Where some pastors advise women to imitate Christ on the cross by patiently enduring 
their suffering and forgiving their abusers, I argue that this text provides the opposite 
message. Here, Jesus prays for his abusers; he does not forgive them himself. Indeed, his 
teachings up to that point are consistent: forgiveness requires repentance, and some 
crimes are unforgivable. On the cross, either case might hold. Imitation of Christ might 
involve praying for one’s abuser, but need not require forgiving or reconciling with an 
unrepentant partner. This reading offers victims a way to remain faithful while also 
remaining safe. 
Together, these case studies highlight the tendency to idealize forgiveness and the 
negative impact that might have on victims of violence and other offense. I maintain that 
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the biblical text offers strict guidelines for a kind of forgiveness that requires 
participation from both the victim and the offender. As such, forgiveness may flourish as 
a mode of community cohesion or relationship repair. In these pages I do not mean to 
suggest that forgiveness be abandoned. Quite the contrary; I challenge advocates to work 
toward a more thoroughgoing understanding of forgiveness, especially when they claim 
biblical mandate. Forgiveness more accurately understood provides opportunities for 
victims and offenders to repair relationships, or for victims to move forward without guilt 
or pressure when the conditions for forgiveness are not forthcoming. 
The concept of forgiveness, lifted from the biblical text and conflated with pop-
psychological understandings, is often idealized and laden with emotional freight. When 
people ask what I am writing about, I give a simple answer: “Forgiveness.” This usually 
elicits very positive, even awe-filled responses. “That’s amazing,” some say. Or, “Oh, 
that’s wonderful! The world needs more forgiveness.” These conversations may be my 
best evidence for how forgiveness has taken on a life of its own where general 
perceptions are concerned. On this point, David Konstan observes: 
That the demand to grant forgiveness may be coercive, the preconditions for 
eliciting it may be faked, its efficacy in assuaging rage may be overestimated, 
and, finally, the very concept may depend on assumptions that are philosophically 
incoherent—all this is reasonably well-known, and points to the possibility that 
we are dealing here with a notion that serves a particular ideological function in 
today’s world.556 
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Biblical scholars in particular might take his words as a warning, as it is often the biblical 
account of forgiveness that is cited as the foundation of the most idealized versions. 
Forgiveness, understood in religious or secular contexts, has enormous potential for 
binding communities and restoring relationships, but stands to be harmful when presented 
to victims as a moral or religious obligation. In everyday reality, forgiveness is an 
ongoing and even mundane process: I am late for lunch and you say it’s okay; you step 
on my toe and I say, no problem; we trade harsh words but later resolve our differences. 
As the stakes get higher, though, forgiveness involves more effort and more risk. I 
present the biblical text as a way of navigating this terrain. I do not dare to say when 
forgiveness is possible and when it is not.  
The basic argument of this dissertation is that forgiveness has limits, and our 
relationships are strengthened and guarded when we understand what those limits are. 
These boundaries are reflected in the biblical instructions, and victims may be morally 
and religiously correct in refusing to embrace forgiveness in some cases. Properly 
questioned and carefully negotiated, forgiveness stands to resolve differences and secure 
a better future than what came before. Imposed on victims who already suffer, however, 
it becomes but another burden with its emotional demands and promise to restore toxic—
or even dangerous—relationships. It is the task of the believer to determine the 
difference. 
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